MIKE SCRAFTON. Hunting for the reason-The new frigates.

In line with normal practise, the government has plenty to say about the economic and employment benefits to flow from the acquisition of the new Hunter class frigates and a little bit about what they can do. But offers nothing about the strategic justification for these expensive naval assets. That doesn’t mean there isn’t a strategic justification. However, the public should be entitled to hear the government’s full explanation of the priority of this capability. 

The 2016 Defence White Paper stated that the nine new future frigates will be ‘optimised for anti-submarine warfare’. According to the Prime Minister, they will ‘one of the world’s most advanced anti-submarine warfare frigates’. It stands to reason, hopefully, that for $35 billion the government is addressing a serious submarine threat to Australia. 

There has been a significant increase in interest in submarine acquisition in Southeast Asia. Vietnam has purchased six Kilo-class submarines from Russia. Indonesia is adding three Korean built submarines to its inventory of two upgraded Type 209 Cakra class. Two German-built submarines have been ordered to supplement Singapore’s existing fleet of four. Thailand will buy three Chinese Yuan-class and Myanmar has indicated an interest in gaining a submarine capability. Malaysia has long-term plans to double its current submarine numbers to four by 2040.

The 2017 White Paper predicts that ‘Within the broader Indo-Pacific region, in the next two decades, half of the world’s submarines will be operating in the region’ and ‘By 2020 China’s submarine force is likely to grow to more than 70 submarines’. India currently operates 14 submarines. This is likely the real strategic issue.

Sound practise in force structuring is not to rely on being able to guess the future intentions of neighbouring states—circumstances and politics change and over time and allies can become friends and vice versa—but to look at the possible forces that could be arrayed against national interests. Taking a narrow view and just focussing on the burgeoning interest in submarines in Australia’s near region, it is easy to appreciate that a threat from submarines is not totally negligible. 

But given the additional factor of constrained resources, governments have to allocate a priority to confronting the submarine threat relative to other strategic challenges. In addition, within that constraint, a decision is required on how much anti-submarine warfare capability is enough. Does the regional threat warrant the very expensive ‘world’s most advanced anti-submarine warfare frigates’? 

This is a difficult question to answer from outside the Russell complex. Anti-submarine warfare is a complex and evolving business. A highly classified cat and mouse game where submariners and surface antagonists are constantly trying out better measures and countermeasures. A contest which takes place in a hostile and unforgiving environment. 

Sonar technology is divided into two areas—the ‘wet end’ and the ‘dry end’. The wet end research is based on acoustics and oceanography. The effectiveness of sonar depends on understanding the unique physical, chemical, and biological signature of the body of water in which the sensor is being operated. Aside from scientific expertise in geophysics and oceanography, underwater acoustics confront a host of practical issues. Including how to detect and distinguish that target signature amid natural noise from wind, waves, ship engines, strumming cables and from sound scattered from other distant objects. 

Increasingly sophisticated dry end processing employs digital technology, statistical programs and now artificial intelligence to try to surmount these challenges. Standard signal-processing techniques such as beamforming, spectral analysis, and statistical analysis determine the probability of achieving a target detection or identifying a false alarm.

 Developments in unmanned underwater vehicles for military applications, while currently immature, promise to disrupt current operational and tactical approaches to undersea warfare. China, Russia, and the US are all pursuing this technology. 

These are bodies of technical expertise essential to effectively operating submarines but they require decades in which to build up a national capability. Submarines also require a professional well-trained service to operate them and maintenance arrangements. Apart from Singapore, no Southeast Asian nation is likely to be able to mount a potent submarine force for a long while. 

So, the government’s decision to spend $35 billion over the coming decade to build the Hunter class fleet raises a question. Is this level of capability commensurate with the regional threat? 

The P-A8 Poseidon, as the Prime Minister announced, ‘has been designed by the US Navy to dominate in Anti-Submarine Warfare.’ The $50 billion future submarine project can, according to the White paper, also make ‘a meaningful contribution to anti-submarine warfare operations in our region’. On balance, the overall anti-submarine warfare capability provided by the Hunter class, the P-A8s, and the future submarine force seems disproportionate to the regional threat. 

On the other hand, all this capability could be intended for the South China Sea. Though, the differences between optimising the anti-submarine capability to operate in the cold deep waters off China in contrast with the warm shallow waters of the Australian littoral would presumably be a far from cost-effective outcome for the Defence dollar. If that is the intent, then Australians have been misled. 

The overemphasis on interoperability with the US contained in almost all government equipment announcements might indicate that the real object of investment approaching $100 billion is to be ready for Australia to sail in tandem with the US into the South China Sea if a conflict breaks out. 

There may be a strategic justification for diverting investment into this capability and away from national infrastructure or provision health or education services. Rather than trying to placate the Australian public with reassuring words about borders and search and rescue, and endlessly reiterating meaningless simplistic slogans about security, the government should say if there is a tacit understanding in Canberra and/or an informal commitment to Washington to automatically side with the US in an East Asian conflict. 

Mike Scrafton is a former senior Defence executive, former CEO of a state statutory body, and former chief of staff and ministerial adviser to the minister for defence.

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6 Responses to MIKE SCRAFTON. Hunting for the reason-The new frigates.

  1. Nick Deane says:

    I agree that Australia is being misled.
    A simple Google search shows that the main trade routes between this country and China, Japan and South Korea all pass to the East of the Philippines and not through the South China Sea. This means that the SCS is of limited strategic significance to Australia.
    If the new frigates are intended for a future conflict over the SCS, they will be serving US interests, not Australia’s.

  2. Simon Warriner says:

    Any decision that involves the “United” Stated of America must logically hinge on those states remaining “United”. This simple dairy farm worker finds that difficult to accept as a long term prospect given the internal political ructions currently being formented and experienced in the USA body politic. Just because our tame, indeed cowed, media does not report the extent of the internal discord does not mean it doesn’t exist. The alternate media is full of it.

    A civil or indeed very uncivil war in the USA is a very real possibility and in that instance where does that leave Australian defense force posture assumptions? Up shit creek in a barbed wire boat without a paddle would seem to be the answer, and our China based economy would be somewhere underneath the boat.

    We need better leadership, and not from people whose acceptance of conflicted interest speaks volumes about their unsuitability for responsible leadership.

  3. David Maxwell Gray says:

    Australia has now enacted some very big-ticket military hardware purchases: this $35 billion for the Hunter class fleet; $30 billion for the P-8A Poseidon; $50 billion for the future submarines. Outside the naval, and relevance to submarines, orientation, we still have the joint strike fighters at a very big multi-billion price ticket.

    What is all this about? Why is there very little public discussion about all this defence largesse, particularly in an era of supposed budgetary tightness?

    What are the specific needs addressed by these bits of hardware, and their concomitant very large expenditures to properly use and maintain them?

    On a particular point: there are alternatives for anti-submarine defensive capabilities which are apparently not canvassed, at least publicly, such as those built around autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV) and other unmanned sonar detection devices. A network of such devices could complement and substitute at least partly for the very expensive hardware mentioned above, and make what we do get more effective. We could even build substantial local expertise in this form of anti-submarine defence.

    As a member of what I took to be a democracy, not an autocracy, I fail to be convinced that properly integrated decisions, based on a more realistic assessment of threats and our possible actions against such threats, are being made. Our strategic decisions, and the hardware purchases which arise from them, should balance any perceived threats from the rise of China, with its major role as Australia’s major customer. We must as a sovereign nation get on with China and all our near neighbours, and not over-estimate the malevolence of their future plans and intentions. Such over-estimates are ridiculously expensive – and probably foolish.

    For a tiny fraction of these hardware expenditures, Australia could develop an independent cadre of cultural and military analysts with Asian language skills to better understand and advise about our neighbours, so as potentially to reduce the “jumping at shadows” phenomenon, so clearly evident in recent political decisions about security. Such people exist within the military, the foreign diplomatic service, academia and think-tanks, but in insufficient numbers, and without the specific remit required to influence the integrated decisions required for these huge and vital expenditures.

  4. Malcolm says:

    Simply put – we can’t ignore China’s growing naval capabilities, which include increasingly potent submarine forces. Nor can we ignore China’s expanding presence from within the first island chain, out to the second island chain, and then beyond, into the Indian Ocean, and potentially in the future, into the South Pacific. Force structure choices have to take into account the strategic outlook, and that’s very uncertain indeed. You can’t plan on the least risk / best case scenario.

    • Mike Scrafton says:

      You are correct – “You can’t plan on the least risk / best case scenario”. I didn’t say Australia should.
      But if Australia is spending $100 billion plus on the basis that it is preparing to take Australia into a high end conflict in East Asia, the consequences of which could not just be globally catastrophic but bring physical destruction and death to Australia itself, that is something the citizens of a democratic nation should have a say upon.

  5. Nigel Drake says:

    My cynical nature leads me to the conclusion that, since the technologies of these most recent military acquisitions are likely to become redundant before the orders are actually completed, the primary purpose is that of shifting a large slice of the nation’s wealth into the pockets of the arms manufacturers.
    A “Game of Mates”.

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