Writer
Jon Stanford
<div id="qt"> <div><span class="font"><span class="size">Formerly Jon Stanford was a division head in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, a Partner in Deloitte Economics and a founding Director of Insight Economics.</span></span></div> <div></div> </div>
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Bewilderingly unsophisticated: ASPI deputy director fires up China threat megaphone
Alex Bristow’s recent piece on China (“Don’t sidestep the China problem in public debate on defence”, Australian Financial Review, 14 February) demonstrates the extent to which the Australian Strategic Policy Institute has become a cheerleader for the US military-industrial complex. Continue reading »
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Covert forces and the overthrow of Edward Gough Whitlam: The series
The dismissal of Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam by Queen Elizabeth’s Vice-Regal representative, Sir John Kerr, was an extraordinary event. For almost fifty years a debate has raged about why the Governor-General took the unprecedented action he did on 11 November 1975. This five-part series puts a spotlight on the on the external events that Continue reading »
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Australia sleepwalking into catastrophic conflict with China
Gareth Evans’ review of Australia’s strategic relationship with the United States (“Why Australia can’t rely on the US to save it from China,” 12 December) provides a timely wake-up call on the dangers of Australia sleepwalking into what would be a catastrophic conflict with China. Continue reading »
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Covert forces and the overthrow of Edward Gough Whitlam: The Series
The dismissal of Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam by Queen Elizabeth’s Vice-Regal representative, Sir John Kerr, was an extraordinary event. For almost fifty years a debate has raged about why the Governor-General took the unprecedented action he did on 11 November 1975. This five-part series puts a spotlight on the on the external events that Continue reading »
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The Overthrow of Edward Gough Whitlam: A stain on Australia’s democracy – finale
“Gough Whitlam was an Australian democrat. He passionately believed in our institutions; the supremacy of parliament, the independence and integrity of the judiciary and the separation of powers to curb possible abuses by the executive government. In the dismissal these institutions failed us. Those with responsibility deceived us. Tradition and conventions built over centuries were Continue reading »
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Whitlam’s overthrow: Queen’s Gambit to checkmate. Part 5
“Well, how about a call from the CIA to MI6 saying we have a security problem in Australia? More than one call. Dozens of calls. We have a security problem with the Prime Minister. He’s endangering national security for the United States and the Alliance. The evidence is he is making noises about our bases, Continue reading »
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Spooky fiddling: The CIA playbook and the overthrow of Whitlam. Part 4
In a telephone conversation between Kissinger and Nixon following the 1973 military coup d’état in Chile, the President asked if “our hand” showed in the overthrow and death of the democratically elected President Allende. Kissinger explained that “we didn’t do it”, in terms of direct participation in the military actions. “I mean we helped them”, Continue reading »
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Cold War imperatives: Whitlam and the US National Security Council. Part 3
In July 1975, Malcolm Fraser spoke to US Ambassador Marshall Green about the Labor government’s alleged “desire for a ‘non-aligned position in world affairs’”. In fact, he added, ‘Whitlam and others may be trying to cause the US to take the lead in abandoning ANZUS’.” Continue reading »
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Stress testing the US alliance: Whitlam and the secrets of Pine Gap. Part 2
When Marshall Green, a very senior official in the State Department, was appointed as Ambassador to Australia in early 1973, President Nixon’s briefing regarding the relationship with Whitlam was succinct and on point: “Marshall, I can’t stand that cunt”. Green later reflected this was “a strange kind of parting instruction to get from your president”. Continue reading »
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“Shame Fraser, shame”: The overthrow of Edward Gough Whitlam. Part 1
When offered the position of Governor-General by Prime Minister Whitlam in 1974, Sir John Kerr consulted friends and colleagues as to whether he should accept the appointment. One of them, Justice Robert Hope, queried why he would take such “a dead-end job, a hopeless job.” Kerr’s response was: “Oh, no, it’s a very powerful position. Continue reading »
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SSNs for the RAN: A response to Brian Toohey
Brian Toohey (Pearls and Irritations, 14 February 2023) makes a number of criticisms of the recent four-part series on national security by Michael Keating and myself that was published in Pearls and Irritations earlier this month. He contends that we have made “assertions that should not go unchallenged”, particularly in regard to our support for Continue reading »
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A sovereign SSN capability and Australia’s national security strategy
There is no way that the UK or the US would ever contemplate surrendering sovereignty over the control of its military operations to any other power. Australia should not either. If Australia is to acquire a fleet of SSNs, the government needs to negotiate an agreement that avoids counter-productive short cuts and ensures sovereign control Continue reading »
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Hard power and Australia’s national security strategy
The previous two parts in this series addressed soft power and Australia’s alliances respectively. The focus of Part 3 is hard power and a discussion of self-reliance and Australia’s evolving military strategy. Continue reading »
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The role of alliances in Australia’s national security strategy
While alliances and treaties offer some protection against an aggressor, they cannot be counted upon. Australia needs to maintain an independent military capability to deter possible future threats to our independence – not least because we cannot rely on the US in all possible future circumstances. Continue reading »
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Australia’s National Security Strategy
To paraphrase former US President, Theodore Roosevelt, Australia’s national security is best achieved by talking softly while carrying a formidable stick as a deterrent. Continue reading »
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The AUKUS pact: ‘If you want peace, prepare for war’
Australia’s nuclear-power submarines will greatly enhance Australia’s ability to provide for its own self-reliant defence. Nevertheless, the new strategic approach confronts us with a number of almighty challenges. Continue reading »
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Why is Australia still investing in a balanced defence force?
When the Prime Minister recently compared Australia’s strategic situation to that in 1939, he was right in two respects. Both in 1939 and in 2021, we have put too much trust in a ‘great and powerful friend’ to secure our independence. Australia’s problem is a Defence department that, simply put, lacks foresight, resourcefulness and innovation. Continue reading »
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Vale Gary Johnston, founder and sponsor of the Submarines for Australia group
Gary Johnston sadly died after a short illness on 10 March 2021. Gary was the founder of the Submarines for Australia website and the generous sponsor of the associated research, submissions and reports published on the site. Continue reading »
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The smart money is that in defending Australia we will be on our own. Part 3
The government’s recent Defence Strategic Update suggests Australia faces the greatest threat to our independence since 1942. In this final article of three, I consider the need for a Review, both to design a new Australian military strategy and analyse the essential elements of the new force structure that this will require. Continue reading »
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Part 2. Australia’s Defence Strategy: built-in resistance to change
The government’s Defence Strategic Update suggests Australia faces the greatest threat to our independence since 1942. This demands a sophisticated diplomatic strategy, the development of a sound military strategy and the careful analysis of how to deliver an appropriate force structure so as to address the threat in an acceptable timeframe. Continue reading »
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Sharp-edged but sophisticated diplomacy needs to underpin our defence strategy Part 1
The government’s recent Defence Strategic Update suggests Australia faces the greatest threat to our independence since 1942. This demands a sophisticated diplomatic strategy, the development of a sound military strategy to deter an attack by a great power and careful analysis of how to design the right force structure to deliver it. This first article Continue reading »
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What should Australian submarines do? – Response to Brian Toohey
Brian Toohey’s challenging post (19 October) concerns what we want our submarines to do. In light of the recent Defence Strategic Update, the ADF needs to build a force capable of deterring an attack by a major power. Continue reading »
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JON STANFORD. A Response to Michael McKinley on Future Submarines
In a series of five pieces in Pearls and Irritations last week, Dr Michael McKinley cites the recent report by Submarines for Australia at some length. While I acknowledge some of Dr McKinley’s concerns about our approach, it is not clear to me what he is proposing in its place. But insofar as I understand Continue reading »
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JON STANFORD: Second rate leadership: Future Submarine Part 4 of 4
I have suggested that recent governments have failed to provide leadership in the defence portfolio. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the case of SEA 1000, the future submarine program. Continue reading »
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JON STANFORD: Second rate leadership: Future Submarine Part 3 of 4
I have suggested in earlier posts that recent governments have failed to provide leadership in the defence portfolio. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the case of SEA 1000, the future submarine program. Continue reading »
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JON STANFORD: Second rate leadership Part 2 of 4: Defence
“Australia is now a confident, wealthy nation that has the right to expect its leaders to rise above the second rate.” Continue reading »
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Second rate leadership. Part 1 of 4
Australia is now a confident, wealthy nation that has the right to expect its leaders to rise above the second rate. Continue reading »
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JON STANFORD. Comment on Mike Scrapton’s article ‘The casual talk of war’.
Isn’t it interesting that in the Prime Minister’s attempt yesterday to make us all very frightened indeed about the national security threats that a Labor government would expose us to — ranging from hordes of asylum seekers at the gates, including paedophiles and murderers in their ranks, to increased domestic violence against women — he Continue reading »
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JON STANFORD. The Future Submarine: Time for a Review
One year ago, Insight Economics, sponsored by Sydney businessman Gary Johnston, published a comprehensive, independent report on the future submarine (FSM) acquisition. Launched at the National Press Club by Professor Hugh White and Dr Michael Keating, the report highlighted the excessive cost of the FSM; its unacceptable delivery timetable leading to a dangerous capability gap; Continue reading »
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JON STANFORD. Australia’s Future Submarine. Part 3 of 3. Responding to the criticisms
At the National Press Club in Canberra on 27 September 2017, Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the ANU, launched an independent report by Insight Economics on Australia’s future submarine (FSM). The report, Australia’s Future Submarine: Getting This Key Capability Right, was commissioned by Gary Johnston, a Sydney businessman and owner of the website, Continue reading »
