Work culture, not One-Child Policy, stalls births

May 31, 2026

Yi Fuxian’s analysis of China’s demographic crisis relies on flawed comparisons and standard neoliberal blind spots. Comparing China’s 49-hour enterprise work week to OECD averages is comparing apples to oranges. OECD figures include casual and part-time labour which artificially depress their averages, whereas Chinese data focuses on full-time enterprise employees.

More importantly, blaming the One-Child Policy ignores the broader East Asian reality. South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan all share ultra-low fertility without ever experiencing a one-child mandate.

The root of the issue has little to do with the author’s macroeconomic complaints and everything to do with a hyper-competitive educational system and corporate culture. When young workers are utterly drained by intense workplace competition (neijuan), they simply lack the time and energy to date, let alone contemplate starting a family. A portion of China’s young people choose to do the bare minimum to get by.

Beijing’s current focus on de-commodifying the structural costs of living – such as popping the housing bubble, making childbirth free, and capping tutoring expenses – shows an understanding of this reality. The genuine hurdle is enforcing a decent work-life balance, not the western neoliberal economic fixes proposed by the author.