In the second of a two-part series, the focus turns to nuclear stewardship. AUKUS would leave Australia responsible for weapons-grade uranium throughout the submarine lifecycle, while lower-enriched alternatives may offer a safer and more sovereign path.

While the government has shrugged off strategic, operational and delivery problems around AUKUS Pillar One, it will find it much more difficult to ignore a more practical issue that is now emerging.

Scott Morrison stated Australia would not need a nuclear industry to sustain British or US SSNs because they never needed refuelling. While these submarines’ reactors contain sufficient fuel to be sealed for life, however, this is a two-edged sword. Alone among the world’s navies, they use uranium enriched to the weapons-grade level of 93–97 per cent. Managing highly enriched uranium (HEU) through its life cycle represents a challenging and hazardous industrial endeavour that would pose potentially insuperable problems for Australia.

While importing the reactor core for SSN AUKUS, which will contain enough fissile material to produce up to 25 nuclear warheads, is permitted under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, safeguarding its HEU in transit and storage raises significant security issues. In the UK such cores are transported only for short distances under armed guard. Shipping them to Australia carries the risk of interdiction, while storing them for installation in the submarines would require ASC’s shipyard in Adelaide to become a military exclusion zone.

In the absence of an unforeseen event, there are no particular safety risks associated with sealed reactors during submarine maintenance. Managing a major industrial accident or fire affecting a live HEU reactor, however, would be a difficult and hazardous task, with community safety potentially at risk. This is particularly true in Adelaide, where the possibility of a major seismic shock is higher than in any other Australian capital city. Australia would need to maintain the highly specialised capability needed to address such emergencies.

The major difficulty would be managing the spent fuel at the end of the submarine’s life. As Peter Briggs writes, “under AUKUS agreements and the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Act 2024, Australia must permanently dispose of all spent HEU fuel domestically without a return provision to the US or UK. Across eight planned submarines, this creates a sovereign liability of over three tonnes of weapons-usable U-235 embedded in spent fuel that requires isolation for millennia.”

To manage the disposal of their unwanted weapons-grade HEU material, whether in nuclear warheads or naval reactors, the US and UK have constructed maximum security facilities, such as at Sellafield in the UK. Australia would again need to develop the specialist capabilities found in great powers’ nuclear weapons industries to manage such facilities.

By contrast, managing a low-enriched uranium (LEU) reactor is an entirely different proposition that lies within Australia’s existing skill set. ANSTO’s LEU reactor at Lucas Heights is regularly refuelled and managed in accordance with international protocols throughout its life cycle. With support from the SSN’s parent nation, Australia could readily provide effective stewardship of an LEU submarine reactor.

Australia is the only G20 nation to place a legislative ban on civil nuclear power. Once the community understands the risks involved in managing weapons-grade HEU throughout its life cycle, it seems highly unlikely that the government will gain a social licence for AUKUS Pillar One. This is particularly the case when there are LEU submarine options potentially available from France and Korea. Not only would their strategic deployments always be under Australia’s sovereign control, but they would also be better suited to Australia’s operational requirements and industrial capability.

Unlike Australia, South Korea (ROK) followed a carefully conceived strategy in pursuit of its planned SSN acquisition. As described by the Sejong Institute, they adopted “four principles: a non-nuclear-armed SSN; LEU below 20 per cent; prior consultation with the IAEA; and consistency with the ROK-US alliance”. As well as addressing concerns in neighbouring countries regarding proliferation, these principles were directed to securing US agreement to the ROK acquiring an SSN capability without ceding strategic and operational control.

Although the ROK will need access to critical US intelligence networks to operate effectively as part of the allied submarine force in the Indo-Pacific, it is otherwise pursuing a more independent path. South Korea is experienced both in submarine and reactor design and construction. Nevertheless, it will need considerable technical assistance with its first class of SSN in refining and integrating systems and minimising acoustic signature. To this end, the ROK has concluded a mutually beneficial strategic partnership with France, which has deep experience in LEU submarine propulsion systems.

For Australia, cancelling AUKUS Pillar One would provide the opportunity for a strategic reset. Five years in, AUKUS looks increasingly like a sub-imperial anachronism. It is now clear Australia cannot rely on the US for its defence or to provide ongoing strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific. Britain can no longer project credible force ’east of Suez’, while Australia’s return to acquiring British warships and submarines after half a century has been a costly disaster.

Although the French Suffren is an affordable, in-production SSN that would suit the RAN well, partnering South Korea in its program to acquire an SSN capability within the US alliance would offer considerable strategic and industrial advantages. Alongside the frigate program with Japan, acquiring an SSN from ROK would allow Australian industry to benefit from both nations’ outstanding shipbuilding capabilities and participate more extensively in Indo-Pacific supply chains.

Most importantly, Australia would finally commit to seeking its security in Asia rather than from it.

Read Part 1 of this series

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.