Israeli voters are choosing between competing approaches to war and security, while Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank continue to bear the consequences.

Three years after Israel’s genocide war on the Gaza Strip, Israel’s elections scheduled for 27 October are approaching. These elections carry particular significance, not only because they are the first since 7 October 2023, but also because they come amid a prolonged war that has spread across multiple fronts and reshaped the political and security landscape inside Israel and across the region.

Over the past three years, Israel has opened fronts in Gaza, the West Bank, southern Lebanon, Iran, Yemen, Iraq and Qatar, targeted sites in several countries, and targeted dozens of leaders from various states and organisations.

In return, Israel has paid a heavy military, economic and political price. Thousands of soldiers have been killed, while the country has faced significant military and economic strain and a major decline in its international standing. At the same time, political, social and religious polarisation has intensified within Israeli society. Crises have also emerged around the military, reserve forces and weapons stockpiles, alongside growing international calls and pressure to limit arms supplies to Israel.

Amid this complex regional situation, the Israeli elections have emerged as a major turning point that could determine not only Benjamin Netanyahu’s political future, but also the shape of the war and Israeli policy toward Palestinians and the wider region in the coming years.

Netanyahu and the decisive election

For current Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, these elections appear decisive. He is not only fighting to retain his position and form a new government, but also waging a political battle over his legacy since 7 October and his responsibility for the greatest blow Israel has suffered in its history, which plunged the entity into an existential crisis.

At the same time, the opposition is seeking to hold him politically responsible for the failures of 7 October, the management of the war, the issue of Israeli captives, and the military and economic strain Israel has endured over the past three years.

Each side is therefore using its electoral cards to win over Israeli voters. But the war itself has become one of the most important of these cards, and perhaps the most influential, because security remains central to the thinking of Israeli voters.

War as an electoral tool

Israeli decisions related to the war cannot be separated from domestic political calculations. Every military operation, every announcement about targeting a leader or taking control of an area, and every claim about defeating Hamas or restoring deterrence can become political material inside Israel, presented to the public as a security achievement.

This is one of the key paradoxes of the upcoming elections.

For Netanyahu and the Israeli right, it is not enough for the war to continue. It must also appear to be a war producing results. Military escalation can therefore become a means of creating a political image of strength, control and deterrence, particularly as the elections approach.

This does not necessarily mean that every Israeli military decision was made for electoral purposes. Rather, it means that electoral calculations have become part of the political environment in which decisions about war, peace and negotiations are made.

This issue becomes even more significant as the elections approach, particularly if opinion polls show Netanyahu’s bloc losing ground or failing to secure a parliamentary majority.

The latest Israeli opinion polls tracked by outlets and institutions such as Israel2026, Haaretz, The Jerusalem Post, Globes and The Economist indicate that Netanyahu’s bloc are on course for between 50 and 53 seats, compared with 55 to 59 seats for the Israeli opposition. According to The Economist’s average updated on 7 September, Netanyahu’s bloc will win around 51 seats compared with 67 for the opposition, including Arab parties, leaving Netanyahu below the 61-seat threshold required to form a government.

As a result, every seat and every percentage point could prove decisive, particularly with small parties running separately and some potentially failing to cross the electoral threshold, which would redistribute seats within the Knesset.

Netanyahu and the far right: an alliance of interests

The right-wing coalition leading the current government does not operate as a single political bloc, but it is united by shared interests involving the war, security control, settlement expansion and opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state.

This political system begins with Netanyahu’s decisions regarding the war, negotiations and relations with the United States, followed by Defence Minister Israel Katz’s decisions concerning military operations, and then the policies of ministers Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich in the West Bank, settlements and displacement.

There is a reciprocal relationship between Netanyahu and the most extreme elements of his government.

Netanyahu needs Ben Gvir and Smotrich to preserve his coalition, while they need Netanyahu to remain in power and implement parts of their political agenda.

Netanyahu therefore faces not only competition from the opposition, but also pressure from within his own camp, where far-right parties want him to adopt tougher positions toward Palestinians, Gaza and the West Bank.

This relationship has become particularly clear as the elections approach, with renewed calls within the Israeli right to remove Palestinians from the Gaza Strip and political plans being proposed for that purpose.

National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir proposed the ‘Disengagement 710’ plan to remove Palestinians from the Gaza Strip under the label of ‘voluntary migration’. The plan aims to have 250,000 Palestinians leave during its first year and around 1.86 million within seven years. He also called for the establishment of a Ministry of Migration in the next government to implement the plan, according to The Guardian.

Defence Minister Israel Katz, for his part, said that “there is no real solution for Gaza in the end without this migration”, adding that Israel is “fully prepared to get them out” by sea, air and every possible means, according to The Guardian, which quoted his remarks at a conference organised by Ynet and Yedioth Ahronoth.

Gaza and the West Bank in electoral politics

Netanyahu views the Gaza Strip as the weakest link in the region and sees continued military pressure there as an opportunity to project an image of achievement ahead of the elections.

Israel can present the continuation of military operations and control over parts of Gaza as evidence that it has not abandoned its war objectives and continues to seek to defeat Hamas and impose security control over the Strip.

The problem, however, is that these objectives have not been fully achieved, while the war continues, along with the killing of Palestinians and the destruction of Gaza.

In the West Bank, the occupation takes a different form. While Gaza is framed in Israeli discourse primarily as a security and military issue, the West Bank has become a space for implementing the settlement, annexation and expansion of Israeli control over the land.

Smotrich continues to push for settlement expansion and channel budgets into the settlement project, while Ben Gvir continues to incite settlers and police against Palestinians, alongside his policies concerning refugee camps, UNRWA facilities and Al-Aqsa Mosque.

During the first half of 2026, the West Bank witnessed widespread escalation. The Wall and Settlement Resistance Commission documented 11,074 attacks carried out by the occupation army and settlers, alongside the killing of 25 Palestinians by settlers, the seizure of more than 4,379 dunams of land, the uprooting or destruction of more than 45,000 trees, and the demolition of 740 structures.

This coincided with accelerated settlement expansion. The occupation authorities approved 34 new settlements during the first half of 2026, bringing the number approved by the current government to 103, while settlers established 42 new settlement outposts. The Wall and Settlement Resistance Commission and the National Bureau for Defending Land and Resisting Settlement confirm that the Israeli government has allocated large sums to support settlements, build roads, develop infrastructure and provide security, including hundreds of millions of shekels.

Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank have therefore become part of two different electoral equations. In Gaza, the war is used to demonstrate military and security strength. In the West Bank, settlement expansion, annexation and displacement are used to appeal to the hardline right-wing and religious electorate.

Israeli voters: security first

To understand the relationship between elections and war, it is necessary to look at Israeli voters themselves.

Netanyahu does not address the public only through the language of war. He also speaks to them through fear of the future, fear of Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah, and fear of another 7 October.

This allows Netanyahu to present himself as the politician capable of protecting Israel, even when he faces criticism over his government’s failures.

The central question is not simply: do Israelis want the war to continue? It is: which politician do they believe is best able to manage the war and protect them?

This gives Netanyahu a political opportunity even when his personal popularity or government faces criticism. The electoral contest may not be between those who want war and those who want peace, but between those presenting themselves as best equipped to manage the war and security threats.

What if the war ends?

This is one of the most sensitive issues for Netanyahu.

As long as the war continues, Israeli debate remains largely focused on security, military operations, captives and regional threats.

But the end of the war could open the door to a very different question:

Who is responsible for everything that happened?

That could lead to demands for wide-ranging investigations into the failures of 7 October, the performance of the military and security agencies, the government’s management of the war, the captive issue, and the scale of the military and economic losses.

The elections are therefore not only a battle over who will govern Israel in the future. They are also a battle over who will pay the political price for the past three years.

This helps explain the political significance of the war’s continuation for Netanyahu, without assuming that the war began or continues solely to keep him in power.

What awaits Netanyahu if he loses?

If Netanyahu loses the elections, he could face a completely different political phase.

He may face demands to hold him accountable for the catastrophic failure of 7 October, the management of the war, the captive issue, military and economic exhaustion, Israel’s declining international standing, as well as the old corruption cases that continue to follow him.

For Netanyahu, therefore, losing the election would mean more than moving from the prime minister’s office to the opposition. It could mark the beginning of a long period of political and legal reckoning.

Israeli opposition: an alternative to Netanyahu or an alternative to policy?

The Israeli opposition appears stronger than before in some polls, but it still faces a fundamental problem: its ability to form a united and viable governing coalition.

There is another, more important question: does the opposition actually offer a fundamental alternative to Netanyahu’s policies toward Palestinians?

Much of the Israeli opposition does not necessarily advocate a fundamentally different policy toward Gaza or the West Bank. Instead, it proposes a different way of managing the war, foreign relations and Israel’s international image.

This makes the elections less straightforward than they may appear.

The real competition may be between two camps that differ over how Israel manages the war and occupation, rather than between one camp seeking to end Israeli control over Palestinians and another seeking to maintain it.

This means that Netanyahu’s defeat, by itself, does not guarantee an end to the war or a fundamental change in Israeli policy toward Palestinians.

What awaits the region?

At the regional level, the Israeli elections are viewed as a turning point that could affect issues extending beyond Israel and Palestine.

The election result could affect the future of the war in Gaza, Israeli-Egyptian relations, relations with Turkey, the Iranian file, the future of US understandings in the region, as well as developments in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

A Netanyahu victory could mean the continuation of the current approach toward Palestinians, the maintenance of an Israeli military presence in parts of Gaza, and continued settlement expansion and pressure on Palestinians in the West Bank.

It could also lead to continued tensions with Turkey, particularly as disagreements between the two sides have intensified in recent months.

On Iran, the next government could determine whether Israel continues its policy of direct confrontation or moves toward different arrangements with Washington and regional states.

Three scenarios after the elections

Israel’s future after the elections can be summarised in three main scenarios.

First: Netanyahu wins and manages to form a right-wing government. In this case, current policies toward Gaza and the West Bank are likely to continue, while the far right remains a key force in shaping the government and its policies.

Second: Netanyahu loses and an opposition government is formed. The way the war and international relations are managed could change, but Israel’s fundamental policy toward Palestinians may not necessarily change, particularly if former security and military figures remain the most influential voices.

Third: neither camp manages to form a stable government. This is a highly plausible scenario and could lead to new alliances involving Netanyahu and a combination of different parties. Such a government would likely be fragile and trigger a new political crisis, and possibly another election, while the war and regional crises continue.

Palestinian blood in the electoral equation

Amid this complex regional and political contradiction, Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank continue to suffer.

While Israeli politicians fight for voters’ support, Palestinians bear the consequences of military and political decisions on the ground.

Gaza becomes a space for demonstrating strength and deterrence, while the West Bank becomes a space for expanding settlements, annexation and displacement. At the same time, the Israeli right uses these policies to demonstrate its commitment to the goals of the war and appeal to the most hardline constituencies.

The issue, therefore, is not simply whether Netanyahu will lose or win.

The more important issue is that the war itself has become part of Israeli electoral politics, with security, war and control over Palestinians serving as tools in the competition for power.

While Israeli politicians seek votes, Palestinians continue to pay the price in blood, land and displacement.

In the end, the question may not only be: who will win the Israeli elections?

It may also be: how much will Palestinians pay for these elections?

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.