
After meeting Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky in Paris recently, US president-elect Donald Trump called for an immediate ceasefire in the Ukraine war, according to a report in The Guardian, adding that, “Ukraine would like to make a deal” to end its war with Russia. Newsmax reported that at about the same time, Trump wished to end “the madness” in Ukraine through negotiation.
Washington’s next commander-in-chief is sending signals that he wants to delink the United States militarily from one of its primary proxy wars. It suggests that some curbs could be applied after 20 January, to the Biden-Blinken fondness for multiplying US warmongering, month after month. And there are some further relevant indications.
Japan and South Korea are home to East Asia’s largest US military garrisons by a long chalk. There are more than 70,000 US service personnel in these two jurisdictions, while various American bases bristle with warships, warplanes, missiles, and countless other military assets.
However, it has proved inconvenient, given Biden’s foreign policy priorities, that these two allies recruited into the US project to stem the rise of China are so unswervingly accustomed to glaring at each other. It is a consequence of Japan’s governance record in Korea from 1910 to 1945, when it combined fast-track modernisation with horrific levels of colonial abuse.
Still, Washington recently thought it had found a solution.
As a result of amplified American encouragement and guidance, then-Japanese prime minister, Fumio Kishida and President Yoon Suk-yeol of South Korea met several times in order to establish how they, with the US, could seriously advance their “trilateral” military co-operation. The Nikkei news service reported in April that the US deputy secretary of state, Kurt Campbell, had found a fresh way to smooth the pathway to enhanced Japanese-Korean warfare readiness. Campbell announced that Kishida and Yoon might deserve the Nobel Peace Prize for their courage “in rebuilding their bilateral relations”.
In the meantime, right-leaning elements in Japan (with Washington’s blessing) have undermined another awkward impediment to winding up Japan’s war footing: the American-applied, post-war pacifist Japanese constitution.
However, the speedy advancement of this enhanced martial co-operation project prominently relied on the leading personalities involved. It was not foreshadowed by a significant reduction in widespread hostility in South Korea to any such militarised reconciliation.
Then, this year, Kishida had to resign because of plunging popularity scores. He was replaced by Shigeru Ishiba as prime minister in October, whose polling numbers were soon also dramatically heading south.
Meanwhile, Yoon has recently done more than anyone, anywhere, to prove that a week is a long time in politics. Within that period, he has declared martial law, cancelled that declaration, apologised for that declaration, been barred from leaving the country, provoked an investigation of his possible treason, and been impeached. His poll numbers are now around 11%. His defence minister, who helped draft the martial law declaration, has been arrested and is being held in custody, where he attempted suicide.
The US-led, trilateral East Asian war-hawk preparations for confronting Beijing have been badly disrupted by the leadership turmoil in Tokyo, and especially in Seoul. It seems unlikely that Trump would want to spend serious political capital on trying to mend what was a rickety Biden project from the outset.
Next, there is a more direct signal of an enhanced war-aversion tilt in the new Trump administration. The Wall Street Journal recently emphasised the significance of the choice of certain key members of the new government. Referring to J.D. Vance (vice-president), Tulsi Gabbard (director of national intelligence nominee) and Pete Hegseth (defence secretary nominee), the journal observed that, “at the top of Trump’s team (were) the angry vets who want to upend US foreign policy”.
These Trump team members were not, it was argued, typical, neoconservative war hawks (like certain other members of the team). They had each experienced grim, wartime action in the Middle East, which had led all three to strongly question Washington’s long-term, pro-war foreign policy.
During his successful election campaign, Trump stated that he would be able to end the Ukraine war “in 24 hours”. Many have wondered how this could possibly be done and also whether Trump would follow through on these claims.
These are reasonable reservations. However, there is no question that the language used by Trump has been consistently pro-ceasefire in Ukraine for a long time. Despite his evident blessing of Israel’s US-backed Middle East rampage, Trump is not another all-round American “armchair warlord”. And he rightly contrasts himself, in this respect, with Biden, who seems increasingly committed to more “war-war” (never mind “jaw-jaw”) as his ill-starred, single term draws to a close.
This article is republished from the Hong Kong edition of China Daily