ASIO mistakes

August 11, 2025

Paddy Gourley makes some excellent points in his analysis of ASIO chief, Mike Burgess’ annual Hawke Lecture. But he is too kind in his assessment of Burgess’ account of ASIO’s historic performance.

Burgess’ account of the Combe/Ivanov Affair is at best misleading.

Burgess quotes then prime minister, Bob Hawke, saying after the event: “There was no question in my mind that we had to be tough, decisive and immediate in our reaction. Any pussy footing around… could have been seen as… soft on the threat of Soviet espionage… I knew it was a sort of make-or-break situation. And if we didn’t handle that properly we would have been a one-term government.”

Burgess then goes on to says: “Despite the claims of his critics including David Combe, the PM handled the crisis properly and went on to win three more elections.”

Yes, he won three more elections. But initially Hawke grossly over-reacted when he was briefed on the matter. He was brought to his senses at Cabinet’s national security committee meeting on 26 April 1983, when deputy prime minister Nigel Bowen questioned then ASIO chief Harvey Barnett’s account of the affair. Foreign minister Bill Hayden also questioned Barnett’s case, which Hawke had wholeheartedly accepted**.**

In the end, they got Hawke to pull his head in.

The subsequent Royal Commission revealed ASIO’s incompetence. ASIO “transcripts” of conversations between Canberra lobbyist David Combe and Soviet agent, Valeri Ivanov were riddled with mistakes. Even those produced with full authorisation, and using all the resources at ASIO’s disposal — such as that between Combe and businessman Laurie Matheson — had astonishing mistakes.

“Even old stacks talk,” Combe is reported to have said, a comment that conspiracy theorists listening might perhaps interpret as some kind of code.

In fact, Combe plainly said: “Ivanov’s been expelled".

Even worse was ASIO’s report that Hawke staffer, Bob Hogg had had breakfast with Combe, in defiance of a direct order from Hawke that no meetings with Combe were to take place.

At the time, ASIO had a full-time surveillance team monitoring Combe’s movements, and his phone was tapped. But they still managed to report a meeting that never happened.

This insight into ASIO’s performance is important. The intelligence ASIO gathers is not made public, like a newspaper report, or a posting on the internet. In time, its records of who did what become part of its files, to be used unchecked by future agents. With this record, how sure can we be today that ASIO is getting it right?

(In 1983 Paul Malone covered the Combe/Ivanov Royal Commission for the Australian Financial Review.)