AUKUS vs India: a strategy and cost critique

February 11, 2026

John Queripel’s critique of AUKUS offers a powerful fiscal warning, but his comparison to India’s Project 75(I) deal rests on a “false equivalence.”

Comparing a $10 billion conventional fleet to a $368 billion nuclear one ignores the immutable geographic realities Australia faces.

India’s German-designed diesel-electric boats are excellent littoral assets for regional “two-front” threats. However, they lack the endurance required for Australia’s vast maritime approaches. As ASPI notes, nuclear propulsion (SSN) provides the persistent, high-speed range that conventional boats – limited by battery and fuel – cannot match. For Australia, a conventional fleet would be exhausted before even reaching primary strategic chokepoints.

Furthermore, India’s “due diligence” involved decades of debilitating delays and capability gaps. AUKUS sidesteps this through the “Strategic Integration” of Pillar One, ensuring a continuous deterrent via US/UK rotations. While Queripel decries the cost, these “down-payments” fund a tri-national industrial base and technological leapfrogging that “off-the-shelf” purchases cannot provide.

India has bought a coastal shield; Australia is investing in a long-range “ecosystem” of deterrence. One cannot critique the price of a marathon runner by comparing it to the cost of a sprinter.