Southeast Asia’s strategic equilibrium is undergoing unprecedented stress tests.

While China’s economic influence grows through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative, ASEAN nations increasingly hedge against over-reliance – seeking sustainable development, maritime security assurances and technological autonomy.

China’s BRI  dominates infrastructure financing in the region but fuels distrust — 41.2% of ASEAN citizens see Beijing as a threat. The US remains the preferred security partner to ASEAN citizens (52.3%), yet Trump 2.0’s unpredictability leaves 31.8% bracing for disengagement. ASEAN’s balancing act has become increasingly precarious as the bloc navigates climate concerns and maritime tensions while maintaining autonomy.

Australia, long a quiet facilitator of regional dialogue, faces its own challenge – remaining relevant in an era of US-China rivalry. Yet beneath these tensions lies an opportunity.

Australia’s position as a Pacific nation with deep Southeast Asian expertise makes it an ideal knowledge partner in China-ASEAN relations. Its academic institutions, policy frameworks and longstanding ASEAN engagement offer a constructive platform for dialogue and collaboration. By leveraging Australia’s niche expertise — from climate adaptation to infrastructure governance — informal, scholar-led collaborations between China, ASEAN and Australia could address shared challenges without requiring political alignment. This proposes not grand trilateral agreements, but tacit co-operation in areas where interests quietly converge.

Three key factors underscore Australia’s suitability for this role as a knowledge intermediary.

Australia is a leading global centre for Southeast Asian expertise. Institutions like the Australian National University and the Lowy Institute have long analysed the region’s political, economic and social dynamics.

Australia has extensive experience in policy dialogues and multilateral engagement with ASEAN. Australia is well-positioned to facilitate multilateral policy discussions that complement official Track I channels. Through platforms like the ASEAN Regional Forum and Track II diplomacy, Australia can act as a bridge between China and ASEAN, offering insights that support their shared pursuit of sustainable development.

Australia has developed considerable soft power and established cultural diplomacy with Southeast Asia. Educational and cultural exchanges between Australia and Southeast Asia have played a vital role in building trust and mutual understanding across the region. Expanding programs that bring together students and scholars from Australia, ASEAN and China can foster organic collaboration and cultivate leaders committed to regional co-operation.

The need for regional co-operation has never been more urgent. The Indo-Pacific region sits at the epicentre of strategic competition and economic challenges. As export-dependent economies face protectionist policies and geopolitical tensions, the region must unite against these destabilising forces. The future of Asia Pacific stability will not be written by geopolitical blocs but by practical coalitions.

Australia’s institutions are natural incubators for such collaborations. Australia’s toolkit, from climate-ready infrastructure models to BRI risk mitigation, offers the region something rare – professional consultation and technical solutions that do not demand political alignment.

Past successful examples have demonstrated Australia’s potential as a regional contributor. Australia’s  Combating Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing and  Promoting Sustainable Fisheries in Southeast Asia Program​​ ​​reduces a major source of maritime tension and contributes to a more secure and predictable environment in contested waters. With 55.3% of ASEAN citizens ranking climate as their top threat, Australia’s coral reef engineering and flood-resistant urban planning offer vital expertise. Through the proposed trilateral knowledge network, this model could expand to include Chinese and ASEAN nations, enhancing maritime domain awareness without exacerbating geopolitical tensions.

The Coral Triangle Initiative, led by Indonesia and supported by Australia, also demonstrates the potential for regional environmental collaboration. Expanding such efforts to include Chinese stakeholders could address overlapping interests in marine conservation and sustainable development.

Regarding infrastructure modernisation, Australia’s climate-resilient design expertise and  China’s BRI infrastructure could synergise across Southeast Asia. Joint research initiatives — such as flood-resistant port designs in Jakarta or solar-powered irrigation systems in the Mekong Delta — offer practical pathways to align BRI goals with ASEAN’s climate priorities.

To encourage informal scholar-led collaboration, the initiative should anchor in existing institutional partnerships that demonstrate complementary expertise and regional trust. These institutions share academic reputation and commitment to meaningful regional collaboration. Together, they offer regional balance, complementary expertise and existing synergies.

Another practical question is funding. A hybrid model, combining seed funding from some agencies with operational support from others, would reduce dependency while ensuring financial sustainability. Equally important, initial projects would need to be low-cost, high-impact activities based on existing research already underway that can deliver quality publications.

The power of Australia as a knowledge partner for China-ASEAN relations lies in its unassuming diplomacy of knowledge-sharing, where technical co-operation outpaces political posturing. For China, such partnerships offer chances to refine its regional role with granular, ground-level insights. For ASEAN, they provide a neutral space to voice concerns without choosing sides. For Australia, they reaffirm its irreplaceable role as a translator, not just between East and West, but between aspiration and implementation.

The three parties are essentially knowledge brokers in a partnership that prioritises technical credibility over geopolitical symbolism. Anchored in mutual respect, the three parties must consciously resist geopolitical appropriation, ensuring the initiative remains a tool for shared progress, not proxy rivalry. This collaboration could emerge as a durable model for the Indo-Pacific, where co-operation, not competition, defines the future by mutual adaptation – one project, one dialogue, one exchange at a time.

Republished from East Asia Forum, 14 June 2015

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.