Japanese prime minister’s abrupt no-show at NATO summit reveals a strained alliance with the US
Japanese prime minister’s abrupt no-show at NATO summit reveals a strained alliance with the US
Craig Mark

Japanese prime minister’s abrupt no-show at NATO summit reveals a strained alliance with the US

Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has sent a clear signal to the Trump administration: the Japan–US relationship is in a dire state.

After saying just days ago he would be attending this week’s NATO summit at The Hague, Ishiba  abruptly pulled out at the last minute.

He joins two other leaders from the Indo-Pacific region, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung, in skipping the summit.

The Japanese media  reported Ishiba cancelled the trip because a bilateral meeting with US President Donald Trump was unlikely, as was a meeting of the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) NATO partners (Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan).

Japan will still be represented by Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya, showing its desire to strengthen its security relationship with NATO.

However, Ishiba’s no-show reveals how Japan views its relationship with the Trump administration, following the severe tariffs Washington imposed on Japan and Trump’s mixed messages on the countries’ decades-long military alliance.

Tariffs and diplomatic disagreements

Trump’s tariff policy is at the core of the divide between the US and Japan.

Ishiba attempted to get relations with the Trump administration off to a good start. He was the second world leader to  visit Trump at the White House, after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

However, Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs imposed a punitive rate of 25% on Japanese cars and 24% on all other Japanese imports. They are already having an adverse impact on Japan’s economy: exports of automobiles to the US  dropped in May by 25% compared to a year ago.

Six rounds of negotiations have made little progress, as Ishiba’s government  insists on full tariff exemptions.

Japan has been under pressure from the Trump administration to increase its defence spending, as well. According to the Financial Times, Tokyo  cancelled a summit between US and Japanese defence and foreign ministers over the demand. (A Japanese official denied the report.)

Japan also did not offer its full support to the US bombings of Iran’s nuclear facilities earlier this week. The foreign minister instead said Japan “ understands” the US’s determination to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Japan has traditionally had fairly good relations with Iran, often acting as an indirect bridge with the West. Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe even made a  visit there in 2019.

Japan also remains heavily dependent on oil from the Middle East. It would have been adversely affected if the  Strait of Hormuz had been blocked, as Iran was threatening to do.

Unlike the response from the UK and Australia, which both supported the strikes, the Ishiba government prioritised its commitment to upholding international law and the rules-based global order. In doing so, Japan seeks to deny China, Russia and North Korea any leeway to similarly erode global norms on the  use of force and territorial aggression.

Strategic dilemma of the Japan–US military alliance

In addition, Japan is facing the same dilemma as other American allies – how to  manage relations with the “America first” Trump administration, which has made the US an unreliable ally.

Earlier this year, Trump criticised the decades-old security alliance between the US and Japan, calling it “ one-sided”.

“If we’re ever attacked, they don’t have to do a thing to protect us,” he said of Japan.

Lower-level security cooperation is ongoing between the two allies and their regional partners. The US, Japanese and Philippine Coast Guards  conducted drills in Japanese waters this week. The US military may also assist with  upgrading Japan’s counterstrike missile capabilities.

But Japan is still likely to continue expanding its security ties with partners beyond the US, such as NATO, the European Union, India, the Philippines, Vietnam and other ASEAN members, while maintaining its fragile rapprochement with South Korea.

Australia is now arguably Japan’s most reliable security partner. Canberra is considering  buying Japan’s Mogami-class frigates for the Royal Australian Navy. And if the AUKUS agreement with the US and UK collapses, Japanese submarines could be a replacement.

Ishiba under domestic political pressure

There are also intensifying domestic political pressures on Ishiba to hold firm against Trump, who is  deeply unpopular among the Japanese public.

After  replacing former prime minister Fumio Kishida as leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) last September, the party lost its majority in the lower house of parliament in snap elections. This made it  dependent on minor parties for legislative support.

Ishiba’s minority government has struggled ever since with  poor opinion polling. There has been widespread discontent with inflation, the high cost of living and stagnant wages, the legacy of LDP political scandals, and ever-worsening geopolitical uncertainty.

On Sunday, the party suffered its worst-ever result in elections for the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, winning its  lowest number of seats.

The party could face a similar drubbing in the election for half of the upper house of the Diet (Japan’s parliament) on July 20. Ishiba has  pledged to maintain the LDP’s majority in the house with its junior coalition partner Komeito. But if the government falls into minority status in both houses, Ishiba will face heavy pressure to step down.

 

Republished from THE CONVERSATION 25, June 2025

Disclosure statement Craig Mark does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.

Craig Mark