In reading analyses of how we can develop the seemingly logical argument by Paul Keating and others that Australia should be seeking its security in Asia rather than from Asia, the issue of official and personal contact in building such ties always seems to be neglected.

Many opinions have been published, including in Pearls and Irritations, but surprisingly, there is hardly a single one where the issue of how to develop a common security outlook has been raised in realistic steps apart from the need for more language training. We look for it, but it’s always missing.

Over the last 60 years or so, British culture and television programs have been replaced in Australia by American ones, and it is taken as a given that our defence alliance is with the US, although Sweden, Germany, Spain, Britain, and at one point, France, have also featured prominently in our naval procurement contracts. We are currently undertaking a new initiative aimed at improving defence links with Western Europe, but what about meaningful developments in our links with close neighbours such as through the existing ASEAN-Australia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership? Peter Drysdale has recently called for reinforcing comprehensive regional security with ASEAN countries, including military, economic, environmental and social aspects, but there seems to be little planning.

Obviously this is a two-way issue and there are national priorities as well as institutional habits and gaps and even some prejudices on the part of Asian countries. We could start with Singapore, a logical and English-speaking ally with whom we could develop closer relations, but whose friendly diplomats often seem preoccupied with their local bilateral issues. Indonesia, the world‘s largest Muslim country by population, has had a prime focus on internal issues. This is true of China as well, where with party and overwhelming economic priorities and a uniformed rather than civilian defence leadership, Australia is underplayed and our independence and interests, often viewed through the mouthpiece of ASPI, almost totally seem to be misunderstood. For Japan as well, scepticism remains about the effectiveness of Australia’s military policy, including AUKUS, but that country now has a clearly heightened awareness of its need for regional strategic partners. So there is an outward-facing educational or informative objective in increasing our links with regional countries.

It happens that the inward-facing one can now be focused on, with Japan as a particular case. In the early 2000s, Australia’s enthusiasm appeared to increase with Kevin Rudd’s successful visit and particularly with Tony Abbott’s stated preference for acquiring updated Japanese conventionally-powered “Soryu”-class submarines. (Given subsequent developments, one can’t help but think the choice of a longer-range Soryu or its evolutionary successor Taigei with notable technological innovations, doubtless reliability, low-price and an early delivery schedule might have left us in a much more appropriate strategic position for the next 20 years.)

We are leading up to another major RAN purchase decision, this time for construction of a fleet of 11 new frigates, now officially down to two prospective designs and partners, those of Germany’s thyssenkrupp Marine Systems’ “Meko A-200” and Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ “Mogami” or its evolving successor. Our government has indicated the first three ships in the class should be built overseas, with the remainder being constructed at the Australian Marine Complex in Western Australia. Obviously there will be many critical factors that need to be taken into account. But given the history outlined above, one can almost guess where this choice is heading. We need to think carefully where — based on the strategic picture, the desirability of forming stronger partnerships with Asian partners, and the world-leading reliability and continuously developing forefront technology of a leading Japanese shipbuilder — it should desirably be headed.

There is a particular issue of honest assessment. A recent op-ed sought to conclude that the perhaps less-capable German design was preferable because German shipyards had wide experience in building overseas, while Japan had none. This is misleading, though it may be truer for naval designs. The largest (tonnage-wise) class of ships ever built in Australia, the six successful Darling River class bulk carriers built at Whyalla from 1966-72 were constructed, according to the Australian National Line fleet history, “in close association with Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries” of Tokyo which advised on “methods of pre-fabrication, planning and time management”. At the time, this writer spoke with a long-time local resident who was amazed at the speed at which the first of these ships was taking shape on the slipway.

This is not to say that Mitsubishi H.I. would initially be fully geared to be receptive to the RAN’s priorities. From the record, more likely than not, their instinct would be to doubt Australian abilities and keep the design elements close to those already formed in conjunction with the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force. They could appear to be unresponsive rather than open and ready to talk, although this would vary with the individual. Working with Japanese planners could certainly be, at first thought, an intimidating prospect for RAN design engineers. But with careful interchanges, experience, such as shown in past automotive design/assembly and other Japanese-related factories in Australia, is that it would be quite workable.

Our conclusion is there needs to be a focus on a two-way educative process from which both sides will benefit in the longer term. For the frigates, a successful interchange involving inputs from different perspectives is going to lead to a stronger overall product. If the technical specifications can meet the RAN’s requirements, assigning the contract to Mitsubishi H.I. would also be a first meaningful demonstration not only to Japan, but also to the wider regional community, of Australian strategic intent of partnering with the region.

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.