Talk of a two-state solution may not go much further
Talk of a two-state solution may not go much further
Andrew Thomas

Talk of a two-state solution may not go much further

A two-state solution to the Israel-Palestinian problem has not been mentioned for ages, but was revived recently. However, it may end with just that – talk.

As Israel’s devastating war in Gaza has ground on, the  two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was thought to be “ dead”. Now, it is showing signs of life again.

French President Emmanuel Macron is  reportedly pressing other European nations to jointly recognise a Palestinian state at a UN conference in mid-June, focused on achieving a two-state solution. Macron called such recognition a “ political necessity”.

Countries outside Europe are feeling the pressure, too. Australia has  reaffirmed its view that recognition of Palestine should be a “way of building momentum towards a two-state solution”.

During Macron’s visit to Indonesia in late May, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto made a  surprising pledge to recognise Israel if it allowed for a Palestinian state.

Indonesia is one of about 28 nations that don’t currently recognise Israel. France, Australia, the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan and South Korea are among the approximately 46 nations that don’t recognise a Palestinian state.

The UN conference, from 17 to 20 June, co-sponsored by France and Saudi Arabia, wants to go “beyond reaffirming principles” and “achieve concrete results” towards a two-state solution.

Most countries, including the US, have supported the two-state solution in principle  for decades. However, the political will from all parties has faded in recent years.

So, why is the policy gaining traction again now? And does it have a greater chance of success?

What is the two-state solution?

Put simply, the two-state solution is a proposed peace plan that would create a sovereign Palestinian state alongside the Israeli state. There have been several failed attempts to enact the policy over recent decades, the most famous of which was  the Oslo Accords in the early 1990s.

In recent years, the two-state solution was looking less likely by the day.

The Trump administration’s decision in 2017 to  recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and move the US embassy there signalled the US was moving away from its role as mediator. Then, several Arab states agreed to normalise relations with Israel in the Abraham Accords, without Israeli promises to move towards a two-state solution.

The Hamas attacks on Israel — and subsequent Israeli war on Gaza — have had a somewhat contradictory effect on the overarching debate.

On the one hand, the brutality of Hamas’ actions substantially  set back the legitimacy of the Palestinian self-determination movement in some quarters on the world stage.

On the other, it’s also become clear the status quo — the continued Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank following the end of a brutal war — is not tenable for either Israeli security or Palestinian human rights.

And the breakdown of the most recent ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, the  return of heavy Israeli ground operations in May and reports of  mass Palestinian starvation have only served to further isolate the Israeli government in the eyes of its peers.

Once-steadfast supporters of Israel’s actions have become increasingly frustrated by a lack of clear strategic goals in Gaza. And many now seem prepared to ignore Israeli wishes and pursue Palestinian recognition.

For these governments, the hope is recognition of a Palestinian state would rebuild political will — both globally and in the Middle East — towards a two-state solution.

Huge obstacles remain

But how likely is this in reality? There is certainly more political will than there was before, but also several important roadblocks.

First and foremost is the war in Gaza. It’s obvious this will need to end, with both sides agreeing to an enduring ceasefire.

Beyond that, the political authority in both Gaza and Israel remains an issue.

The countries now considering Palestinian recognition, such as France and Australia, have expressly said Hamas cannot play any role in governing a future Palestinian state.

Though anti-Hamas sentiment is  becoming more vocal among residents in Gaza, Hamas has been  violently cracking down on this dissent and is attempting to consolidate its power.

However, polling shows the popularity of Fatah — the party leading the Palestinian National Authority — is even lower than that of Hamas at an average of 21%. Less than half of Gazans support the enclave returning to Palestinian Authority control. This means a future Palestinian state would likely require new leadership.

There is almost no political will in Israel for a two-state solution, either. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has  not been shy about his opposition to a Palestinian state. His cabinet members have mostly been on the same page.

This has also been reflected in policy action. In early May, the Israeli Security Cabinet approved a plan to indefinitely occupy parts of Gaza. The government also just approved its  largest expansion of settlements in the West Bank in decades.

These settlements remain a major problem for a two-state solution. The total population of Israeli settlers is more than  700,000 in both East Jerusalem and the West Bank. And it’s been  increasing at a faster rate since the election of the right-wing, pro-settler Netanyahu government in 2022.

Settlement is enshrined in Israeli Basic Law, with the state  defining it as “national value” and actively encouraging its “establishment and consolidation”.

The more settlement that occurs, the more complicated the boundaries of a future Palestinian state become.

Then there’s the problem of public support. Recent polling shows neither Israelis nor Palestinians view the two-state solution favourably. Just  40% of Palestinians support it, while only  26% of Israelis believe a Palestinian state can “coexist peacefully” alongside Israel.

However, none of these challenges makes the policy impossible. The unpopularity of the two-state solution locally is more a reflection of previous failures than it is of future negotiations.

A power-sharing agreement in Northern Ireland was similarly unpopular in the 1990s, but  peace was achieved through bold political leadership involving the US and European Union.

In other words, we won’t know what’s possible until negotiations begin. Red lines will need to be drawn and compromises made.

It’s not clear what effect growing external pressure will have, but the international community does appear to be reaching a political tipping point on the two-state solution. Momentum could start building again.

 

Republished from The Conversation, 4 June 2024

Disclosure statement Andrew Thomas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.

Andrew Thomas