Chinese diaspora communities in Australia and the US both face racism and loyalty suspicions under “China threat” narratives, yet their voting has diverged.

In Australia, compulsory voting electorates swung to the Australian Labor Party after rhetoric from the Liberal Party on Chinese interference. In the US, Chinese Americans typically back the Democratic Party despite limited policy differentiation. Differences in population share, electoral institutions and socioeconomic inequality help explain why similar experiences of marginalisation yield distinct political outcomes.

Both Chinese Australians and Chinese Americans believe their nation’s relationship with China has negatively affected their personal lives. They report feeling vulnerable to random racist attacks in public and fear being treated as potential agents of a hostile country. Whether this shared sense of political marginalisation shapes their voting decisions in similar ways remains unclear. Exploring how their experiences shape political engagements is both significant and timely.

The influence of Chinese Australian voters was evident in the last two federal elections. In May 2022, a swing to Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s centre-left Labor Party in marginal seats with large Chinese Australian populations provided the support needed to win. In 2025, they again played a crucial role in key seats. Labor not only held their seats but also captured a few long-held Liberal seats with substantial Chinese Australian support.

In February 2025, the Liberal Party’s hope of winning back Chinese Australian voters through friendlier public rhetoric on China and the Chinese Australian community unravelled. Then opposition leader Peter Dutton attacked the government’s response to Chinese naval ships circumnavigating Australia.

Meanwhile, Pauline Hanson’s nativist One Nation party advised its voters to preference the Liberals second, a move partially reciprocated by Dutton. Prominent China hawks such as Liberal Senator James Paterson continued to stoke fears of Chinese interference. Senator Jane Hume’s remark about “ Chinese spies” proved the final straw, rapidly eroding the Liberals’ standing with Chinese Australian voters. After the election,  Sussan Ley, the newly elected leader of the Liberal Party, held a roundtable with members of Chinese Australian communities and admitted that “we did not get the tone right … [and] needed to change course”.

The so-called Chinese Australian community has never been a monolithic group. Chinese Australians don’t really have enough in common to form a cohesive interest group. Traditionally, they favoured conservative parties because of their focus on family values and small business interests. But this pattern changed as geopolitical tensions between Australia and China intensified. China’s rise fuelled a “ China threat” narrative in the West, shaping how political parties, the media and the public view Beijing’s posture in the world. Western countries, including Australia, have had to balance trade with China against relying on the US for security.

Chinese diaspora communities in Australia and the US have faced scrutiny over loyalty. In Australia, the message from Liberal politicians was clear — either become a “true Australian” or remain an object of suspicion. Many Chinese Australian voters became increasingly wary of speaking out, fearing undue scrutiny. But they recognised one tool to express their views – voting.

Surveys of Chinese Australian voters in the last two federal elections suggest they now place greater emphasis on foreign policy than the public in general. Traditionally conservative and pro-business, they increasingly vote primarily on political as well as economic grounds. As their numbers grow, parties can no longer ignore their sentiments. Increasingly aware of their electoral power, they are ready to vote out any party they believe harms their interests.

In past US elections, Chinese American voters have tended to support the Democratic Party more than the Republican Party, though support fell slightly in the 2024 presidential election. Approximately 53% supported Kamala Harris while only about 39% supported Donald Trump.

Cross-national comparison is complicated by several factors. In Australia, both Labor and the conservative Liberal–National coalition have adopted securitisation policies towards China, but Labor has been more successful in managing tensions and avoiding offending Chinese Australian communities.

In the US, concerned voters may not see much differentiation between the two major parties. Both Democrats, who created the China Initiative, and Republicans, advocate policies to contain China’s rise. Plus, the US has higher levels of socioeconomic inequality and political polarisation. In countries with high levels of socioeconomic inequality and political polarisation, voters may prioritise economic survival over political and foreign policy considerations.

Structural differences between the two countries also play a role. Chinese Australians comprise approximately 5.5% of Australia’s population, compared with 1.6% of the US population. Compulsory voting in Australia ensures turnout close to 100% among Chinese Australians. By contrast, voluntary voting in the US means that if Chinese Americans are more or less motivated to vote than other citizens, their turnout might be very different from their share of the population.

This difference in voting systems likely exaggerates the impact of population size on electoral participation. Compulsory voting, compared with voluntary voting, boosts political participation and encourages broader representation across different socioeconomic, ethnic and age groups. As a result, Chinese Australians seem likely to have more impact on electoral outcomes than their US counterparts.

How the government is formed may also shape the relative power of Chinese voters. In Australia, the prime minister is chosen by the party that wins enough seats in the House of Representatives to form government. This makes electorates with high numbers of minority voters crucial, especially under preferential voting system when neither major party can command an outright majority. By contrast, ethnic minority voters in the US can have an impact on national outcomes, but only if sufficient numbers of them live in a battleground state or a swing district.

Both Australia and the US are favoured destinations for migrants of Chinese origin while maintaining complex relationships with China. These shared concerns suggest common challenges faced among Chinese diaspora communities, yet differences in political systems and social contexts may lead to distinct voting behaviours. This is an important and complex topic worthy of future research.

Republished from East Asia Forum, 26 July 2025

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.