_Australia will recognise_ Palestinian statehood in September, while at the same time continuing to supply critical components for the F-35 fighter jets used by Israel in its military operations in Gaza.

This apparent contradiction between diplomatic positioning and export policy raises questions about the consistency of Australia’s approach, as defence exports may provide material support for those same military actions that Australia is calling for an end to.

International legal context

Since October 2023, the war in Gaza has escalated dramatically with horrific effects for the population. There is now an increasingly prevalent view among international law scholars that a genocide is occurring in Gaza. A preliminary ruling of the International Court of Justice in January 2024 said it was “plausible” that Israel was committing genocide in Gaza, finding “reasonable grounds to believe” that all states’ genocide prevention obligations were triggered. Following the ICJ decision, in November 2024, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Israel’s prime minister and defence minister on charges of crimes against humanity and the war crime of using starvation as a method of warfare.

The legal obligations of states providing material support to Israel, including through arms transfers, is being considered by the ICJ. In March 2024, Nicaragua brought proceedings against Germany, Israel’s second largest supplier of weapons after the US, providing 33% of all Israeli arms imports in 2020-2024.Nicaragua alleged that Germany’s arms transfers to Israel breached obligations to prevent genocide and to ensure respect for international humanitarian law. While the case is ongoing, Germany announced on 8 August that it was suspending exports of military equipment that could be used in Gaza. This evolving international legal landscape raises important questions about the legal obligations of all states supplying military equipment to Israel, and significant implications for Australia’s arms export decisions.

Australia’s legal obligations

Australia is a party to the Arms Trade Treaty, which strictly prohibits arms transfers when a state knows that the items will be used to commit serious violations of international law. In all cases, states must evaluate the potential that serious violations could be facilitated by the items being exported and must not authorise transfers representing an “overriding risk”.

Australia also has relevant obligations under IHL, which requires all states to respect — and ensure respect for — the Geneva Conventions. It remains to be seen whether the ICJ will rule that Germany’s military assistance to Israel breaches this duty, but the case has at least put all states on notice of their potential liability for arms transfers into armed conflicts.

Australia’s national export control policy framework requires that export applications for goods and technology on the Defence Strategic Goods List be considered against criteria outlined in regulations. These include the risk that items may be used contrary to Australia’s international obligations, or to commit serious abuses of human rights, or to further militarise conflict.

The F-35 supply chain

Under Australian legislation, the export of controlled items requires a permit issued by the Defence minister. However, Defence does not publish what items are exported, to whom, or for what purpose. This approach, in place since 2004, has made it difficult to assess Australia’s compliance with international law obligations. In contrast, the US provides comprehensive information across 21 separate item categories, and the European Union reports across 22 categories.

In the wake of Germany’s decision to suspend arms exports to Israel, questions around Australia’s provision of military equipment have intensified. Defence Minister Richard Marles maintains that Australia is not supplying weapons to Israel. However, this evaluation turns on the distinction between items considered “weapons” as opposed to items that are considered “parts and components” of weapons.

The tension in this categorisation is evident in the increasing scrutiny of Australia’s role in the multinational defence program producing F-35 fighter jets. Australia is one of about nine “partner” countries in the program, which includes Israel and is led by the US. More than 75 Australian companies supply F-35 components, with more than 700 “critical pieces” manufactured in Victoria alone.

Australian manufactured items are vital to the F-35 supply chain. Australian company, RUAG Australia, is the sole supplier of the mechanism that opens the plane’s bay doors to release missiles. The Australian Government position is that it has no "direct bilateral arrangement" with Israel regarding the F-35 program and that components are not exported directly to Israel, but sent to other countries for integration and final assembly in the US (despite recent reports that aircraft parts are being directly exported to Israel). The US, which is the only F-35 partner state not a party to the Arms Trade Treaty, may therefore be considered the “end-user” for export licensing decisions rather than Israel.

Efforts to seek accountability for states’ involvement in the F-35 program in other partner countries have had mixed results. Whereas a Dutch court has ordered the government to block exports of F-35 parts to Israel over international law concerns, the UK High Court rejected a similar challenge.

The complex global supply chain involved in F-35 production demonstrates how little scope exists to enforce national controls once items leave a country’s borders. This contributes to a regulatory "race to the bottom" and a concerning failure of mechanisms to effectively control weapons component transfers. The F-35 example highlights the urgent need for greater transparency and traceability in weapons component transfers, thereby reinforcing national and international arms-control obligations.

Conclusion

Australia’s recognition of Palestinian statehood sits uneasily alongside the government’s continuing policy to export military equipment, including F-35 components, for potential use in Gaza. This inconsistency is only exacerbated by the opacity of Australia’s defence export regime. So long as Australia is not willing to disclose what it is exporting and to whom, it remains unaccountable for its compliance with those standards of international law it professes to promote.

The Australian Government must address the transparency deficit in its defence export regime and explicitly align its export policies with its legal obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty. Alongside diplomatic efforts, this would better serve Australia’s national interests and make a more meaningful impact on international peace and security.

Republished from InternationalAffairs.org.au, 22 August, 2025

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.