When the Soviet communist agent Vladimir Petrov was sent to Australia by a predecessor of the KGB in 1951, he was not tasked with stealing Australian and Western defence and diplomatic secrets.

Instead, his main function was to spy on other members of the Soviet Embassy, and to research the activities of Russian émigrés who had made their way to Australia.

Petrov was put in charge of Russian espionage only, on top of his counter-intelligence functions, when the man responsible for the organisation of spying was called back to Moscow.

The focus on émigré work was typical of KGB activities all around the world and took up perhaps half of the time of Russian intelligence activities abroad. It was closely directed in Moscow Central, because the KGB would use its own databases in the Soviet Union to establish whether émigrés were hostile or neutral to their former country, and whether they had relatives in Russia. Some were, effectively, exiles, including people who had fought with Nazi units during the war, and many belonged to organisations fiercely hostile to communism. Some could be induced to co-operate with the embassy in the hope of concessions about the travel or living conditions of relatives.

Petrov involved himself in the activities of Russian clubs and societies, and in the affiliations of different strands of Russian orthodox movements. I have no information about where he stood on new-wave Buddhist movements, but the very idea of flexibility, innovation and different ideas suggests that he would have judged Stalin to be opposed. ASIO was monitoring him full-time, but I do not know that they ever protested any appalling assaults on human values and freedoms or warned Petrov that “we are watching, and we have zero tolerance".

But 70 years ago, it was the first job of Russian intelligence staff to be paranoid about the affections and dispositions of its own people – most of whom had relatives back home as effective hostages to their good behaviour. Émigrés were studied for assessments about whether they could be useful, or whether their anti-Soviet activities could be neutralised. By no means were they the only embassy engaged in such activities.

Such work was mundane and unexciting, but critical, the KGB calculated, to any assessment of the challenges faced by the Soviet Union. Around the world, Soviet intelligence was occasionally having spectacular successes in spies, for example with the Cambridge University spies and the Gold Ring capturing Manhattan Project atomic secrets. But these long-term and very patient achievements necessarily involved great care against betrayal or indiscipline.

Everyone, including us, does it, but it is, apparently, only wicked when they do to us

Russian and other Soviet satellites were hardly the only states closely monitoring the activities of citizens, or former citizens abroad. Most nations did, and many of their own security services also monitored groups, such as Russian émigrés, for signs of clandestine or espionage activity.

By the late 1960s and early 1970s, many Southeast Asian nations were closely monitoring the activities of their students in Australia, fearing that they might be subverted by communist or other groups, or be seduced by the Australian lifestyle. Embassy staff moved among the students and put pressure on some to report back about meetings and other activities. At times, students were coerced into reporting on the activities of others by threats of punishment of relatives back home. No doubt some students — the future ruling classes of their own country — themselves voluntarily reported adversely on fellow nationals, some of whom would be summoned to embassies to be dressed down, threatened with loss of scholarships, or, in some cases, “turned” so that they became a part of the external reach of their native states.

Universities and other institutions were aware of the pressures being placed on such students, and occasionally protested, if usually ineffectively. Australia’s own security services also monitored some foreign students. Generally, they were less than helpful at protecting students if the country was regarded as a friend. It is generally, and I believe accurately, remarked that the propensity of bodies such as ASIO to express passionate disapproval of student harassment was, and is, in inverse proportion to whether the nation in question is regarded as anti-American. ASIO and others, including state and federal police, have been known to pass on information about the activities of students to foreign friendly countries. Open American retaliation under Trump against dissenting students in their own country suggests monitoring students is okay.

In the past week the AFP, acting on ASIO information, has arrested a foreign national who has permanent residence in Australia. She is alleged to have been bullying and intimidating a Chinese-based Buddhist group described by the Chinese as an evil cult. She is also alleged to have been reporting their activities to the Chinese. The very language reflects Chinese abuse of another alleged “evil cult”, the Falun Gong.

Such groups represent substantial numbers of Chinese people belonging to organisations that are not accountable to, or obedient to, the supreme will of the Chinese Communist Party. Members are obviously aware of this disapproval, so persisting in membership or group activities is seen as defiance. Some such bodies have initially seemed quite harmless, and, at worst, focused on (non-approved) religious beliefs, and sometimes exercise and other wellness regimes. They have insisted themselves to be completely harmless.

In China, there are many bodies, not least in the Tai Chi movement, or state-approved religions, including Christian and Buddhist ones, which are approved and not regarded as hostile underground subversives.

Evil cults, heretics and dissenters

Vigorous Chinese persecution of the sects has led to bitter attacks from cult members and entrenched the idea that some of the bodies are fundamentally in opposition to the Communist Party regime. For people in the Western liberal tradition, such repression involves violation of rights or freedom of religion, association and expression, and can never be justified except as a response to clear threats to social order. But many other nations, not invariably accused of totalitarianism, proscribe groups and organisations, and forms of speech on unconvincing law and order grounds.

Even in Australia, some media organisations have seemed to demand that expressions of support for one side or another of the war against Gaza, or the wearing of flags of groups described as terrorist, should be banned. Among neighbouring nations such as Indonesia, Thailand, Burma, and India, forms of expression which would be unexceptionable in Australia have led to punishment. There is sensitivity to words or actions seen as threatening the unity of the state, the rule of law, blasphemy and the impunity of the local rulers, including kings.

Nations such as Australia must keep a close eye on avoiding taking sides in some types of local political struggle, and of being consistent in the way they apply the law. They also must be consistent in the way that they resist claims of extra-territorial application of laws. The Australian national security legislation about political interference focuses on the impact in Australia of repressive or coercive acts against groups, not on the law of the country of origin of those involved. Even there, however, the language can get florid.

Assistant AFP commissioner Stephen Nutt said, for example, that “foreign interference is a serious crime that undermines democracy and social cohesion”.

“As with other like-minded countries Australia is not immune to [from?] foreign interference and we should not expect that this arrest will prevent further attempts to target our diaspora communities. At a time of permanent regional contest, offenders will attempt to spy on individuals, groups and institutions in Australia. That’s why the AFP and our partners will continue to educate the community about what foreign interference is, how communities can protect themselves, and, importantly, encouraging the public to contact authorities if they believe they are being targeted by those working for foreign entities."

Only sometimes are police or security agencies guardians of our rights

It is by no means clear that the AFP, or state police forces, regards as inherently suspicious the actions of multinational groups who “research” demonstrators and take action to isolate them, or, in the case of Western Australia or NSW, where almost any form of demonstration or protest is now forbidden, to prevent their assembling or gathering. The drama of marching over the Sydney Harbour Bridge shows that police (and premiers) hold views against freedom of assembly, engage in panicked propaganda about the risk of violence, and often behave in manners plainly partial to one group or another in a political protest. They haven’t suddenly become the champions of democracy and social cohesion.

It is not that people are not entitled to hold different views about the balance of rights between citizens using public streets. It is, rather, that people pretending to be champions of human rights, and opponents of public assemblies do not always seem to be proponents of social cohesion. The curious thing is that significant sections of the ALP are hostile to demonstrations, especially those critical of Israel. It cannot merely be the presence of foreign influences which converts contention into illegality: it must involve monitoring, intimidation and threats.

Mike Burgess of ASIO, never one for moderating language to an occasion, even when crime is alleged, said that foreign interference of the kind alleged is “an appalling assault on Australian values, freedoms and sovereignty". I can be quite opposed to the actions of foreign agents in spying on groups and still think it far from the worst crime in the book, even in the national security field. Soon even more intemperate and over-the-top words are necessary to describe something perhaps a bit more serious — a terrorist bombing, perhaps — and Burgess runs out of superlatives. It might be better if he was calm and not hysterical and dropped adjectives and adverbs from his vocabulary. They make the work of his organisation, which is difficult enough without his insatiable thirst for publicity, more difficult.

One might be forgiven for thinking that if the word appalling is the appropriate one to be used, ASIO might have taken a more active interest in clear examples of such conduct in the past.

Capability and resolve are open to estimate

“Anyone who thinks that it is acceptable to monitor, intimidate and potentially repatriate members of our diaspora communities should never underestimate our capabilities and resolve,” Burgess said.

Of course, he means business and is oblivious of the many contradictions between what he, on behalf of ASIO, says and what it does in the national security space. Burgess never misses an opportunity to suggest that China is a great threat and is engaged in large-scale spying on us. It is, apparently, the worst it has ever been.

Like many members of those who seem to think that war is inevitable, he has never had a reproach for the role of some of our allies in stoking up conflict, and community disharmony. He is not a Cassandra warning us that we are living in a dream so much as an advocate of pre-emptive conflict. There is an extensive lobby singing from the same hymn sheet, with others, former professional colleagues of Burgess, discussing mass internment in the event of war. Polling evidence from the Lowy Institute suggests that more Australians regard the US as a greater threat to our sovereignty than China.

As it happens, one reason I feel uneasy about the arrests is that I had an office in the building where the crime is alleged to have occurred. I occasionally let in would-be Chinese worshippers and listened to their children tearing around the stairwells and corridors of the four-storey building. I thought the coincidence of the offices on the ground floor amusing. On one side was a business apparently promoting travel to China, and assistance with student visas and entry into educational institutions. On the other side was Five Eyes Consulting, which seemed to be about selling specialist advice from expert former intelligence folk about cybersecurity and such things. Each could look on the other. Or on Chinese visitors or (presumably) harassers and intimidators. It was very cosy; I was focused on sorting my books, but it could have been cover, of course.

Burgess’s lack of judgement in making ex-cathedra statements invites questions about his judgement, his leadership and stock of ideas. He has already been involved in a few prosecutions, for example in relation to Australians writing non-classified reports for the Chinese. The prosecutions may prove to fail, not only on their facts but on the law. In grandstanding about them at the time there were charges (there has been much silence since), he again seemed to me to break the sub judice rule and ignore fair-trial rights. So did the AFP.

Some of his ideas — for example in his correspondence with Mike Pezzullo about creating a national security surveillance state of Australia that would put China to shame or his own-goal advice about the exclusion of Huawei from 5G research — are loopy and fail to show a proper balance between the needs of security and respect for democratic rights. Getting national security any infusion of cred requires putting it in better hands.

Republished from The Canberra Times, August 2025

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.