The Trump-Putin encounter in Anchorage has angered some, disappointed others and baffled many more. Yet it has told us much about the state of the war in Ukraine, and the obstacles to the ending of hostilities.

Anyone wishing to make sense of the event would not have been helped by Trump’s proverbial incoherence and self-promotion. Nor was the banal coverage on offer in much of the Western mainstream media any more helpful.

Trump’s grave mistake in the weeks prior to the summit was to give the impression that a ceasefire agreement could be secured by the threat of sanctions. Once it became clear that the approach was doomed to failure, he turned his mind to diplomatic summitry, an option Putin welcomed with undiluted enthusiasm.

Not surprisingly perhaps, media reporting became fixated on the theatre of the occasion and the failure of the summit to produce “a ceasefire deal”.

The warm words of welcome that greeted the Russian president, the red carpet extended along the runway of the airbase in Anchorage, the effusive praise Trump lavished on Putin in his subsequent interview on Fox News were clearly not to the media’s liking.

The early finish of the meeting, the changes made to the previously announced program, the hastily concluded press conference at which both leaders refused to take any questions were all depicted as signs of failure.

Almost unanimously, the media offered the contradictory assessment that Putin had triumphed and that no agreement had been reached. Few bothered to entertain the thought that Trump was careful not to commit to a deal that would be unacceptable to America’s European allies, let alone Zelenskyy’s Ukraine.

Somehow, the media preferred to dismiss the claim of both presidents that substantial agreement had been reached on key issues, choosing instead to rehearse the verdict of “no deal”.

Within less than 24 hours, it became apparent that Trump and Putin had agreed that the priority of any future negotiations should be a peace agreement rather than a ceasefire deal.

To this extent at least, Putin had succeeded in getting Trump’s support for Russia’s longstanding insistence that the cessation of hostilities would be short lived without a lasting resolution of the conflict.

It is now clear the two leaders did not announce any details of the common ground they had reached, because Trump felt it necessary to communicate first with Zelenskyy and European leaders.

Following those phone calls, Trump posted on Truth Social: “It was determined by all that the best way to end the horrific war between Russia and Ukraine is to go directly to a Peace Agreement, which would end the war, and not a mere Ceasefire Agreement, which often times do not hold up.”

Within hours of this statement, numerous reports started circulating that Trump was now advising Zelenskyy that Ukraine would have to cede territory to Russia.

In his interview on Fox News, Trump had already signalled that he and Putin had discussed land transfers and security guarantees for Ukraine, and had “largely agreed”.

The European reaction was in line with their well-established two-track strategy: on the one hand, welcome Trump’s efforts to end the war in Ukraine, and on the other, continue to apply maximum pressure on Russia until an agreement is reached.

Keir Starmer’s comments on the Alaska summit reflected a widely held European perspective. The British prime minister acknowledged Trump’s efforts had brought an end to the war closer than ever, but added “… until (Putin) stops his barbaric assault, we will keep tightening the screws on his war machine with even more sanctions".

Clearly, the Europeans will have a lot of hard thinking to do in the coming days and weeks. What exactly will they be counselling Zelenskyy to say and do when he meets Trump shortly?

For his part, Trump has made it clear that the ball is now in Zelenskyy’s court. He wants Zelenskyy to enter into negotiations for a peace agreement, at which the ceding of territory will be a key agenda item. But contrary to much media coverage, the ceding of territory may not be the most difficult bone of contention.

Territorial arrangements can take many forms. Much discussion will, no doubt, centre on where borders should be drawn. Here the Russian side may not be as inflexible as their publicly stated position would suggest.

Russia and Ukraine border demarcations are open to numerous twists and turns, and both may well be open to considering a special status for some kind of buffer zone between them.

However, Russia’s other demands may be even more unwelcome.

Throughout the conflict Putin has repeatedly stated that Russia expects:

1. Its security concerns regarding NATO expansion to be taken seriously, which means in effect NATO acceptance of a Russian sphere of influence along its borders;
2. Ukraine to forego any intention of joining NATO, and to pursue instead a policy of neutrality
3. Limits to be placed on Ukraine’s military capabilities and, in particular, no NATO military deployments within Ukraine
4. Adequate protections for the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine, which would mean in practice an end to any form of strident anti-Russian nationalism.

Trump, western Europe and Zelenskyy have until now focused on the question of territory, in part because it helped divert attention from these decidedly thorny Russian demands.

Now that Trump has agreed to make a comprehensive peace agreement central to any negotiation, both Zelenskyy and supporting European governments may find it more difficult to pursue their diversionary strategies.

Two other pressing questions will have to be confronted, perhaps sooner rather than later.

In their Alaska talks, Trump and Putin acknowledged that any agreement would have to provide Ukraine with security guarantees. But the devil will be in the detail. Who will offer what guarantees? Will both sides agree to them?

The other question relates to Ukraine’s internal political processes. Is the Zelenskyy Government able to negotiate in a coherent fashion, or will such discussions be the subject of internal dissension? And should any agreement be reached, will it be the subject of democratic deliberation?

Ukraine’s society and economy have been devastated by the war. An official assessment released earlier this year estimate the cost of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine to be US$524 billion (€506 billion) over the next decade.

Will the US, Europe and perhaps Russia underwrite these costs? If so, will contributions come with strings attached, and with the mutual suspicions and recriminations that such strings inevitably arouse?

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.