Dear prime minister, How very unfortunate that you chose 14 September to announce further expenditure on submarine facilities.

Obviously these facilities will be connected to the AUKUS program. Your choice of date prompts me to write to you this week.

15 September was the anniversary of the announcement of the AUKUS project in 2021. Why this ill-advised scheme should remain as Scott Morrison’s legacy is just one of many mysteries associated with AUKUS.

By now, you should be well aware of the many concerns and objections to AUKUS circulating within the community. Highly intelligent and qualified commentators have raised serious questions about Pillar 1, under which we expect to acquire nuclear submarines. None of their questions have been answered satisfactorily. The general public still has no access to the text of the original, 2021 agreement. You and your government have provided no plausible rationale for the scheme – beyond the specious argument that Australia needs to “project power”, presumably because of some imagined threat from China. Indeed, the entire scheme seems to rest on the premise that China must be confronted militarily.

You and your government appear to have lost sight of the inherent safety of the Australian continent. Even Japan, at the height of its power, decided against launching any full-scale attack on the nation. The raids on Darwin were never the prelude to any sustained attack on the mainland. Any nation wishing to launch an attack must cross a wide stretch of sea to do so. The English Channel was enough to protect the UK from invasion during World War II. The expanse of water that must be crossed in order to attack Australia is vastly greater. The likelihood of any nation even considering, let alone undertaking, an attack on Australia is vanishingly small. Yet, contrary to a rational assessment of our situation, we seem to be in constant fear of invasion – hence our (your) obsession with high-end military hardware to “project power” in the region.

The idea that Australia needs to project power is, of course, entirely consistent with the acquisition of what are, by definition, weapons of attack (rather than defence). Why Australia needed to shift from operating defensively to adopting this, essentially aggressive, military stance is a question that has never been addressed or explained by your government. This has changed Australia’s reputation within the global community. No longer can we be viewed as a peace-loving nation, when we have, by the acquisition of attack submarines, so obviously oriented ourselves towards war. How this was allowed to happen is mysterious.

Likewise, the fact that AUKUS takes us in the direction of a nuclear industry for Australia, contrary to major decisions taken four decades ago, has not yet been justified. Then, the nation was convinced that the inherent dangers of any nuclear industry, particularly the unsolved problem of the long-term disposal of highly radioactive material, made such a move unnecessary, unwise and inadvisable. What brought about this change of heart? The public is waiting to hear.

The question of whether or not the AUKUS decision places Australia in contravention of the Treaty of Rarotonga (also known as the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty) remains unanswered. The IAEA’s apparent acceptance that Australia is not in actual, direct contravention of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is, at best, extraordinary – and clearly against that treaty’s spirit. The impact on the community of Pacific Island nations is currently reverberating.

When speaking to a meeting on Hiroshima Day, I put it to my audience that, in the heat of any actual war, the undertaking not to equip AUKUS submarines with nuclear weapons could change overnight. That is something for you to consider, as the prospect of a war between the US and China becomes steadily more plausible and the chances of Australia involving itself with the US’ military efforts increasingly likely in that scenario. That AUKUS submarines, whether supplied by the UK or the US, would be capable of being nuclear armed, is an incontrovertible fact.

Many experts have raised questions about the cost of acquiring nuclear submarines, especially the opportunity cost to alternative programs – even alternative defence programs. Again, the staggering amount of money to be devoted to AUKUS has never been convincingly explained and justified, nor the opportunity cost addressed. Is the nation really in such immediate, military danger that this enormous expenditure on armaments is necessary? How do you justify such extreme extravagance?

Underlying this whole saga there lies, of course, the question of Australia’s military alliance with the US, exemplified by the Pine Gap facility, the Force Posture Agreement of 2014, the growth of military facilities in Australia’s North and the provision of submarine facilities in WA. Here, you would do well to consider the wisdom of ex-PM Malcolm Fraser. Not only did Fraser challenge the US’ “neither confirm nor deny” position on nuclear weapons, he insisted the US not bring them into Australia. In his book Dangerous Allies, he pointed out that Australia only needs the US’ “protection” because it is so closely allied with the most aggressive of all nations. We have placed too much faith in the US’ benevolence towards us and have chosen to ignore its horrifying record of military violence and meddling in the affairs of independent nations. It is time to see our relationship with the US for what it is – a “protection racket”.

Meanwhile, it is doubtful that the AUKUS submarines can ever be as effective in Australia’s defence as alternative ships. Further, analysis of the production of submarines in the US indicates it is unlikely that Australia will ever be supplied with second-hand US nuclear submarines.

From its inception, AUKUS has been a bad idea. The weight of rational argument against it is simply overwhelming. The final mystery is why you can continue to support such a hare-brained initiative. Nothing about it adds up to anything resembling good sense.

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.