If we want to win the Pacific, we must first listen – and stop blaming China for everything
If we want to win the Pacific, we must first listen – and stop blaming China for everything
Fred Zhang

If we want to win the Pacific, we must first listen – and stop blaming China for everything

A 9 September editorial in The Sydney Morning Herald, titled China and Australia in a high-speed race to win control of the Pacific, offered a vivid picture of the daily contest for influence in the region.

From duelling vehicle donations in Honiara to “kung fu diplomacy”, it painted a familiar picture of Australia and China locked in constant competition. Yet this framing, while colourful, risks entrenching a mindset that has repeatedly undermined Australia’s interests.

Australia has long treated the Pacific as its exclusive sphere of influence. But this attitude has cost us dearly. The Solomon Islands’ 2022 security pact with Beijing was not simply China’s doing – it was the consequence of years in which Canberra neglected Pacific concerns and dismissed their priorities. When island nations warned of climate change as an existential threat, Australia doubled down on fossil fuel exports. When they sought more economic options, our offers fell short. Unsurprisingly, some of our closest neighbours turned to others.

This is more than a matter of pride; it goes to the heart of strategy. When Pacific nations feel ignored or disrespected, they naturally become more receptive to alternative partnerships. By treating influence as an entitlement, Australia has left space for others to step in, often at the expense of our credibility and regional trust.

The SMH editorial’s analogy, likening China’s current role in the Pacific to Imperial Japan’s wartime occupation of the Solomon Islands, is equally misplaced and historically misleading. During World War II, China was an essential ally, suffering tens of millions of casualties, tying down well over a million Japanese troops and preventing Tokyo from redeploying its forces into the Pacific theatre.

Without China’s resistance, campaigns such as Guadalcanal and Papua New Guinea could have been far more catastrophic for Australia. To now equate China with Imperial Japan erases that history, disrespects the sacrifices of a wartime partner, and distorts the lessons we should be drawing. The true lesson is clear: sustainable influence is earned through genuine partnership, not through coercion or historical misrepresentation.

Compounding this, the editorial oscillates between trivialisation and melodrama – portraying China and Australia as teenagers vying for affection one moment, then as heroes battling demons the next. This kind of framing may grab attention, but it does little to help Australians understand the serious, structural challenges in the Pacific.

It reduces sovereign neighbours to characters in a play about us, while inflating ordinary diplomacy into a civilisational clash. The result is a narrative that entertains but does not inform – and risks leading policymakers to repeat shallow patterns of engagement that have already failed.

The article also leans heavily on allegations by opposition figures in the Solomon Islands that Chinese agents offered cash to politicians in 2022. Whether or not those claims hold water, focusing on them obscures the larger reality: Beijing has built influence not only through whispers of bribery, but through delivering what Pacific governments say they need – roads, ports, schools, hospitals, scholarships and investment. It also brings hard-won experience in poverty reduction and infrastructure building that resonates with nations still struggling for development. These are the offerings that give Beijing credibility, not envelopes of cash. By dwelling on allegations alone, Australian commentary risks missing the bigger truth: China wins attention in the Pacific because it addresses needs we too often overlooked.

The deeper issue is a Western-centric lens that frames the Pacific as a chessboard for great powers. In this telling, China and Australia are the players; Pacific nations are the pawns. This ignores the clear and consistent assertion of agency by Pacific leaders themselves. The Solomon Islands’ 2022 pact with Beijing was driven by domestic needs — riot control, economic diversification — not simply by Chinese manipulation. Kiribati’s alignment with China reflects a sovereign decision to diversify development partners. For these nations, Beijing’s presence is a hedge against over reliance on Canberra. Reducing such choices to “elite capture” misses the reality: Australia’s own paternalism and climate inaction have driven neighbours to diversify.

Much of this comes back to a deeper blind spot in Western media and among political elites. Modern Australia was, in many ways, born into wealth – endowed with vast resources, sheltered by geography, and integrated early into global trade. That prosperity fostered a lingering sense of entitlement inherited from Britain: the habit of treating smaller Pacific Island Countries, many of them former colonies, as pawns rather than equals. But this mindset no longer works. Today’s Pacific leaders are well educated, their populations are connected to global information flows, and they understand perfectly the importance of equality and respect. They will not tolerate being patronised.

By contrast, China continues to frame itself as a developing country and a voice for the Global South. Whatever one thinks of Beijing’s motives, it does bring to the table experience in poverty reduction, infrastructure building and economic planning. This gives it a vocabulary of solidarity that often resonates more strongly with Pacific states than the paternalism they have sometimes encountered from Canberra or Washington. Australia cannot afford to ignore this. Respect, partnership, and humility are not idealistic slogans – they are the basis of sustainable influence.

This Western centrism is also evident in the proposal for a “Pacific Union” that would integrate Australia and New Zealand with island nations, but exclude China and the United States. Such a vision assumes Pacific Island countries should align with Australian strategic anxieties rather than their own priorities. In reality, the Pacific Islands Forum’s “2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent” sets out a clear agenda: climate resilience, sustainable fisheries, renewable energy and equitable development. Any integration framework that sidelines these priorities risks repeating the mistakes of the past.

The zero-sum mindset is not only politically corrosive, it is economically inefficient. The Pacific holds enormous potential in renewable energy, sustainable fisheries, tourism and critical minerals. But no single country can unlock that potential. Australia has capital and expertise, Pacific nations hold resources, and other players — including China — bring technology and manufacturing. Instead of outbidding every initiative dollar-for-dollar, Canberra should focus on leading partnerships that put Australia at the centre of value chains that deliver benefits for all. A Pacific solar project that draws on Australian finance, Pacific resources, and outside technology is still a win for Australia if it stabilises the region and creates opportunities for our firms.

Our long-term security is best served by a multipolar Pacific in which no outside power dominates. The surest way to achieve that is to encourage diverse partnerships, while ensuring Australia is consistently the most reliable, respectful and useful partner. Forcing countries to choose sides is counterproductive; positioning ourselves as indispensable is far smarter.

Climate change is where Australia’s credibility will be decided. For Pacific nations, rising seas and extreme weather are not future concerns – they are present realities. Vehicle donations will not secure our influence, but leadership on climate action could. That means helping the region adapt, investing in renewable energy, and — crucially — accelerating our own energy transition. If Canberra wants lasting trust, we must show that we take seriously the very threat our neighbours say is existential.

History provides a guide. The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands worked not because Australia imposed its will, but because it answered a request and respected local sovereignty. Similarly, the Albanese Government’s greater emphasis on listening, rather than lecturing, is a welcome correction. The more Australia demonstrates that it hears Pacific voices and responds constructively, the more secure our position will be.

Compared to the more ideological narratives of the Morrison years — when China was often painted as a near-demonic threat — the SMH’s recent editorials present a more measured account of strategic competition and a broader global perspective. That shift is refreshing and deserves recognition. But the persistence of a zero-sum framing risks perpetuating the very resentments that weaken Australia’s influence.

In the end, influence is not won by gifts of cars or grand speeches, but by showing up when it matters – on climate, on development, on dignity. Australia can either play a zero-sum game it cannot win, or embrace a higher standard: to be the partner that Pacific nations want, not the patron they resist.

 

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.

Fred Zhang