Ishiba’s China policy increasingly contested after electoral setback
September 3, 2025
In Japan’s July 2025 Upper House elections, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and its coalition partner Komeito suffered a major defeat, while conservative parties such as Sanseito and the Conservative Party of Japan made significant gains.
During the election campaign, xenophobic rhetoric was prevalent on social media and there was widespread criticism that Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba was “pandering to China”.
Even though right-wing minor parties made significant gains, the LDP-led government remains in power. Though only half of the 250 seats in the House of Councillors were up for election, the LDP lost a significant number of seats and the ruling coalition failed to secure a majority. It also failed to secure a majority in the House of Representatives, making it a minority government in both houses. But the Ishiba administration continues.
The basic framework of the Ishiba administration’s China policy is a continuation of his predecessor Fumio Kishida’s policy. During a meeting in Peru in November 2024, Ishiba and Xi Jinping confirmed the comprehensive promotion of a “strategic mutually beneficial relationship” centred on co-operation regarding the common interests of both countries, as well as the construction of a “constructive and stable relationship”.
But since the Kishida administration, the international environment has undergone significant changes.
Donald Trump’s re-election is one factor. Another is that China has significantly more enthusiasm for the Ishiba administration, which does not include any ministers affiliated with the LDP faction of the hawkish former prime minister Shinzo Abe. Ishiba, himself, opposes visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, and he regards former prime minister Kakuei Tanaka, who achieved the normalisation of Japan-China diplomatic relations, as his “mentor”, which is seen as a positive factor by Beijing.
China has sent a number of friendly messages to Ishiba and shown a willingness to respond to Japan’s requests regarding the issue of treated wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear power plant.
The US is taking a tough stance on tariff issues, even toward its allies. Though the importance of Japan-US security ties was confirmed at the summit meeting between Ishiba and Trump, Japan is concerned that the Trump administration’s interest in security relations with its allies is declining. For China, such a situation is extremely favourable. China will take this opportunity to try to lessen the unity between the US and its allies, as well as among the US’ allies themselves.
Since Ishiba took office, visits to China by LDP executives and Diet members have become more frequent. LDP Secretary-General Yutaka Moriyama has been particularly active, giving conservatives the impression that the Ishiba administration is “pro-China”. But some view such exchanges between lawmakers as important for maintaining channels of communication between Japan and China amid poor US-China relations under the new Trump administration.
China is still Japan’s largest trading partner and economic relations remain important. Ishiba, himself, has refrained from discussing issues — such as the establishment of an Asian version of NATO and the revision of the US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement, for which he had advocated before taking office — and is now seeking to maintain the Japan-US security alliance. The Ishiba administration could be trying to strike a balance between the US and China.
There are certainly grounds for criticisms of Ishiba’s China policy. The Chinese People’s Liberation Navy and the Coast Guard have become more active in waters around Japan than ever before. The fact that two Chinese aircraft carriers have reached the Second Island Chain and are conducting activities there is putting significant pressure on the Japanese security community.
There have also been incidents of Japanese nationals being attacked and Japanese businesspeople being detained in China. On 18 September 2024, the anniversary of the Japanese Empire’s 1931 invasion of Manchuria, a Japanese child was killed during a series of attacks on Japanese nationals near Japanese schools in China. The large number of Chinese tourists visiting Japan, as well as ongoing disputes between Chinese migrants and Japanese residents in Japan, have likely stoked negative sentiments among some Japanese citizens.
After the 2010s, 90% of Japanese citizens have held negative feelings toward China, which Japanese politicians have kept in mind. But 60% of Japanese citizens believe that relations with China are important. The Japanese Government must manage its relations with China while being mindful of these nuanced public sentiments.
The economy, which has long underpinned the importance of strong relations with China, is losing its salience. The number of Japanese citizens who support maintaining strong ties with China is gradually declining.
Traditionally, Japan has managed its relations with China through the principle of separation of politics and economics. But maintaining this separation has become increasingly difficult as economic security issues have gained prominence. While Japanese companies still place a high value on the Chinese market and are working to minimise the impact of economic security concerns, Japanese direct investment to China is declining, and various forms of risk are becoming more strongly recognised.
The Ishihara administration places greater emphasis on dialogue with China than previous administrations, which were organised by the Abe faction, a conservative political group within the LDP. There are no former Abe faction ministers in the Ishihara administration, making the situation difficult to navigate.
If the next administration is led by the conservative wing of the LDP, Japan’s policy toward China could shift abruptly toward a more hardline stance, including on issues of historical recognition, which would threaten the currently constructive and relatively stable bilateral relationship. But even if conservative powers rise in Japan, this does not necessarily mean they will immediately move toward strengthening the Japan-US alliance. The Sanseito, which made significant gains in the July Upper House election, has taken a critical stance and is instead advocating for greater autonomy in Japan’s security policy.
Republished from East Asia Forum, 31 August 2025
The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.