If a pathway to translating Palestine into reality remains elusive, and the wounds of today are not healed, a grim future awaits – not only for Palestinians, Israel and Israelis, but for the cohesion of Australian society as well.

Recognition of Palestine is, therefore, welcome, both as a statement of Australian values and because it reduces the gap which supporters of Palestine can identify between the idealism of our rhetoric and the realism of our formal policy position.

Although many in the community would like more action to stop the carnage in Gaza, at least there is now a starting point for constructive dialogue between the Australian Government and its critics about the limits to the possible.

But two key issues remain to be addressed.

The first, following from recognition of Palestine, is how best to pursue, even as a generational project, the achievement of peace with justice, security and equal rights for Israelis and Palestinians.

In principle, the goal is clear, but its practical form, and the pathway to reaching such an outcome, have never looked more uncertain.

Are there to be two states — as Israel firmly rejects — or one state? Is Australia to accept that the right of self-determination from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean is to be reserved, indefinitely and exclusively, as Israel insists, for Jews?

What does justice mean when it comes to the rights of Palestinian refugees — perhaps 80% of whom still live within 100 kms of the homes they were forced to flee in in 1947-48? And even if that issue has an answer, at least in theory, how would anyone address the political issue within Israel of what happens to Jewish families who have lived in those Palestinian homes since 1948, or on Palestinian land since 1967?

If refugee issues are to be part of a region-wide settlement, will there be justice for those Jews who were forced to flee from Arab countries such as Iraq and Yemen when Israel was created?

No one can predict what will be the political, societal and security consequences, a generation from now, of the cruelty beyond belief that Palestinians have experienced. Nor is it clear what values and patterns of behaviour will characterise Israeli society when the fighting stops.

What is clear is that the US and Israel are now more isolated than ever before on the Palestine issue. And the traditional, exclusive US grip on dealings between Israel and Palestine is at risk in the UN context, even as the prospects for achieving a resolution of the conflict diminish.

Until Israeli and Palestinian leaders emerge who will have the courage, vision and political discipline to engage and bring such open-ended issues to a durable, programmatic political resolution — and that seems impossible at this juncture — doubts about achieving any solution to the conflict, two state or other, will remain.

The second, more immediate issue, is that international recognition of Palestine adds, logically, to the urgency of halting the current Israeli military campaign that has no realistic chance of achieving its stated political objectives of destroying Hamas and freeing hostages. (Its probable, if unstated, objective of rendering Gaza uninhabitable is another matter, however.)

Hamas is an abomination. Its attack in 2023 destroyed the lives and hopes of Palestinians for generations. But the problem, so far as ending the fighting is concerned, is that Hamas and the Israeli occupation are mutually constituted.

Although Hamas leaders may undertake to eschew any formal role in governance, so long as the occupation continues, Hamas will remain, in practice, more determined and battle-hardened, and more potent socially and politically, than any Palestinian alternative.

Even those Arab states sometimes able to influence and constrain its behaviour have proven unable to challenge the organisation’s fundamental sense of identity and purpose.

Under occupation, Hamas has not lost, and will not lose, the will to fight. And far from being party to disarming Hamas on behalf of Israel and the US, the Arab leaderships will continue to live with it.

Meanwhile, the Israeli military campaign, along with the de facto annexation of the West Bank, will continue to severely compromise the political legitimacy and credibility of the Palestinian Authority. And the ultimate effect of further discrediting the PA, and eviscerating its financial viability, is to deny the possibility of achieving the justice, security and equal rights for Palestinians upon which peace ultimately depends.

Traumatised by 7 October 2023, and preoccupied with the fate of Israeli hostages, few Israelis appear concerned at the genocide and famine in Gaza, or the reduction of Israel to the international status of a pariah state. In practice, such external criticism matters little.

For Israeli extremists, including the Jewish settler movement, 7 October represents an opportunity to pursue a vision of a Jewish state that extends across Gaza and the West Bank.

Even if the present government is forced to stop short of formal annexation of those areas, it will place enormous pressure upon Palestinians living beyond major urban centres and in refugee camps.

Trump has shown no interest in constraining the military campaign. US Congressional support for Israel is unwavering.

For Australia, ending the military campaign sits logically and morally alongside support for a Palestinian state. Australia is legally obliged to support attempts to end the war.

However, there are clear practical and political limits to placing additional pressure upon Israel. And the pursuit of Australia’s wider interests in the relationship with Washington suggests we should find a place in the middle of the vanguard on Palestine, rather than the front.

Australia is already sanctioning high-profile advocates for the settler movement, including some members of the Israeli Cabinet. Australia is unlikely to commit itself to executing international arrest warrants. Arms sales are effectively suspended already.

Like other Western governments, Australia has acted against imports from Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Introducing an economic boycott at the national level would encounter strong political resistance and have little actual impact upon Israel.

Australia may delay the appointment of the next ambassador to Tel Aviv, but few Israelis would know or care if Australia reduced the level of its defence co-operation or diplomatic representation.

Given the obduracy and determination of Israel’s political leadership to pursue its assault, and the failure of sustained efforts by concerned Israelis to shift the Netanyahu Government on such issues as the hostages, and before that on legal reform proposals, the likelihood of popular pressure in Israel ending the war on Palestinians is very limited.

But unless there is a change of approach on the part of President Trump, it is only by bringing home to ordinary Israelis that the actions of Israel in Gaza since 2023 have far exceeded any legal or moral justification, and that there will be consequences for them if the military campaign continues, that lives may be saved.

Accordingly, if it is to contribute to ending the conflict, Australia should help to build a global consensus to suspend all cultural, sporting and academic links with Israel until it ends its actions in Gaza, and enables the unhindered distribution of humanitarian aid by UN agencies to all those in need.

While stopping short of direct interference, Australia should work, ideally but not essentially in step with like-minded governments, to make it clear to those bodies that are at the peak of Australian sport, culture and academia that the government would understand and support any decisions on their part to suspend contacts and engagement with their Israeli counterparts until those requirements are met.

There should be a clear statement that those Australians who, as dual nationals, may serve with the Israel Defence Forces, may be subject to prosecution in Australia if the International Court of Justice determines that war crimes have been committed. It should also make it clear that Israelis seeking to visit Australia will be asked whether they have undertaken military service in Gaza; and their visa applications will be reviewed accordingly.

While these modest measures may prove to have limited effect on the ground in Israel, let alone in defence of Palestine, there can be no justification for Australia failing to use such influence and leverage as may be open to it to help bring this carnage to a halt.

Republished from The Sydney Morning Herald, 28 September 2025

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.