Reforming university governance: Restoring accountability and the public mission
Reforming university governance: Restoring accountability and the public mission
Adam Lucas,  James Guthrie

Reforming university governance: Restoring accountability and the public mission

Over the past three decades, Australia’s public universities have experienced a profound shift in governance culture.

Collegial decision-making — once anchored in democratic representation — has been replaced by corporate models emphasising market competition, managerial authority and financial performance. While advocates of this shift claimed it would modernise the sector, mounting evidence suggests it has damaged educational quality, eroded staff morale, and undermined public trust.

Reports from the National Tertiary Education Union, Academics for Public Universities, and Public Universities Australia and our own public research reveal a consistent pattern: excessive executive salaries, extravagant discretionary spending, over-reliance on external consultants, poor workforce planning and widespread wage theft. These failings are not isolated episodes, but symptoms of governance frameworks that have prioritised commercial perspectives over the expertise and voices of those who teach, research and study in our universities.

From collegiality to corporatisation

Legislative changes since the early 1990s have altered the composition of university governing bodies, or councils, in ways that have diminished academic and student representation. Today, fewer than 25% of council members are elected by staff or students, while 68% are appointed – over half from industries such as mining, consulting and finance. Fewer than one-third have direct higher education experience.

By contrast, corporate boards in the private sector generally maintain a majority of members with deep industry-specific knowledge. The inversion in higher education has facilitated a managerial culture in which vice-chancellors are treated — and paid — like corporate chief executives.

The results are stark. In 2023, the average vice-chancellor’s salary was $1.049 million – almost twice that of the prime minister. Across the sector, more than 300 executives earned more than their state premiers. These remuneration levels have been accompanied by significant spending on overseas travel, entertainment, office refurbishments and prestige building projects, even as academic programs are downsized or closed.

Workforce impacts

This executive largesse has occurred alongside worsening conditions for the academic and professional workforce. Over the past 15 years, more than 30 universities have underpaid at least 142,000 staff by a total of $382 million. Around 68% of staff are now on casual or fixed-term contracts – fixed-term rates are more than 10 times the national average. Casual staff often work unpaid hours, face contract manipulation and risk blacklisting if they raise concerns.

Workforce instability has been compounded by poor planning. During the COVID-19 pandemic, approximately 35,000 staff were retrenched – many from roles that had to be refilled later. The cycle continues, with further job cuts announced in 2024 and 2025. Disciplines such as sociology and other humanities fields are being downsized or eliminated, even in universities with rising student enrolments.

The democratic deficit

The concentration of decision-making authority within small executive circles has diminished transparency and weakened accountability. Major budgetary and policy decisions — affecting thousands of staff and students — are often made behind closed doors, with limited or perfunctory consultation.

An NTEU survey of elected staff representatives found that only 19% expressed confidence in their governing body’s ability to address governance failures, 76% were unaware of any processes to manage conflicts of interest and more than half believed their contributions were disregarded. Some reported being actively excluded from subcommittees or discouraged from participating in governance discussions.

Such governance cultures, critics argue, are opaque, intolerant of dissent, and increasingly detached from the academic mission. The Universities Accord (2024) acknowledged that governance in higher education should be “exemplary” although it remains one of the least transparent domains of public administration.

Legislative reform as a precondition

With the exception of ANU, Australia’s 37 public universities are constituted under state and territory legislation, which defines the composition, powers and responsibilities of their governing bodies. Most of the necessary reforms will, therefore, require legislative amendment at the state and territory level and negotiations via the Council of Australian Governments.

The goal should be to restore a balance between appointed members and elected representatives, ensure sectoral expertise predominates and embed statutory obligations for transparency, ethical conduct and genuine stakeholder participation. Academics for Public Universities has developed proposals for democratically accountable governance, and Public Universities Australia has drafted a Model Act to guide reform.

Key recommendations

The NTEU has outlined reforms that draw on both domestic research and international best practice:

  • Require at least 50% of governing body members to be elected staff and students.
  • Ensure a majority of appointed members have public sector or higher education experience.
  • Publish board agendas, minutes and performance evaluations.
  • Align remuneration with public service norms, ban undisclosed bonuses and require complete salary transparency.
  • Mandate disclosure of all board and executive financial interests and prohibit executives from holding paid positions in companies contracting with their university.
  • Provide mandatory ethics induction training for all board members.
  • Guarantee full participation rights for elected representatives on all subcommittees.
  • Link increases in public funding to demonstrable governance reform.
  • Incorporate governance quality indicators into federal performance-based funding criteria.

Such measures would address not only excessive remuneration and managerial overreach, but also the lack of transparency and accountability that characterises governance in the sector.

Restoring the public mission

Australia’s public universities were established to advance education, research and public service – not to emulate private corporations. The dominance of commercially oriented appointees on governing bodies has undermined this mission, weakened the sector’s capacity and jeopardised its social licence.

International examples demonstrate that high-performing universities can — and often do — maintain strong academic and student representation in governance. These arrangements promote transparency, protect academic freedom and align leadership decisions with the institution’s core mission.

If universities are to rebuild public trust and deliver on their foundational purposes, governance reform must be treated as an urgent priority. Restoring democratic representation, sectoral expertise, and transparency is not simply a matter of principle – it is essential to the sustainability and integrity of Australia’s higher education system.

 

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.

Adam Lucas

James Guthrie