On 1 November, the leaders of the nations of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum will meet in the historic South Korean city of Gyeongju.

Gyeongju was the capital of the ancient kingdom of Silla (57 BC – 935 AD), which ruled most of the Korean peninsula for close to a thousand years. Not unlike the modern Republic of Korea, Silla became a prosperous and wealthy country. Gyeongju was then the fourth largest city in the world. 

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung will host the 2025 APEC Summit and Leader’s Forum. The occasion is historic for Korea, timely for Australia, and opportune — or dangerous — for the US-China relationship. The original idea of APEC was proposed by former prime minister Bob Hawke during a speech in Seoul on 31 January 1989. Ten months later, 12 Asia-Pacific economies met in Canberra to establish APEC. The full membership now numbers 21 nations – including China, Russia and Vietnam. 

In 1993, prime minister Paul Keating convinced US President Bill Clinton to support the establishment of an annual APEC Leaders’ Meeting to provide greater strategic vision and direction for economic co-operation in the region. Keating wanted APEC to be a geopolitical strategic forum for heads of government. To accommodate the Americans, he settled for a hybrid model that included leaders, but focused mostly on economic matters. It is this leaders’ meeting, in November, that will provide a unique opportunity for Presidents Trump and Xi — along with prime minister Anthony Albanese and the leaders of Japan and the ASEAN economies — to meet in person. The usual proceedings of the summit will be enlivened this year by the escalating economic and military tensions between the US and China – and between China and the host country, Korea.

Writing in this journal on 6 October, former Australian foreign policy official Jeffrey Robertson highlighted the potential impact of anti-China protests at the upcoming summit. Robertson now lives in Korea. He notes that anti-China sentiment is today a regular feature at political demonstrations in Seoul and has grown substantially with the spread of extreme right sentiment on social media. Both Beijing and Seoul are concerned, he says. 

Over the past year, at least 110 anti-China rallies have taken place nationwide, according to data from the Korean National Police Agency. Anti-Chinese emotions escalated in 2024 following former South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol’s false claims that past elections in Korea were rigged due to Chinese government influence. Though Yoon is now standing trial for insurrection, anti-China sentiment among far right conservatives remains strong.

Robertson has speculated on what the anti China protests really mean for Koreans:

“Some American analysts have taken comfort in South Korea’s growing anti-China sentiment, seeing opportunities to sit Seoul firmly beside Tokyo, Manila, and Canberra on the anti-China bandwagon. This interpretation is not only shallow – it is wrong. Anti-China sentiment in South Korea is real, and it’s growing, but it should not be read as a simple alignment with US strategy. Indeed, anti-China protests may actually mark South Korea’s steady turn to China.”

That alliance, a critical element in America’s current policy of containment of China, is itself undergoing a significant transformation. Earlier this month, President Lee announced he would proceed with plans to take back wartime operational control of his country’s military from the US. The US has more than 28,000 troops in South Korea. In peacetime, South Korea has authority over its own forces; a formidable 450,000 troops, plus 3.1 million reservists on call. But if war were to break out, command of combined Korean and US forces would revert to an American general. This uncomfortable operational control reflects the history of the two countries’ alliance during the 1950-53 Korean War. Then the ROK depended heavily on US forces and firepower to fight North Korea and China. Today, the story is markedly different. Koreans have confidence in their defence capabilities and resources. The ROK’s defence budget is 1.4 times North Korea’s total GDP, making it the world’s fifth largest military power.

After years of internal debate and repeated obstruction in Washington, President Lee declared this month that the era of dependence on foreign security guarantees must now give way to a “self-reliant defence” rooted in national sovereignty. There is also an active, if muted, debate in Korean society about the merits and risks of developing nuclear weapons. Many Koreans want their country to break free from the unreliable US nuclear umbrella and counter the nuclear threat from North Korea themselves. As undesirable as that outcome may be, it is more evidence that Koreans want their defence and security to be in their government’s hands.

Lee’s concept of “self-reliant defence” based in national sovereignty is an aspiration Australia would do well to explore. Currently, we are saddled with Richard Marles’ dangerous “All the way with the USA” doctrine – exemplified by the reckless AUKUS pact. As the Koreans navigate the complex geopolitical and military dynamics of the US-North Korea-China relationship, Australian leaders would do well to watch and learn. The legacy of the Korean War has left South Korea with a unique relationship with the US that makes sovereignty a concrete issue. But as the operational control question highlights, Koreans are prepared to show confidence in their regional relationships and move away from their dependence on the US alliance. Australia is yet to show that confidence. 

The operational control issue surfaced recently in Washington when Elbridge Colby, Donald Trump’s Undersecretary of War for Policy, said he “supports efforts to bolster South Korea’s role in in the alliance” and hinted that an operational control transfer may be approved by Trump. Such a move could be advantageous for Washington should it choose to reopen dialogue with North Korea and renew Trump’s first-term dalliance with Kim Jong-un. Pyongyang has long fixated on the US-South Korea alliance and the existential threat it presents to the Kim regime. Any substantial US-Norh Korea agreement — particularly an end-of-war declaration or peace treaty — could signal the end of the US military presence on the peninsula. Colby is, of course, the same senior Trump official in charge of the much anticipated US review of AUKUS. It is expected the US will soon approve the AUKUS pact.

Of course, the hawks in the Pentagon or the ever erratic Trump, may well derail the opportunity Lee’s operational control proposal presents for a political settlement in Korea. In his first meeting with Lee, Trump openly stated his intention to seek “ownership” of the huge US military base at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek. Notwithstanding Trump’s conceit, the reality is his attitude points to the uncertainty of US foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region. For some time now, Trump has been signalling a strong emphasis on homeland defence for the US. It is apparent that his administration has not yet resolved where to draw the defence line in Asia. 

There are signs are that a determination is coming. Colby emerges again in speculation about what Washington will reveal for the Asia-Pacific in a soon to be released National Defence Strategy. Credible media reports in the South China Morning Post and Nikkei Asia have asserted that the strategy will reposition the US military as a “restrainer” of Chinese power – backing away from outright containment and confrontation and seeking more military self-reliance from US allies. Colby has also reportedly said that, while Taiwan is a very important ally, it is not “an existential interest for the US”. 

The evidence for a change in the US position has been accumulating for some time — notably open calls from Washington for Taiwan, Japan, Korea and Australia — to pay much more for their own defence. The MAGA-inspired Republican Party wants the US to prioritise defence of the US homeland rather than seeking confrontation with Beijing and Moscow. For South Korea, the upside may well be an opportunity to assert full sovereign control over its military – a prospect that may ironically lead to improved relations with both North Korea and China. It is possible such a move may open a window for a peace treaty on the peninsula. That would indeed be a gift for the world.

For Australia, the geopolitical window of opportunity is currently obscured by the blind faith in the Cold War era ANZUS treaty. The often politically invoked “US alliance” has encouraged Australians to believe that the US will come to our rescue in a war with a regional enemy. That enemy is now openly named as China, in a conflict, it is said, that must come sooner or later. That crazy belief, reinforced by the bipartisan political investment in AUKUS, is our foreign policy Achilles heel. It anchors us in an Alice in Wonderland world of geopolitical irrelevance.

There is an alternative and an opportunity for Australia. As the architect of the APEC Leaders Forum, Keating believed strongly that the forum had the capacity to tackle the “difficult topics”. He identified these as “of the strategic variety, like the arms race currently being run in North Asia and the risk proposed by the continued proliferation of nuclear weapons”.

In a speech about the potential of APEC given at the Evatt Foundation in August 2007, Keating succinctly identified the reality of Australia’s place in the world and the main threats to peace in the Asia-Pacific. He said:

“Australia’s vital interests are in East Asia. They are not in North America or Southern Africa or Europe. They are here, where we live, in the fastest growing region in the world. It is in this region that Australia’s destiny lies; it is only in this region that our security can be found and that will only happen when our foreign policies and our economic and trade policies are in appropriate and sensible alignment…

“In my opinion the most seriously dangerous part of the world is North Asia, within that triangle of unresolved tensions between China and Japan and the Korean peninsula.”

Trump is riding high from his “peacemaking” initiative in the Middle East and is about to unveil new policy in the Asia-Pacific. Xi has repositioned China as a defender of orderly international free trade and a multipolar world. Lee has signalled his intention to adopt a more independent and measured security policy and engage co-operatively with China and North Korea. His Unification Minister told the National Assembly this week that a framework recognising South and North Korea as “two peaceful states” will now become the official position of the government.

Are Australia’s foreign policy mandarins watching these developments? What will Prime Minister Albanese contribute to APEC, the forum his Labor predecessor did so much to establish? Most importantly, will Australia reassess its strategic outlook in response to the tectonic shifts now underway in the “triangle of unresolved tensions”? 

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.