David Day’s book Hawke PM is the latest in a long list of books covering the Hawke era and may well be the last we’ll see for quite some time.

But it should not be regarded as the last word. Those who were there during his time in office, or who closely observed the Hawke era, will find it hard to align this book with what they observed.

Day clearly has no idea what it is like to be in a ministerial position, never mind being prime minister. If you are to believe Day’s account, Hawke spent his days in office sleeping around and corrupt activities.

Day tells us nothing new as he regurgitates every allegation ever made against Hawke.

In the index, under the broad headings of “businessmen and corruption” and “negative actions and outcomes,” we find 31 entries, the former with 11, and the latter with 20. The entries range from “association with dodgy characters to “called a little crook by Peacock".

By way of contrast, China rates only two references.

Corruption is suggested when we read that “without giving any reasons” in September 1982, Sydney judge John Foord overturned a conviction against Hawke’s daughter Susan for marijuana cultivation and possession.

Hawke was not even prime minister at this time and there is not a jot of evidence to support any allegation of his corruption in this decision.

We are also told that the July 1987 election was prompted by the Queensland state government announcement of the Fitzgerald inquiry into Queensland corruption. Day tells us that, “The inquiry could see Hawke dragged into the spotlight, much as Murphy had been in New South Wales.”

In fact, the Fitzgerald inquiry targeted the corruption of the Queensland state National Party and, if anything, would have been seen as a boost to Labor’s chances in the federal election. Labor was duly elected, winning 86 seats in the House to the Coalition’s 62.

What of all the other Day stories, allegations and innuendo? Not one charge of criminal behaviour was ever laid against Hawke. Not one was even brought to court.

This is not a book about Hawke, the prime minister, as the title suggests, but rather a book of Hawke tittle-tattle.

How did the Prime Minister really spend his days in office? When in Canberra, typically he would be in Parliament House by 8.30am. On a quiet day he might leave at 6pm but often would then have to deliver a speech, or attend a meeting.

If he went straight to The Lodge_,_ he’d still have to read briefing papers.

On a sitting day he’d be lucky to get away from Parliament House by 10pm.

Hawke sought to limit the doorstop interview on entering, or leaving Parliament House. But that could never stop a rogue journalist from trying it on, or the grumpy old man having a go.

Like every prime minister, he had to know about every major media story and be ready to respond to questions. He had to be on top of the economic, environment, foreign affairs, education, or health political issues of the day. Daily appointments with dignitaries, business people, ministers, caucus leaders and, of course, his own staff, consumed every spare minute. Hawke didn’t just have private meetings with transport tycoon, Peter Abeles, and a sprinkling of allegedly corrupt businessmen, as this book implies.

Question time is an ordeal for any minister. Every day, before the event, Hawke had to get on top of his question time brief, a large folder containing draft answers to questions prepared by his department and staff. Before entering the House, he met treasurer Paul Keating and the leader of the government in the Senate, John Button, to get their answers straight.

There is little in this book on policy development and the real political struggles of the day, whether they be over US MX missile tests, the Gordon-below-Franklin dam, or the challenges of industry policy, where in the Hawke Government’s early years, plans were developed that adjusted and saved the steel, automotive and textile, clothing and footwear industries.

In the early years in the old Parliament House, where journalists could lurk in King’s Hall waiting to ambush a cabinet minister, cabinet meetings sometimes ran until well after midnight, as ministers argued over such things as tax policy, funding cuts, or the logging of Tasmanian forests.

While giving us accounts of Hawke’s womanising and alleged nefarious activities, Day omits, or barely mentions, many of the real challenges and achievements of the day.

The Whitlam Labor Government started the rapprochement with Beijing. But it was Hawke who took the relationship forward, with his understanding of the need to establish favourable government-to-government relations.

In 1984 — a year after Hawke was elected — an agreement was signed in Canberra to undertake a feasibility study into a China-Australia joint venture iron ore mine at Mt Channar in the Pilbara. The following year, Hawke escorted China’s Communist Party secretary-general, Hu Yaobang, around the Pilbara, where they visited the potential mine site. The next year, Hawke and Hu flew around China together and formed a close relationship. And, in 1987, Rio Tinto and Sinosteel signed the Channar joint venture agreement – China’s first major overseas investment in an Australian iron ore mine.

In 1984, China was Australia’s 10th biggest trading partner. The following year, it was our fifth biggest with our iron ore and concentrate exports worth a mere $179 million. Today China is by far our largest trading partner and our iron ore and concentrate exports to China are worth a staggering $105 billion!

In many controversial issues, Day seems to accept the Keating version of events. He says that although Keating was prime minister for less than half the time Hawke was, many observers believe Keating had a bigger impact on the direction of the nation.

He presents Keating’s version of the successful floating of the dollar and his version of the failure of the tax summit.

In fact, it was Hawke and his office and the Reserve Bank, that drove the float of the dollar. Treasury, led by John Stone, was strongly opposed to the float and Keating went along with Stone, telling ministerial colleague, John Button, “You have to understand the Treasury writes the book and I speak it.”

In his biography of Keating, his former staffer, John Edwards, says Keating’s own economic adviser, Barry Hughes, agreed that Hawke’s office drove the float. And the confirmation of this comes in a contemporary Note for File, written by Treasury deputy secretary, C.R. Rye on 13 December 1983, saying that Keating told Stone on the night before the float that the prime minister had “bought in” and that Keating was “afraid that the matter was getting away from us".

In 1984-85, tax reform was the major policy challenge. Hawke gave Keating the job of developing and selling tax policy. Who else should he have given it to? The environment minister?

In the months leading up to the July 1985 Tax Summit, Keating and his staff met Hawke’s team. Keating then wheeled his “tax cart” around the country, with most of the Canberra Press Gallery comfortably on board, uncritically accepting his “Option C” proposal.

But Keating failed miserably to win the support of the key interest groups, never mind the general public. On the weekend before the summit, the Victorian Labor Party state conference overwhelmingly voted to reject Keating’s Option C.  This came on top of criticism of the proposal from other leading Labor politicians such as the NSW premier, Neville Wran, NSW right-wing Labor Council figure, John McBean, all of the Left of the party, and the leader of the centre-left’s faction, Senator Peter Cook.

Three days before the Summit I wrote in a comment piece for the Canberra Times that the prospects of Keating’s consumption tax being introduced had been “blown apart".

On the morning of the summit, the Canberra Times published my comment which opened saying, “The question is no longer whether the government’s preferred tax package will be accepted but when and how the government can dump it.”

As best I can recall, only Niki Savva, writing in the Herald Sun, expressed similar views. The rest of the gallery appeared to swallow Keating’s line.

But from the moment the summit began, it was clear that his proposal was doomed. The first speaker, the president, of the Business Council of Australia, Bob White, said bluntly that the BCA could not accept any of Keating’s options, A, B or C. He was followed by 21 other speakers who rejected Keating’s proposal.

Covering for their failure to see the bleeding obvious, media stories followed, presenting the story that Hawke had let Keating down. This is the version that Day presents.

No significant player at the summit supported Keating’s proposal. State premiers, business leaders, the welfare lobby and the Labor and union movement rejected it. So much for Keating’s exceptional persuasive powers, which to this day some of his old press gallery fans continue to tout.

Hawke was far from perfect. But it is a Keating myth that after Hawke broke down in tears in August 1984 over his daughter Rosslyn’s heroin addiction, he failed to perform as prime minister. He went on to win three more elections.

Keating followed, winning a fifth term for Labor, thanks to Opposition leader John Hewson’s 650-page doctrinaire Fightback policy. Hawke was to later observe that he had saved Keating by stopping his Goods and Services Tax (Option C) and John Hewson saved him by having a GST.

Senator Susan Ryan is one of Hawke’s many ministers who later praised what really mattered, his ability to run a cabinet government. She said: “Bob Hawke was a very good leader.

“I would have to say — having seen many corporate chairmen operate since, in my career outside of politics — he’s probably the best chairman I have ever seen. He gave everyone a voice; he was not an autocrat.

“There was always a lot of humour, too, after a huge tense fight.”

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.