This week, South Korean authorities expressed concern regarding the potential impact of anti-China protests during APEC.

Anti-China sentiment is today a regular feature at political demonstrations in Seoul and has grown substantially with the growth of extreme right sentiment on social media. Both Beijing and Seoul are concerned.

Some American analysts have taken comfort in South Korea’s growing anti-China sentiment, seeing opportunities to sit Seoul firmly beside Tokyo, Manila, and Canberra on the anti-China bandwagon. This interpretation is not only shallow – it is wrong. Anti-China sentiment in South Korea is real, and it’s growing, but it should not be read as a simple alignment with US strategy. Indeed, anti-China protests may actually mark South Korea’s steady turn to China.

To understand why, decision-makers need to both know South Korea and its history. Reading diplomatic cables, opinion polls, and three-day visits won’t cut it. The utility of diplomatic reporting isn’t what it used to be; opinion polls in South Korea are, to be frank, pretty dodgy; and cosmopolitan gatekeepers at conferences will tell you what they want you to know.

South Korea is one of the world’s most patriotic and nationalist societies. It’s shaped by colonial rule, division and constant foreign pressure. Koreans tie national identity to sovereignty, resilience and collective pride, whether it’s football, k-pop, national dress, shipping, language, or dance. There’s a constant, seething, bubbling, nationalist sentiment that envelopes everything – and after young males finish compulsory military service, times that by 10 for the next few years (until they realise how hard it is to get a job and buy a house).

Then there’s history. In the 1980s, 1990s, and even into the 2000s, South Korea was home to fierce anti-American protests. Some were violent, others symbolic, but they were consistent enough to cause real anxiety in Washington. The American media often portrayed these protests as signs of a fraying alliance. Yet, what they truly reflected was something much deeper: a nationalist backlash against the perceived dominance of a foreign power over Korea’s politics, culture, and society.

The protests were not about rejecting the US wholesale. They were about resisting the dominance of a foreign power in a fiercely nationalist society.

Fast forward to today, and the pattern is strikingly familiar. The focus has shifted from Washington to Beijing. China has become the bogeyman of South Korea’s political fringes. Anti-China protests are not expressions of pro-Americanism – they are expressions of Korean nationalism. This distinction matters.

South Korea is one of the most nationalist and patriotic societies in the world. Whether expressed through mass football chants, flag-waving demonstrations, or consumer boycotts, Korean nationalism has always been less about alignment with a foreign power than about resistance to a foreign power. In the 1980s and 1990s, that meant resistance to America. In the 2020s, it increasingly means resistance to China.

Why China? Because China’s presence in Korea is growing. From tourists flocking into Seoul and Jeju on visa-free entry schemes, to the entanglement of Korean businesses in Chinese supply chains, to the cultural and political spillover effects of Beijing’s rise, China is now more relevant to Korea’s future than ever before. For Koreans who feel their nation’s autonomy is being constrained by outside powers, Beijing has become the obvious target. Anti-China protests are thus not symptoms of alliance cohesion, but of nationalist unease with a rising, nearby hegemon.

Take this to the next level. As China gets more and more important to Korea, and there is more and more benefit (and America is harder and harder to get along with), the protests will continue, but the protesters will be more on the fringe.

The danger for Washington is to misread these protests as strategic alignment. American analysts comfort themselves with survey data showing high anti-China sentiment among young Koreans and assume that translates into an automatic strengthening of the US-ROK alliance. But that is a category error. High anti-China sentiment does not equal low anti-American sentiment. It equals high nationalist sentiment. The target shifts depending on who appears dominant.

This means two things. First, the protests will not go away. Just as anti-American protests flared up intermittently over decades — peaking at moments of political crisis, or after tragic incidents — they will continue to do so against China. The protests are an outlet for resentment of foreign dominance and, in a society as politically mobilised and nationalist as South Korea’s, such outlets will remain powerful.

Second, the fact that the target has shifted should not reassure Washington. Quite the opposite. It should raise alarm bells. In the past, the bogeyman was America, because America was the dominant outside power. Now the bogeyman is China. That shift reflects not that Korea is “choosing America”, but that China is becoming more prominent, more important, and more inescapable in Korea’s daily life.

When Koreans chant against China, they are acknowledging — however reluctantly — that Beijing’s influence is pervasive. From a strategic perspective, this is what American analysts should worry about.

South Korea is not being drawn into a neat “anti-China coalition". Instead, it is grappling with a complex, uncomfortable reality: China is too big, too close, and too important to ignore. Korean businesses profit from friendlier trade conditions and geographic proximity. Korean universities and tourist industries benefit from Chinese students and travellers. Politicians may rail against Beijing, but they must also accommodate it. The mainstream of Korean society is pragmatic. It will continue to profit from China, even as a nationalist fringe shouts slogans against it.

The lesson of the past is clear. Anti-American protests did not unravel the alliance, nor did they bind Koreans permanently to Washington’s worldview. They were eruptions of nationalism in response to perceived dominance. Anti-China protests today are the same. They are not signs of a durable strategic shift, but of an episodic nationalist response. Washington analysts who see these protests as evidence of alliance strength misunderstand the dynamics of Korean politics.

The truth is harder to swallow: the real story is not about anti-China protests, but about China’s growing centrality to South Korea. If Beijing were irrelevant, there would be nothing to protest. The protests are proof of relevance, not irrelevance. And in a country as fiercely patriotic as South Korea, that relevance will continue to provoke both intermittent backlash and deepening dependence.

Washington should take no comfort in Korean flags being waved against China. They are not signs of loyalty to the US. They are signs that China, not America, is now the dominant “other” against which Korean nationalism defines itself. That should be a far more sobering thought than the easy narrative of alliance solidarity.

Republished from Junotane, 1 October 2025

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.