The second Trump administration has transformed US foreign policy, with immediate implications for economic and security ties with Asia and long-term implications for regional and global order.

The administration’s trade policies have had the most visible effects, forcing long-time trading partners to  adjust to tariffs that were calculated using an  opaque and illogical formula and then to  negotiate over the results with an administration that is  unwilling to commit to a bargaining position.

The US’ global strategic posture under Trump — downplaying commitments to NATO allies in favour of hemispheric dominance and  homeland defence — suggests that the Trump administration is uncommitted to a robust or coherent Indo-Pacific policy.

Most of these developments were predicted long before January 2025, though the specific details were unknowable at the time. Nearly a year into the second Trump administration, the shape of its foreign policy has become clearer.

Foreign policy will be volatile and transactional, with an eye for  flashy wins in the US media and a focus on  mercantilist-inspired "deals". But for US partners and allies in Asia, the most troubling developments are the Trump administration’s evisceration of the core institutions of the American state.

The second Trump administration’s approach to government is guided by the politics of dominance at the expense of competence. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth prioritises  lethality and the exercise of violence over deterrence and leadership expertise. White House budget director Russell Vought  speaks with delight about putting federal employees “in trauma” and “in pain”. Kristi Noem’s Department of Homeland Security has targeted the Super Bowl — the United States’ most popular sporting event, with a half-time show set to feature Spanish-language recording artist Bad Bunny — calling the National Football League “so weak” and quipping “they suck and we’ll win”. The administration’s social media strategy is, quite literally, shitposting.

This approach to governing a modern state is unserious, juvenile and repellent. But the administration’s public posture cannot be dismissed as mere peacocking and trolling. As it weaponises the state  against the president’s opponents, it is also shedding the career staff who make its bureaucracies work and prevent disastrous policy errors. When they are replaced, it is by know-nothings and toadies who delight in transgressing norms but  lack relevant expertise.

Marco Rubio’s State Department is a case in point. Not only has  Rubio shuttered the United States Agency for International Development and  attacked Voice of America, he has also  fired many staff responsible for the state’s China strategy and Asia-Pacific policy. These moves leave the State Department without expertise in core issues related to China and even less capacity to manage fragile diplomatic relations or respond to future crises. The Trump administration’s ambassadorial picks include manosphere influencer Nick Adams for Malaysia and Florida surgeon  Anjani Sinha for Singapore. Each has earned wide criticism within the region and neither brings any diplomatic expertise.

An administration that  wilfully violates domestic and international law undermines the State Department’s diplomatic credibility, both domestically and internationally. When asked about the legal authority that allows the administration to  destroy boats in the Caribbean, killing all those aboard, Rubio could  only deflect and dissemble.

The implications for Asia are stark – the Trump administration has dismantled much of the institutional and professional expertise needed to effectively manage US interests throughout the region. The officials who remain are loyal to the president, rather than to their oath of office.

The administration’s economic diplomacy faces similar issues. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has been a consistent advocate for mercantilist trade policies. Bessent holds that Trump’s tariff threats and the  general volatility of his trade policy stance reflect a  deliberate attempt to cultivate strategic uncertainty. But given the shambolic execution of the first tariff announcement, a more likely account is that the administration has no strategic vision at all. Bessent also  defends the legality of Trump’s tariffs, despite their reliance on emergency powers that circumvent Congressional authority over tariff policy.

Given these two sources of uncertainty — about what the Trump administration actually wants and whether it has the legal authority to enact its most transformative policies — US trade partners in the region cannot rely on the Trump administration to advance a consistent economic policy.

The administration’s excesses face no effective constraint because Trump’s Republican Party controls both houses of Congress and has appointed a majority of sitting Supreme Court justices. Many of his legislative and judiciary allies truly support his unconstrained exercise of executive authority. But even if some do not, the Supreme Court and Congressional Republicans have proven unwilling to check his exercise of authority. Even when individual Republican legislators oppose Trump’s actions — such as Senator Rand Paul’s  opposition to extrajudicial killings — the party, as a collective, has been unmoved.

Amid a government shutdown with no end in sight, experts fear career civil servants will quit their positions rather than work without pay. Others may be dismissed by an administration that views a government shutdown as an opportunity to implement its vision of massively reducing the federal workforce and  dismantling the administrative state.

The US will retain a systemically important economy and a globally dominant military, even if economic growth stagnates and the military and executive agencies become mere tools of the sitting president. But US allies and partners across the Asia-Pacific must anticipate more than just a future in which the US is unwilling to lead on the security, economic and diplomatic fronts because there is an isolationist party in power. They must prepare for a future in which the US cannot lead, regardless of who is in power.

Republished from East Asia Forum, 2 November 2025

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.