There are a great many reasons why the UK government should pay more attention to the Asia-Pacific, but that does not mean that it will.

A recent government reshuffle has reopened questions about the depth of Britain’s commitment to Asia. The role of minister for the Indo-Pacific is now a part-time job, held by an undersecretary of state who also serves as minister for equalities.

While the change was being announced in September, British naval ships were steaming through the Sea of Japan for joint exercises with Japan and South Korea in a demonstration of the United Kingdom’s ability to project power and influence into Asia.

But this deployment stemmed from decisions made some time ago. It’s not clear whether another such deployment will be authorised again. What, then, is the outlook for Britain’s role in Asia? Will economic and security concerns in Europe prompt a turn outwards in search of prosperity and stability, or the reverse?

There are a great many reasons why the British government should pay more attention to the Asia-Pacific, but that doesn’t mean that it will.

The current Labour government has made reviving economic growth its overarching priority, but it faces immense challenges. The British economy has struggled with low growth since the global financial crisis of 2007-08.

The previous Conservative government had hoped to find a source for renewed growth in Asia-Pacific markets, but a parliamentary report published in June found the share of Britain’s exports going to the Asia-Pacific “has remained stubbornly flat for decades – hovering around 12 per cent since the 1990s”.

Recent changes to UK foreign policy appear to have resulted in a much more self-interested, harder-nosed approach. Liberal internationalism is out and realism is in.

In an era of great power competition, when Britain feels under threat from Russia and China, this will make it much easier for the UK to deal with “swing” regimes whose own commitments to human rights and pluralism are somewhat shallow.

Different parts of government view China differently, some as a threat and others as an opportunity. There are ongoing discussions about how strictly to screen future investment from the country.

The result of these changes is that Britain has become a status quo power in the Asia-Pacific. Rather than promoting change, it seeks to align its activities with the priorities of local partners.

The UK has tools for exerting both soft and hard power. It remains a major provider of development aid in the Asia-Pacific. However, budgetary challenges and domestic criticism have driven successive governments to reduce spending in this area.

Other forms of soft power are easy to find. Britain has universities, media outlets, financial institutions, scientific laboratories, unicorn start-ups, cultural organisations and law courts with global reputations. It also has many historical and diasporic connections to countries in Asia. If handled badly, these can be a liability, but if handled well, they are another important vector of soft power influence.

Britain also remains a significant military power, one of the few that can flex significant muscle far from its shores.

Nato has made a strategic choice to engage more deeply with Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, and Britain also has its own security partnerships in the region.

This is particularly true in the area of defence procurement. Pillar One of AUKUS, the three-way defence technology agreement between Australia, the UK and the US, is critical to the future of the Royal Navy’s submarine fleet and thus to the country’s nuclear deterrent.

Pillar Two of AUKUS has wider benefits for all three militaries – and may expand to include other countries in Asia. There are, however, risks with AUKUS, given doubts about the project in both Australia and the US.

The Japan-Italy-UK Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) – aimed at jointly developing sixth-generation stealth fighter aircraft by 2035 – is critical to the future of the Royal Air Force.

So long as these programs continue, the strategic interests of Britain will remain tethered to the Indo-Pacific by necessity.

There is undoubtedly plenty of support in the region for a UK presence. Dozens of countries engaged with the Royal Navy’s carrier strike group in 2025 with port visits and military exercises. Now it has left the region, that engagement mission will be maintained by two offshore patrol vessels – smaller but just as welcome.

Other engagements – including the Five Power Defence Arrangements, the UK military presence in Brunei (which is largely funded by Brunei) and in Singapore (which is of a tiny scale) – will continue.

The current government places great weight on being seen as stable and reliable. In place of its predecessor’s “flip-flopping” on policy, it wants to reassure allies and partners that it will live up to commitments. The question now is whether it can actually deliver.

Given the changed world situation, the foreign policies of all states have shifted. Where once they viewed international cooperation as the best way to advance their own state’s interests, there has been a global shift towards a more populist conception of the national interest.

Domestic politics in Britain have moved in the same direction. Public support for altruistic initiatives around human rights, overseas aid and even climate change has diminished. As a result, these have become “nice to haves” rather than core elements of British foreign policy.

Given the state of government finances, this is likely to be a long-term change.

Following other governments, Britain is likely to become more transactional in its foreign policy. Given the rising calls at home to address domestic issues, there will be much more focus on what certain policies – whether focused on the economy, diplomacy or security – deliver for the UK.

Britain will continue to spend money on naval deployments and diplomatic initiatives, but to be sustainable, it will need to see economic returns.

For the time being, what will keep the UK government’s attention anchored in the Indo-Pacific is the defence trade, especially through AUKUS and GCAP.

As for normal trade, boosting exports will not be easy. As all governments eventually discover, it is easier to send ships and ministers on foreign trips than to persuade businesses to become better exporters, especially amid intensifying global competition and rising protectionism.

Republished from South China Morning Post, November 24 2025.

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.

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