China now buys 60 per cent of the world’s soybeans. That dependency shapes its food security strategy – and its trade battles with the United States.

Soybeans are more than just a crop – they have become a litmus test of Beijing’s evolving food security strategy and sit at the heart of the US-China trade war.

As a crucial source of animal feed and cooking oil, soybeans have remained a flashpoint throughout the ebbs and flows of the two nations’ trade disputes, from the tariff war during US President Donald Trump’s first term to the current one.

Less well known is China’s transformation from soybean exporter to the world’s leading importer. Spanning three decades, researchers believe the shift reflects evolving domestic needs and the impact of policy reforms, international agreements and technological innovations aimed at bolstering food security.

Today, China imports about 100 million tonnes a year – about 60 per cent of global trade in the commodity – an evolution that has reshaped international markets and farmers’ livelihoods.

In proposals released in late October for the 15th five-year plan, Beijing called for efforts to “diversify agricultural imports and better align trade with domestic production” – underscoring the country’s persistent impact on one of the world’s most traded commodities.

“It seems necessary for China to be self-reliant on soybeans [given current geopolitical risks], but it’s impossible to actually achieve this,” said Zheng Fengtian, a professor from Renmin University in Beijing who has studied Chinese agriculture for over two decades.

The country’s limited arable land cannot accommodate the crop at the scale required, he said, while attempting to produce all soybeans domestically would divert land away from critical staple grains – ultimately threatening food security.

The roots of Beijing’s dilemma can be traced back to the early 1990s, when China was a net exporter of soybeans – a crop believed to have been domesticated in the country over 6,000 years ago. According to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, output peaked at 16 million tonnes in 1994, driven by large-scale cultivation in fertile, black soil-rich northeastern regions such as Heilongjiang province.

Exports routinely exceeded one million tonnes a year, with official data from the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) showing that China retained its status as an exporter until 1995 by shipping surpluses to regional markets.

But the landscape soon shifted dramatically. By 2000, imports had surged to over 10 million tonnes, reversing the trade balance into a persistent deficit. China’s integration into the global trade system and soaring domestic demand – fuelled by rapid urbanisation and rising middle-class affluence – drove the trend, Zheng said.

“The United States, which wields significant control over the global food market, emerged as a key enabler in this import surge, particularly following China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) accession in December 2001,” he added.

Before China joined the WTO, US soybean shipments to the country averaged below one million tonnes a year. But under the 1999 US-China Agricultural Cooperation Agreement and the bilateral WTO accession protocol, Beijing agreed to cut agricultural tariffs to an average of 17 per cent. For soybeans, duties would be slashed to 3 per cent and quotas and licensing restrictions were gradually removed.

With domestic demand soaring and strong US production, soybeans – along with wheat, cotton and meat – were prioritised in the accords, expanding market access for American exports.

Liberalisation catapulted US deliveries to 32 million tonnes by 2016, capturing 38 per cent of China’s import share at its zenith. American advantages – including yields almost double those of China’s, genetically modified strains and streamlined logistics – powered the boom and supported China’s crushing industry.

“It was, and still is, a principle for China to remain self-sufficient for staple grains – rice, wheat, corn – and since soybean yields were low, we opened up the sector at the time,” Zheng said.

“From WTO accession until 2018, the prevailing logic in China was that soybean imports brought more benefits than drawbacks – they effectively spared our arable land for more important crops.”

In the seven years leading up to the 2018 trade war, the US exported an average of 28 per cent of its soybeans to China. That share peaked at 31 per cent in the 2020 to 2021 marketing year following the phase one trade agreement, according to the American Soybean Association.

China’s domestic market has also undergone sweeping changes in recent decades, turning soybeans from a modest staple into a critical input for the food industry. Meat consumption exploded as living standards rose, fuelling an insatiable demand for soybean meal as the country’s primary livestock feed. Vegetable oil consumption also surged, with soybean oil’s affordability making it one of the most widely consumed.

On the supply side, limited farmland and a huge population forced policymakers to prioritise essentials like rice and wheat, reallocating arable land and relegating soybean farming to secondary status.

“As soybean yields are low, which means lower profitability than other crops, farmers are not keen to grow it,” said Zhong Yu, a researcher at the Institute of Agricultural Economics and Development at the China Academy of Agricultural Sciences.

“And China’s relatively small size of arable land, compared to its 1.4 billion population, is the biggest constraint, necessitating a strategy to balance domestic and international markets.”

Fears mounted in 2018 during Trump’s first term, prompting Beijing to reassess its dependence on American crops.

“People began to realise that the US was turning China into an enemy to curb its rise, and might weaponise soybeans – though today it’s also a weapon for China in trade talks with the US,” Zheng said.

To counter this vulnerability, Beijing pushed to refine agricultural policy, notably through the annual No 1 Document – the first directive issued by the Communist Party’s Central Committee each year, traditionally dedicated to agriculture and rural affairs.

The 2019 version introduced a soybean revitalisation plan that called for expanded planting through diverse methods. The strategy has remained an important theme of agricultural policy, with substantial investments poured into breeding higher performing varieties.

Production rose 29 per cent from 16 million tonnes in 2018 to 20.65 million tonnes last year, according to China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) – though this covered only about 20 per cent of the country’s huge import demand.

While per-unit yields remain below 60 per cent of those grown in the US, according to figures from the NBS and the USDA, China has invested heavily in breeding high-yield, high-oil varieties and has achieved some success in trials.

In September, the official Farmers’ Daily reported that scientists had developed several new varieties with oil content exceeding 22 per cent and regional trial yields 8 per cent higher than regular strains. These advances “will boost soybean oilseed yields, increase product value for oil processors, drive industry upgrades, reduce import reliance and strengthen China’s food security”, according to the report.

China has also diversified its suppliers, increasing imports from Brazil and Argentina while investing in infrastructure to facilitate trade. Recent customs data showed that Brazilian soybeans continued to dominate in September, with a nearly 30 per cent year-on-year increase, accounting for 85.5 per cent of China’s imports for the month.

Soybean imports could fall to about 79 million tonnes by 2034 as domestic capabilities strengthen, according to the China Agricultural Outlook Report for 2025 to 2034, published by an expert committee under the agriculture ministry in April.

That trajectory aligns with the leadership’s pledge in this year’s No 1 Document to “consolidate” achievements in soybean expansion, signalling a shift from raising production to stabilising it.

“China will still need the international market for supplies, but imports can be reduced through substitution and reduced consumption,” Zhong said, noting that alternative proteins could replace soybeans in livestock feed.

“Also, edible oil consumption has now become somewhat excessive after decades of upgrades to nutritional structure, leaving room for health-driven cutbacks.”

Under President Xi Jinping’s “ all-encompassing approach to food” to guarantee security, Beijing has pursued replacements beyond traditional crops. The State Council issued a directive last year to establish a diversified food supply system by 2027, with alternatives expected to come from forest-based food industries, grass-fed livestock and deep-sea aquaculture.

Republished from the _South China Morning Post_, November 20, 2025.