After decades of near-continuous rule, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party is now governing as a minority under a more ideologically polarised leadership. A new era of fragmented, negotiated politics is taking shape.

The October 2024 lower house election marked a turning point in Japan’s political landscape. The long-dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was forced to govern as a minority ruling party. This shift was compounded in October 2025 when Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi – a long-time conservative contender – secured the LDP presidency on her third attempt, defeating reformist Shinjiro Koizumi.

Takaichi’s rise raises a critical question – is Japan entering a new era of ideological polarisation and political fragmentation?

Despite occasional instability – including brief stints out of power from 1993-94 and 2009-12 – the LDP has mostly governed from a strong position. Controlling the House of Representatives for nearly seven decades, it tended to manage policy through internal committees and informal consensus, with the Diet often functioning more as a rubber stamp than a forum for genuine deliberation. Parliamentary negotiation, especially with opposition parties, was rare and often superficial.

That era is ending. The 2024 election forced the LDP into minority rule. Its subsequent  loss of upper house dominance in 2025 and Komeito’s departure from their long-standing coalition pushed the LDP into unfamiliar territory. A fragile alliance with the Japan Innovation Party, while temporarily stabilising, leaves the LDP two seats short of a majority and dependent on parliamentary bargains to pass key legislation.

This new reality signifies a ‘re-parliamentarisation’ of Japanese politics. Policy decisions, once confined to LDP factional settlements, now spill onto the Diet floor. Opposition parties gain new leverage to shape legislative agendas and each session carries elevated risks of gridlock or no-confidence votes.

The LDP’s deeper challenge lies in its narrowing and fragmenting support base.  Exit polls from the July 2025 upper house election revealed that 38 per cent of its supporters were aged 70 or older while only 10 per cent were under 40. Even among self-described LDP supporters, one-third opted for other parties in the proportional representation segment – splitting towards newer options such as far-right Sanseito and the centrist Democratic Party for the People.

This reflects a broader erosion of the LDP’s identity as a ‘big tent’ party. While it once spanned the political spectrum – from pragmatic centrists to nationalist conservatives – its centre of gravity has shifted rightward under Takaichi. It now competes with anti-establishment movements appealing to nationalist and anti-globalist sentiments, as well as centrist reformists appealing to urban professionals and younger voters dissatisfied with both the LDP’s traditionalism and the opposition’s inertia.

Takaichi’s strategy mirrors her mentor, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe – combining rhetorical conservatism with selective pragmatism to bridge ideological divides. Yet the political terrain is less forgiving than during Abe’s tenure. The breakup with Komeito has exposed the LDP to constant electoral risk. The Japan Innovation Party’s regional power base and confrontational style may stabilise governance in the short term, but its ambitions could easily clash with LDP interests on issues like decentralisation or constitutional revision.

If Japan is moving towards a competitive multiparty system, the health of the opposition becomes crucial. Yet the current configuration offers more fluidity than genuine competition. The Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), the largest opposition group, remains weighed down by memories of the flawed 2009-12 administration. Other opposition parties are fragmented – more preoccupied with media relevance than policy coherence.

Some argue this multiplicity is inevitable under Japan’s mixed electoral system, which encourages smaller parties to survive through proportional representation. But without a credible governing alternative, Japan risks a democratic deficit where voters cannot meaningfully hold the ruling party to account. Unless the CDP can forge coalitions with other centrist and progressive forces, the opposition will continue to splinter the reform vote, perpetuating LDP dominance by default.

Generational dynamics compound this challenge. Younger voters – immersed in digital spaces and facing precarious futures – are less aligned with legacy institutions. They view the LDP as inefficient and conservative, the CDP and others as old-fashioned and uninspiring. Climate change, gig economy regulation and educational reform matter deeply to them, yet remain peripheral to major party platforms.

Japan’s political evolution reflects global currents. Across Europe and North America, traditional parties are struggling to navigate rising inequality, value pluralism and regional identity politics. Japan, too, faces widening socioeconomic divides and growing distrust in elite institutions. The disintegration of long-held partisan loyalties has not produced populism on the scale of US President Donald Trump or Brexit – but the seeds of fragmentation are evident. The proliferation of small parties, independent candidates and volatile swing voters suggests a transition from hegemonic stability to competitive pluralism.

This transition marks the broader unravelling of the ‘1955 system’ – the LDP-led political order that defined postwar Japan. The new equilibrium remains uncertain. Governance is likely to become more negotiated, policy-based, exposed to public scrutiny and vulnerable to paralysis or instability.

The LDP’s survival will require adapting to demographic realities and ideological fragmentation. That means courting younger voters, balancing nationalist appeals with policy pragmatism and rebuilding cross-party coalitions. The opposition’s relevance demands coordination, substantive policy proposals and a willingness to present a credible government-in-waiting.

Japan has entered a  post-hegemony era. Dominance no longer guarantees legitimacy. Diverse parties must learn to compete, cooperate and communicate in ways that reflect the complex and changing society they aim to serve.

Republished from the East Asia Forum, 3 December 2025