Corruption in politics is not an accident or an exception. It is a predictable outcome of a system that rewards loyalty, access and survival over accountability, transparency and the public interest.

Corruption is not a very surprising human response to the political/economic environment/rules. It is the system that creates corruption, acting as a selection process for survival of the fittest – you have to ‘play the game’ to reach a position of power.

This guarantees sub-optimal outcomes.

If Australia was more democratic, would its economic policies be better? - ABC News put it:

“We like to call ourselves that, [but] we are not a democracy. It’s not power to the people, it’s power to a chosen set of leaders who the people, yes, have chosen, but then have to put up with once they are in the corrupting position of being in power.”

Regardless of someone’s initial intent in entering politics, their primary priorities quickly become securing re-election, gaining influence in government, and advancing their career. Their priorities are to deliver for the party, not the electorate. This is easily justified as short-term aims to justify long-term gains – but the long term is often forgotten, or if not forgotten, never achieved, and the politician runs the risk of being corrupted little by little.

It would be useful to identify the organisational problems, such as the structure of our political system, and why this generates these outcomes. Problems such as the short-term electoral cycle, non-fixed electoral terms, enforced party allegiances, and closed or pre-ordained pre-selections, amongst many others.

We have a semblance of democracy; an endorsed candidate is mainly at the ‘gift’ of power brokers in each political party, particularly for the Senate. It is hard to accept that voting for a party, but not selecting the candidate you vote for, is truly democratic – preselection is one (perhaps the only one) feature of the US system that appeals.

Changing the structure of our political system is difficult in the short- to medium-term – it would certainly require cooperation and agreement among the political parties, and some reforms would necessitate constitutional change. Consequently, we need to manage these imperfections until longer-term change can be achieved.

To manage the process while we wait for longer-term reform, we should examine closely what motivates politicians – then determine how to manage these motivations and mitigate the influence of various stakeholders, as well as the corrupting influence of power.

A reformed National Anti-Corruption Commission and real  improvements in Freedom of Information are essential to exert pressure on politicians and public servants to operate in our interest. However, there are other issues we should also focus on:

1. The narrow membership base of political parties enables those with an agenda to push the party in a particular direction, amongst other “bubble” concerns (e.g. party membership tends to be from a narrow socio-economic group).
2. The closed candidate selection process (particularly egregious in the Senate), typically managed by ‘power brokers’.
3. The seen (and unseen) influence of various lobby and power groups.
4. Lack of transparency in decision-making.
5. The strong partisan nature of our politics means that everything is a contest.

Points three and four are related – we can and should press for such issues as public, real-time diaries recording all contacts by a minister and their staff with all stakeholders, and the definition of ‘stakeholders’ needs to be broad.

Lobbyists (as I was) have access and influence well before the public is involved, or even aware, of an issue. Lobbyists host numerous dinners, theatre events, and private boxes at football and cricket matches, the Melbourne Cup, Tennis, F1, and many others. This gives easy ‘off the record’ access to bureaucrats, politicians, and staffers – providing countless opportunities to ‘help’ the Government ‘manage’ issues as they arise – and to work with the Government to ensure that a policy development does not have ‘unintended consequences.’

I managed the development of many tenders, ensuring (often via other stakeholders) that the requirements of the tender favoured my organisation. I also worked with many community groups to assist them in applying for funding, which subsequently benefited my organisation.

Where there is a honey pot, people will exploit any loophole to access the funds – often the secondary aim is to deliver the declared outcome. Additionally, the success in obtaining a grant can be influenced by delivering a positive outcome for a politician, at the expense of the overall program’s aims.

An incomplete list of suggestions:

• Broaden the definition of lobbyists – those employed by companies directly (as I was) do not need to be registered.
• Create a public register for all meetings (formal, informal, and ‘accidental’) with lobbyists, ‘people of influence,’ and stakeholders, with a reporting deadline of seven days.
• Ban all corporate entertainment/hospitality – these are investments that are expected to yield a return. This should also include freebies for the press. Note: the press can also be managed; my backgrounders often found their way into print.
• To reduce the influence of donations, increase government payments to each candidate based on the number of votes received, and simultaneously restrict spending.
• Reintroduce the separation between public servants and politics – ban political appointments unless they are made on a bipartisan basis. Reverse the politicisation of the public service. This also includes re-visiting outsourcing, particularly in core policy areas (see next point).
• Change the way the government supports policy development and think tanks – for example, the Defence Department funds many of these, which then give advice on defence/military priorities, and also lobby for these outcomes. Apart from reinforcing the views of the department, using selective briefs and ‘operational guidance’, this makes academics and researchers think twice when being critical of a funding department. I have been in meetings where consultants have asked, “What are you hoping to find with the report?” This is code for “what do you want the report to find?” While public funding should support research, this should be done via a bipartisan or, preferably, non-political process. The boards should be non-partisan.
• The NACC has been a disappointment – the choice of commissionaires ensures that this is ineffective.
• Strengthen and reform the FOI Act; however, the changes that are proposed seem designed to make any FOI request harder. Perhaps there is another way to reduce the number of FOI requests. I suggest revising the confidential nature of documents – a case can be made that all documentation can be reviewed unless harm can be demonstrated.
• And last but not least, adequately fund the Audit Office.

John Hewson wrote in 2020 on How to clean up politics: six rules of engagement.  It is past time that we acted.