Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s early popularity rests on speculative public expectations, a fragile LDP–Ishin arrangement and her dependence on party heavyweight Taro Aso, leaving her authority vulnerable despite high initial approval ratings.

To avoid the rapid collapses in approval that have plagued past Japanese governments, Takaichi must deliver tangible policy outcomes in a factionalised political environment.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has made a strong start, registering a 74 per cent approval rating in an  October opinion poll. Despite the dissolution of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)–Komeito coalition, her success in forging a new alliance with Nippon Ishin has paved the way for implementing her  policy agenda, which spans economic reform and nationalist state-control initiatives.

Despite her high approval rating, it remains uncertain whether Takaichi’s leadership can effectively address the public’s underlying disaffection with Japanese politics and the economy.

The LDP’s defeats in both the 2025  Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election and the 2025  national upper house election reflected widespread frustration with the party’s persistent failure to tackle economic and social issues. These include the rising cost of living, prolonged economic stagnation, increasing household burdens from social security expenditures and an ageing, shrinking population. The new administration must also navigate the shadow of then prime minister Shigeru Ishiba’s equivocal response to a political donation scandal, which involved tens of LDP lawmakers affiliated with the former Abe faction.

In Japanese politics, particularly since the 2000s, a government’s high initial approval rating has not necessarily been a reliable indicator of long-term stability. Approval ratings often  plunged quickly, as seen in the first Abe, Fukuda, Hatoyama, Kan, Noda and Suga governments. Public expectations, initially high, soon gave way to the realities of political leadership and policy implementation.

A notable exception was the second Abe government (2012–2020), which  sustained relatively strong public support. But his conservative orientation contributed to polarisation between conservative and liberal segments of society.

This tendency for sudden drops in high approval ratings is reinforced by the methodology used in Japanese opinion surveys.  Most Japanese questionnaires do not ask respondents to evaluate the policies of either the previous or new government. Instead, they directly ask whether respondents support the new government or which policy areas they prioritise. While this polling style is not unique to Japan, Japanese respondents often answer without sufficient information about the new government’s policies, making their responses largely speculative.

Takaichi’s strong initial support may reflect similar limitations. Her assertive political style is perceived by conservative voters as indicative of strong leadership, attracting nationalist LDP supporters and those anticipating policy change. But expectations alone do not necessarily translate into political stability — Takaichi must deliver tangible policy outcomes.

Despite her strong leadership image, Takaichi’s government rests on fragile political foundations. Her support within the LDP derives primarily from rank-and-file members rather than elected lawmakers. Lacking a personal faction, her ascent to the LDP presidency was made possible only through the backing of then supreme advisor and current LDP Vice President  Taro Aso. In the final round of the presidential vote, Takaichi defeated Shinjiro Koizumi due to tactical voting by Aso’s faction.

The composition of the new LDP leadership, including the appointment of its secretary-general, clearly reflects Aso’s continued influence over  party governance. Takaichi’s power relative to Aso’s remains limited, and her policy decisions will likely be subject to his paternalistic leadership.

The LDP–Ishin coalition also remains weak, as Ishin does not hold any cabinet posts. The party has opted for a confidence-and-supply arrangement to preserve its autonomy, retaining the option to withdraw should the LDP become unwilling to  implement their agreement. Ishin recognises that its political survival could be jeopardised by the LDP’s superior power and tactical manoeuvring, yet it prioritises the realisation of its policy goals — even at the potential cost of its own dissolution.

Despite its use of similarly nationalistic slogans, Sanseito is not necessarily a reliable partner for Takaichi. Though often described as a rightist party, it criticises her policy proposals from a populist standpoint, claiming they are not  genuine reforms. Its political posture remains one of emotional opposition to the ruling establishment. A right-wing coalition between the two parties does not seem to be a feasible scenario.

To overcome her fragile political foundations, Takaichi needs to deliver tangible policy outcomes, but this is not straightforward. Most of her proposals are neither original nor substantively new. Many have already been considered under the Ishiba government or simply reiterate Abe-era initiatives, particularly in areas like  economic security and  the Indo-Pacific.

Takaichi’s attempt to advance state-control policies, such as  an anti-espionage act, alongside her push for  expansionary fiscal policy, may reflect her own initiative, but such proposals remain controversial even among LDP supporters and divert political capital from Japan’s persistent economic and social challenges.

Time is limited,  even for the LDP. The  dissolution of the coalition with Komeito, due to Takaichi’s perceived insensitivity to the LDP’s political donation scandal, may prove a fatal blow in the next national lower house election, expected in 2028. The LDP has long relied on Soka Gakkai — Komeito’s core support base — for electoral mobilisation. One survey predicts the LDP may lose between 25 and 45 seats in the  upcoming election.

Takaichi’s high approval rating does not guarantee  political stability. Her assertive style may temporarily shift public sentiment, but underlying dissatisfaction with the LDP persists. To secure lasting support, she must engage a broader spectrum of political actors and acknowledge the limits of nationalist ideology in crafting balanced and inclusive policies.

Republished from East Asia Forum, 26 November 2025