China’s foreign policy priorities are driven more by domestic stability and long-standing sovereignty claims than by ambitions to dominate the global order.

China is often portrayed in Washington as a revisionist power seeking global dominance, but this view misreads Beijing’s intentions. China’s leaders remain focused on domestic stability, economic management and long-standing sovereignty claims rather than military expansion or replacing the United States.

Its growing role in global institutions and initiatives such as the Belt and Road reflects economic growth and US retreat, not a bid to overturn the international order.

Understanding China as it is, rather than through the lens of US domestic politics, is essential for a sustainable US–China policy.

The past year has seen a slight change in Washington’s views towards China. Although the ‘China threat’ is still the dominant view, some cracks have emerged such as a controversial  RAND report that advocated for improving ties with China — though it was later withdrawn for ‘further review’. These changes are important because the view of  China as a threat is incorrect.

As Professor Jia Qingguo recently pointed out, the ‘China threat’ thesis in Washington stems as much from  domestic US politics as from China itself.

China is more a status quo power than a revisionist state. Its leaders are more focused on domestic challenges and stability than expanding the country’s external influence. While China often bullies its neighbours, it does not seek to invade or conquer them. China’s main foreign policy focus is on territories that the rest of the world has agreed — at least diplomatically — are Chinese, including Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. China’s ambitions rarely stretch further.

Xi Jinping and other Chinese leaders often call for China to play a larger role in global governance but this does not mean that China seeks to replace the United States as the dominant global power. Since the Cold War, China has emphasised multilateralism. Its increasing influence in bodies such as the United Nations reflects its economic growth and the US retreat from these institutions. As US financial contributions dry up, China is taking on a larger role. There is little evidence that China hopes to become the sole superpower.

China’s global actions seek to boost both economic growth and political influence but they stem from domestic concerns. The  Belt and Road Initiative, for example, is designed to alleviate excess domestic capacity in infrastructure related industries, not to spread Chinese values or encourage other countries to adopt China’s political or economic systems. Instead, these programs  use China’s economic leverage to secure international support for specific sovereignty claims,  especially over Taiwan.

Critics often point to new phrases in Chinese rhetoric as evidence of expansionist ambitions. Since 2021, Xi has invoked the phrase ‘the East is rising and the West is declining’. But this phrase is  descriptive, not aspirational, reflecting Beijing’s perception that China’s power is increasing while that of the United States and Europe is decreasing. When Xi uses the phrase, it is often followed by another mostly overlooked sentence — ‘China has no intention to change the United States, nor to replace it’.

Chinese leaders use this language largely to justify the need to further strengthen state capacity to address internal and developmental challenges. In an internal speech in 2023, Xi invoked the phrase to highlight China’s successful domestic policy agenda and portray it as a model for accelerating economic growth while emphasising that such a model could not be exported.

China has aggressively built military outposts in the South China Sea and  flexed its muscle against smaller Southeast Asian neighbours. But China is not the sole cause nor the only barrier to resolving competing border disputes. These island reclamation projects do not threaten another country’s existence. What is at stake are historical disputes that require skilled diplomacy. China will not give up its claims, but it may be willing to compromise on managing the commons. Importantly, China’s solution is unlikely to be led by its military.

The main disputes between China, its neighbours and the United States are economic, commercial and diplomatic, not military or existential. The US military cannot address  Chinese interference in domestic politics, nor can more military spending solve issues of  Chinese commercial behaviour or the behaviour of its firms and trade practices.

Viewing the future status of Taiwan as an early indicator of rising Chinese ambitions is even more misleading. A lasting solution to cross-straits relations  will not be military. China’s claims are about identity and history and are limited to Taiwan. Taiwan is different from other cases in the region, not the first in a list of targets of Chinese conquest.

Chinese leaders have argued since the 19th century that the island is part of China. These claims are not pragmatic or strategic, but centred on reunification. There is little indication that China’s territorial ambitions extend beyond Taiwan and East Asian states  do not show particular fear of China.

Because of China’s size and global reach, it is causing adjustments in economies and business around the world. But this differs from an intentional attempt to change the world order. As Jia Qingguo pointed out, much of US policy and the ‘China threat’ view in Washington is a result of US concerns about their own position.

An enduring and proactive US policy towards China requires understanding China as it exists, not the China that US policymakers of both parties tell each other it is. Chinese leaders’ rhetoric has been clear and consistent in stating that their goals are more modest and less revisionist than often believed in the West.

Republished from East Asia Forum, 10 January 2026.