Since 1945, one country has carried out a conventional military buildup unmatched in scale, cost and global reach. Claims about recent rivals distract from the historical record of how modern military dominance was built.

It’s become commonplace for western politicians – the latest being Australia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles at the Munich Security Conference – to argue that for the last two decades, China has been undertaking the biggest conventional military build-up that we’ve seen in the world since the end of the Second World War. 

This is trite and is either deliberately misleading or evokes historical ignorance. 

Since the end of World War II in 1945, the United States has executed the most extensive conventional military buildup in modern history. This effort has transformed a postwar force into a global powerhouse, sustained through vast financial commitments, unprecedented hardware acquisitions, and an expansive spatial footprint of bases and facilities. 

The scale of this buildup is evident in quantitative terms: cumulative expenditures exceeding $36 trillion in constant dollars, net additions of hundreds of thousands of military platforms, and a network of over 800 operational sites worldwide today. At various points, US resourcing has surpassed the combined efforts of all other nations, underscoring a deliberate strategy of dominance in conventional warfare capabilities. 

Financially, the US military buildup represents an unparalleled outlay of resources. From 1946 to 2025, inflation-adjusted spending on conventional forces – excluding nuclear programs – totals approximately $36 to $39 trillion in constant 2021 dollars. This figure derives from annual defence budgets, procurement allocations, and operational costs documented in US government reports and historical archives.

The buildup began modestly in the immediate postwar years, with expenditures averaging around $200 billion annually in constant terms during the late 1940s demobilisation phase. However, the Korean War (1950-1953) marked a pivotal escalation, injecting roughly $1.8 trillion into rapid force expansion, including troop mobilisation and equipment production.

The Cold War era from 1954 to 1991 amplified this trajectory, with cumulative spending reaching $18 to $20 trillion. Annual budgets peaked at over $800 billion in constant dollars during high-tension periods like the Vietnam War buildup, where $2 to $3 trillion supported sustained operations and hardware development. Research and development (R&D) consistently claimed 20-30 per cent of these funds, fostering innovations in conventional technologies such as jet aircraft and precision munitions. Post-Cold War, the 1990s “peace dividend” saw a temporary dip to $4-5 trillion for the decade, but this was followed by a resurgence after 2001. The so-called Global War on Terror and subsequent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq drove another $6-7 trillion through 2021, with annual figures stabilising at $750-800 billion.

Data for 2022-2025 add $3-4 trillion, reflecting ongoing modernisation amid strategic priorities. Notably, during several Cold War years, US military spending exceeded the aggregate of all other global defence budgets combined, a pattern that persisted into the early post-9/11 era. As a percentage of GDP, this investment averaged 5-6 per cent during peak Cold War years – reaching 14 per cent in 1953 – and hovers around 3.4 per cent today, translating to nominal annual outlays approaching $1 trillion. These funds have not only maintained readiness but also enabled the procurement of advanced systems, ensuring long-term superiority in conventional domains.

In hardware terms, the buildup has resulted in the net addition of millions of military items, shifting from WWII-era surpluses to cutting-edge inventories. Postwar demobilisation reduced active equipment stocks dramatically – tanks, for instance, fell from over 20,000 in 1945 to a few thousand by 1949. The subsequent buildup reversed this, with net additions of 150,000 to 200,000 tanks and armoured vehicles from 1946 onward. Key programs included the M47 and M48 Patton tanks in the 1950s for NATO commitments, the M60 series in the 1960s-1970s for Vietnam-era needs, and over 5,000 M1 Abrams tanks since the 1980s, incorporating advanced composite armour and fire-control systems.

Aviation assets saw even more dramatic growth, with 100,000 to 120,000 net aircraft additions. Fixed-wing fighters and bombers totalled around 20,000 jets, starting with the F-86 Sabre in the 1950s Korean theatre, progressing to the F-4 Phantom in the 1960s, and including over 2,000 F-16 Fighting Falcons since the 1970s. The F-35 Lightning II program alone has added more than 1,000 units since the 2000s, at a lifecycle cost exceeding $1.7 trillion. Helicopter fleets expanded by 50,000 units, from the UH-1 Huey in Vietnam to the AH-64 Apache attack helicopters and 5,000 UH-60 Black Hawks for multi-role operations. Strategic bombers like the B-52 Stratofortress, with around 75 still active from 1950s production runs, exemplify enduring hardware legacies.

Naval hardware additions numbered 5,000 to 6,000 vessels, building from a 1946 fleet of about 6,000 ships post-drawdown. This included 100 aircraft carriers, such as the Nimitz-class from 1975 and the Ford-class since the 2010s, each capable of projecting power with dozens of aircraft. Submarines added 300 units, focusing on conventional attack roles with diesel-electric models early on and advanced Virginia-class vessels today. Surface combatants like destroyers and cruisers reached 1,000 additions, highlighted by the Arleigh Burke-class since the 1990s. Missile and artillery stockpiles ballooned to millions of units: 500,000 to 1 million guided missiles, including air-to-air Sidewinders from the 1950s and Tomahawk cruise missiles from the 1980s, alongside 50,000 to 70,000 artillery pieces like the M109 howitzer.

Emerging technologies further augmented this, with over 10,000 unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) added since the 1990s, such as the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper for reconnaissance and strikes. Ground vehicles included millions of units, like 200,000 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) since the 1980s. The buildup’s pace was most intense in the 1950s-1980s, prioritising quantity to match perceived threats, before shifting to quality-focused modernisation post-1991. Today, active inventories – 13,000 aircraft, 4,000 tanks, and a blue-water navy unmatched in tonnage – reflect this cumulative hardware investment.

The spatial footprint of this buildup manifests in a global network of over 800 bases and facilities operational today, providing logistical hubs, training grounds, and forward-operating positions. Official Department of Defence counts list 128 persistent overseas bases across 51 countries, but broader assessments, including cooperative security locations and access agreements, estimate 750 to 877 sites in 80-95 nations. This infrastructure spans 795,000 acres abroad, with 26,000 buildings valued at $146 billion, supporting 243,000 personnel – 177,000 active-duty, 29,000 reserves, and 36,000 civilians.

The expansion began in the late 1940s with European installations for NATO, growing through the 1950s Korean commitments and 1960s Vietnam escalations. By the Cold War peak, hundreds of sites dotted allied territories, enabling rapid deployment. Post-1991, while over 1,000 European bases closed, the network adapted with “lily pad” facilities—smaller, agile sites for special operations and drone missions. Major installations like Ramstein Air Base in Germany (40,000 personnel) and Camp Humphreys in South Korea (3,454 acres, 30,000+ troops) exemplify scale, housing command centres, airfields, and storage depots.

In the Indo-Pacific alone, there are 24 persistent bases, with more than 200 broader sites in key allies. Japan hosts 98-120 facilities, including Yokota and Kadena Air Bases; South Korea has 73-80, centred on Osan and Humphreys. These support carrier strike groups, missile defences, and joint exercises. Annual maintenance costs billions, with recent upgrades emphasising resilience against modern threats. This footprint ensures persistent presence, from Atlantic to Pacific theatres, solidifying the buildup’s operational legacy.

The US conventional military buildup since 1946 stands as a testament to sustained strategic investment. Financially, trillions have funded this dominance; in hardware, hundreds of thousands of platforms have been added; spatially, over 800 bases form an enduring global grid. This legacy operates today, maintaining readiness through a scale that, at times, outstripped all others combined. The evidence is clear: America’s postwar military evolution has no parallel in conventional terms.

This is evidence of what US scholars Monica Duffy Toft and Sidita Kushi, in their book _Dying by the Sword_, call a country “addicted to military intervention.”