Claims that China is exporting authoritarianism rest on a shallow reading of both Chinese political tradition and how governance ideas actually travel. A longer historical view points instead to Confucianism – a philosophy that has shaped governance across East Asia for centuries.

In recent years, elements of Western media and certain think tanks have expressed growing concern that China is “exporting its system of governance” to the developing world. These claims are typically framed as part of a systemic rivalry between democracy and authoritarianism, with China cast as actively promoting an alternative political model. Such analyses, however, often rest on a shallow reading of Chinese political traditions and an overly narrow conception of how governance philosophies actually travel.

In reality, China has been exporting a governance philosophy for centuries. That philosophy is Confucianism.

Articles such as the Atlantic Council’s  A Global South with Chinese Characteristics warn of “training future authoritarians” and “portraying party governance as the root of China’s success”. The underlying assumption is that China’s influence is best understood through the binary lens of democracy versus authoritarianism, with Chinese governance reduced to a variant of Marxist–Leninist control. These accounts tend to be speculative, warning of what might occur rather than presenting evidence of widespread coercion or the direct suppression of democratic rights in other countries. Notably, they do not claim that China is exporting its system through regime change or force, but rather suggest that developing countries may feel obliged to adopt Chinese governance practices in order to secure economic or political ties.

This framing misses a more historically grounded explanation. Confucian governance does not travel through coercion, but through imitation: via education systems, bureaucratic norms, meritocratic selection and shared assumptions about what confers political legitimacy. Seen this way, China’s influence looks far less novel — and far less sinister — than some contemporary analyses suggest.

At the heart of Confucian political thought lies a distinctive theory of legitimacy. Authority is earned primarily through competence, moral authority and outcomes rather than through electoral competition. This does not mean that Confucianism is inherently hostile to democracy; rather, it places greater emphasis on the quality and conduct of governance than on the procedural means by which leaders are selected. Stability is regarded as a moral good, hierarchy is tempered by reciprocal obligation and education is treated as essential state infrastructure rather than merely a private good.

There is a strong body of evidence to suggest that elements of this governance philosophy have been adopted well beyond China, that they are compatible with modernisation and that they can coexist with a range of political systems. Japan and South Korea are two instructive cases.

Japan’s Meiji Restoration drew heavily on Confucian ideas of meritocratic hierarchy and administrative order. The modern Japanese state was built around a professional civil service whose prestige and authority rested on education, examination and continuity. To this day, Japan’s bureaucratic culture places a premium on administrative competence and institutional memory, helping to provide stability across changing political circumstances — itself a core Confucian value.

South Korea offers another example. Its exceptional educational outcomes are underpinned by an intense meritocratic examination culture, one that channels elite talent into leading universities and onward into state and corporate leadership. While Korea’s political system is democratic, its governance ethos reflects Confucian assumptions about education, hierarchy and the moral obligations of those in authority. These societies modernised rapidly, demonstrating that elements of Confucian-influenced governance are not inherently inimical to economic development or democratic institutions.

Confucian values have also played a significant role in China’s own transformation over the past five decades. In Confucian thinking, social stability is a moral good and the prolonged period of stability following the end of the Cultural Revolution created the conditions necessary for sustained economic development. Within a meritocratic bureaucracy, legitimacy is derived from delivery and competence rather than rhetoric. Large-scale administrative achievements in infrastructure, public health and education reflect this performance-based logic.

This is not to suggest that Confucian governance is without flaws. While teaching a course on classical Chinese philosophy to Year 7 and 8 students in Beijing some years ago, one student expressed vehement opposition to Confucianism, arguing that an emphasis on moral leadership could become an excuse for weak legal institutions and, in turn, corruption. This critique is not new. A relational culture combined with a large and powerful bureaucracy has, at various points in Chinese history, proven vulnerable to corruption and abuse of authority. Chinese political thought has long recognised this tension, giving rise to legalism as a corrective tradition emphasising law, punishment and institutional constraint.

It is also important to recognise that Confucianism is more than a theory of governance. It is a practical moral philosophy concerned with self-cultivation, education and social responsibility. The personal and the political are closely linked: the moral quality of individuals is understood to shape families, communities and ultimately the state. This ethical dimension helps explain why Confucian ideas have proven durable and adaptable across cultures, even as political systems change.

When Chinese leaders speak of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” as offering a model for developing countries, Confucianism is arguably the most pervasive and enduring of those characteristics. Its influence long predates the People’s Republic of China and extends well beyond China’s borders. Countries at varying stages of development and with differing political arrangements have selectively adopted elements of Confucian governance, not as an act of ideological submission, but because those elements have proved administratively useful and culturally resonant.

Interpreting this process as the export of “authoritarianism” risks misunderstanding both China and the countries engaging with it. What is being transmitted is not a political system in the narrow sense, but a civilisational logic – one in which competence, education, moral authority and social stability are central sources of legitimacy.

Confucianism has been shaping governance across East Asia for centuries, and its continued influence should be understood less as a geopolitical threat than as a reminder that there is more than one coherent way to organise political life.