Taiwan has welcomed the United States’ latest National Security Strategy, but beneath the reassurance lie strategic and economic risks that Taipei should not ignore.

On 4 December 2025, the US government released its  National Security Strategy (NSS). According to the NSS, Washington will prioritise the  security of the western Hemisphere, strengthen its economic security by replacing globalist agendas, and build a  burden-sharing alliance system.

A sense of anxiety has descended on many US allies and partners in  Europe and  Asia. But Taiwan’s responses were generally positive, as the NSS underscores Taiwan’s strategic location in the first island chain and recognises its semiconductor dominance. Yet given a more  inward-looking United States, Taiwan  should remain cautious of the underlying risks set out in the NSS and avoid misinterpreting Washington’s military and economic strategy.

Following the publication of the NSS,  Taiwanese leaders welcomed its  prioritisation of deterrence against a Taiwan contingency, with Taiwan’s Defence Minister  asserting that “peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific are the biggest core interest of the United States”. Many Taiwanese analysts also praised the NSS as the confirmation of US assistance in the defence of Taiwan, with one expert located in Taiwan arguing that “ to protect Taiwan is to protect the United States."

Indeed, Taipei’s positive attitudes are understandable. Yet it should avoid overconfidence and misinterpretation.

These assessments of the NSS present an overly rosy picture for Taiwan and position its defence as a  vital interest of the United States. But the United States is now embracing ‘flexible realism’ and prioritising dominance in the western hemisphere.

It is difficult to support the claim that stability in the Indo-Pacific constitutes the United States’ biggest core interest and that Taiwan is ‘irreplaceable’ to US security strategy. The NSS itself makes no such assertion. Instead, as Under Secretary of War for Policy  Elbridge Colby stated in 2025, Taiwan was important but not an ‘existential interest’ for the United States. Similarly, Michael Anton, the former director of policy planning who  primarily drafted the NSS,  argued in 2021 that going to war over Taiwan did not constitute a ‘core American national interest’.

The NSS thus at most points to an  offshore strategy of denial anchored in preserving US ‘military overmatch’. It means Washington aims to deter and deny Chinese military actions by pressing Taipei to increase its defence spending, equipping Taiwan with  more weapons and dispersing more  security burdens among US allies in the region. The underlying logic is to enhance US strategic flexibility while lowering the costs of possible military involvement. Such a commitment will remain critical for Taiwan under a second  Trump administration.

On the economic front,  Taiwanese officials and  analysts have welcomed the recognition of ‘Taiwan’s dominance of semiconductor production’ in the NSS, as Taiwan produces almost  90 per cent of the most advanced chips. Yet they should be alert to the risks posed by Washington’s economic nationalism. In other words, what Taiwan is celebrating – its chip dominance – is precisely what the United States seeks to challenge.

For years, Taiwanese leaders have underscored the irreplaceability of Taiwan’s semiconductor manufacturing capacity. This chip dominance has served as a ‘ silicon shield’ for Taiwan. But the irreplaceability of Taiwanese chips strikes US President Donald Trump and his officials  as unfair, a  national security risk, and even  a threat. Dependence, in Trump’s worldview,  means vulnerability.

As the NSS states, the United States ‘must never be dependent on any outside power for core components’ that are critical for national security or the US economy. This position was evident in September 2025 when the US Commerce Secretary  proposed a 50–50 split in semiconductor production as a possible condition for Taiwan to receive US protection.

This strain of  US economic nationalism has manifested itself in the latest US–Taiwan trade deal announced in January 2026. Under  the agreement, Washington agreed to lower its tariff on Taiwanese goods to 15 per cent in exchange for US$250 billion in investment from Taiwanese semiconductor and technology companies and another US$250 billion in credit guarantees from the Taiwanese government. The  objective for Washington is to ‘bring 40 per cent of Taiwan’s semiconductor supply chain’ back to the United States.

The consequences for Taiwan are likely to be mixed. The deal will reduce economic uncertainties and shield Taiwan from the  personal wrath of Trump. It will also diversify Taiwan’s semiconductor manufacturing capacity,  strengthening its complementarity with the  US economic ecosystem. But it could also risk  diluting the perceptions of the irreplaceability of Taiwanese chips.

The outcome is not predetermined, but one conclusion is certain. In an  asymmetrical relationship in which Washington unapologetically dictates the terms, there is no guarantee for Taiwan that the United States will not keep pushing to extract  further concessions. Allegations that Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s  trade secrets were leaked to US technology company Intel in 2025 should have sounded an alarm bell for Taiwan. In a world where rules are taking a back seat to might, a contingency plan for  further coercion is conceivable and much warranted for Taiwan.

The Trump 2.0 NSS presents underlying challenges for Taiwan and it should remain cautious to avoid misinterpretation. With a possible summit between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the horizon in  April 2026, uncertainty looms large about whether Trump will negotiate  a grand bargain with China, and where that would leave Taiwan remains to be seen.

Republished from East Asia Forum on 7 February 2026