Japan’s prostitution laws are under review, exposing a system that penalises women while leaving demand largely untouched. The direction of reform will shape whether policy shifts toward rights or reinforces moral control.

Japan’s prostitution regime – long defined by moral prohibition, selective enforcement and legal ambiguity – may be approaching its most significant policy reckoning in decades. If reforms proceed under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s conservative leadership, the government must choose between policing social morality and confronting the structural role of demand in its sex industry.

In November 2025, Takaichi stated that the  government would review the country’s regulation of prostitution under the Prostitution Prevention Law. The statute does not criminalise buyers, leaving the gendered structure of demand largely untouched. While prostitution itself is broadly prohibited, penalties focus mainly on solicitation and transactional intermediaries. This means women who solicit customers in public may be arrested, but the men who purchasing sex face no legal sanction.

The urgency of reform is visible in Tokyo. In July 2025,  four women were arrested in Shinjuku for alleged solicitation, with several media outlets publishing their names and faces and portraying the incident as a ‘social problem’. Episodes like this reveal Japan’s gendered regulatory system – female sellers are policed in the name of public order, while the male buyers driving demand remain legally invisible.

Takaichi did not directly mention reviewing the Act on Control and Improvement of Amusement Business (‘fueiho’). This is important given that the regulation of Japan’s sex industry rests on a dual legal structure. The  Prostitution Prevention Law formally prohibits prostitution and criminalises solicitation, while fueiho regulates adult entertainment businesses – including hostess bars and clubs – through a police-administered licensing system. This means prostitution is illegal in principle, yet the surrounding entertainment industry operates under regulation.

This arrangement leaves Japan in an ambiguous position internationally. Unlike jurisdictions that frame prostitution policy through the principles of human rights or gender equality, Japan’s legal framework remains rooted in postwar moral protectionism. The country is thus neither a fully abolitionist regime nor one that recognises sex work as labour.

But recent legal developments suggest Japan’s normative framework may be evolving. In April 2024, the government implemented the Act on Support for Women Facing Difficulties, signalling a shift away from the paternalistic goal of ‘protecting’ girls at risk of prostitution. The law instead focuses on helping women live safely and independently, expanding support for those facing domestic violence, sexual abuse and other vulnerabilities.

Yet the broader regulatory structure remains largely unchanged. Japan still formally prohibits prostitution while informally tolerating many of its associated practices. Women remain the primary targets of moral discipline and protection, but male buyers continue to be shielded from legal scrutiny.  Public debate  is intensifying, with some advocating penalties for buyers and others calling for decriminalisation to improve sex workers’ safety and labour protections.

Takaichi’s electoral victory reshapes the political context of this debate. Her administration emphasises social order, family values and national cohesion – priorities pointing towards a regulatory approach centred on moral governance rather than market liberalisation. But her willingness to consider penalising buyers introduces a possible shift towards the demand-focused approach associated with gender-equality discourse.

This convergence is striking – a conservative government focused on reinforcing traditional norms may end up enacting reforms consistent with feminist critiques of demand. Whether this produces genuine protection of rights or simply a new form of moral regulation will depend on the reforms’ framing and implementation.

If penalties on buyers are introduced primarily to restore public order, regulations may reinforce stigma and push the sex trade further underground. Framed instead as a response to gender inequality and exploitation, they could represent a shift towards recognising the structural drivers of demand.

The core issue is thus not whether prostitution should be regulated, but which framework best protects the rights and safety of those involved. In Japan, principled regulatory approaches remain underdeveloped. The Prostitution Prevention Law treats prostitution largely as a public-order problem, limiting its effectiveness in safeguarding women’s rights.

Other countries’ experiences illustrate the policy choices available. The Netherlands  treats sex work as lawful when entered into voluntarily while enforcing regulatory standards. Meanwhile, Sweden’s  abolitionist model criminalises buyers but not sellers in an attempt to reduce demand and frame prostitution as gender-based violence.

Japan’s current regime sits uneasily between these models, combining  prohibition with tolerance. Authorities police visible street solicitation while leaving the broader structure of demand largely intact.

Japan could move towards a Nordic-style model penalising buyers and reframing the purchase of sex as gender-based harm. It could alternatively pursue a regulatory framework recognising sex work as labour while prioritising safety and rights.

Takaichi’s strong leadership makes inaction unlikely. But the direction of reform will reveal whether  her administration’s traditionalism produces a more equitable framework or simply reinforces moral governance. For reform to succeed, the debate must confront the realities of Japan’s sex industry. Ethical appeals or harsher penalties alone will not eliminate demand – as long as demand exists, the market will reappear in some form.

The focus of any political change should be on the individuals vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, fraud, intimidation and abuse. The true test of  Takaichi’s leadership will be whether reform moves beyond public-order rhetoric towards a principled framework that places human rights at the centre of policy.

Republished from East Asia Forum, 31 March 2026