The war has strengthened Iran’s strategic position while weakening US alliances, credibility, and influence across the Middle East.

There is no doubt the United States will come out of this war in a worse strategic position than when it entered it. For now, despite pressure from Netanyahu, it seems Trump is prepared to live with a situation where the key issues concerning Israel remain unresolved. It remains to be seen whether Trump continues to feel the political and economic costs of an escalation are prohibitive, but there is no military solution to the impact Iran can have on energy shipments, and on Trump’s political fortunes.

By any measure, the ceasefire is a humiliation for Donald Trump which calls into question the judgment and competence – and even the stability – of the US President in launching the war in the first place.

The outcome of the war so far represents the successful exercise of Iranian leverage (military and geographic and economic, within a framework of tight internal control) over US military might. If Iran had been dealing with a more competent, less impulsive US president, that leverage would have been less potent.

Contrary to the arguments advanced by Netanyahu to Trump in getting his agreement to launching the war, the Iranian regime remains intact, and even more hardline in its ideological approach.

The sacrifices of the Iranian population, before the war was launched, in seeking the long-overdue replacement of the theocratic regime by one which more accurately reflected Iranian popular aspirations and potential, have once again been wasted.

The consequences of the war at the global level will take time to emerge, but a repressive, disciplined Iranian regime has shown it is possible to outlast and outwit a foolishly-led, isolated but militarily superior power. China and the DPRK will take note, as will Putin.

Unrealistic demands – and threats – by Trump for support for a war lacking credible and clear objectives, and about which they were neither consulted nor given time to prepare, meant US relations with Persian Gulf Arab states, NATO partners and others, suffered needless damage.

Confidence in US commitment to regional security arrangements relying on US support has been damaged as well. Even in Australia, where belief in the value of ANZUS will continue to underpin the US relationship, Trump’s intemperate performance must surely heighten scepticism about AUKUS.

The Iranians still have their highly enriched uranium. A return to the terms of the JCPOA so capriciously abandoned by Trump is highly improbable without far-reaching US concessions regarding any Iranian enrichment program. Iran is most unlikely to trade its enriched uranium for promises of sanctions relief.

Perhaps 40 per cent of Iranian missile stocks remain intact. They now have a great deal more expertise in deploying them.

From being a passage for unrestricted oil and gas exports, the Strait of Hormuz has become an Iranian strategic asset. Moreover, it may generate significant revenue (one estimate suggests $90 billion annually – compared to Iranian oil exports of $50 billion annually) for Iran to rebuild its military capability and infrastructure, even if US sanctions are not lifted.

It is fanciful to suggest the Strait may yet be forced open by military means if Iran and the US cannot reach agreement. The Iranians will not relinquish the leverage they now enjoy, not only over energy shipments, but over Trump’s political fortunes in a situation in which his miscalculations are directly impacting US consumers.

The oil market will adapt to the new situation while passing on the cost to consumers. Brent crude oil prices dropped from $111 to $95 on news of the ceasefire, suggesting the oil market believes the worst of the unpredictability may be over, even with the Iranians levying tolls.

There may be some investment in alternative oil export pipelines, and a stronger shift among consumers to renewables – or coal. But for the foreseeable future, the many and varied possible uses of tolls will be firmly on Iran’s mind.

The pushback from Israel against the ceasefire has been intense, both in reported angry conversations with Trump and in a significant increase in Israeli bombing of Lebanon – the latter probably seeking to force Iran to abandon the ceasefire in order to protect Hezbollah. But the Israeli ground offensive in Lebanon appears to be stalling short of the Litani River, and even if Trump allows the Israeli air campaign to continue, Iran may decline to take the bait.

In the Persian Gulf, and almost certainly in coordination with Israel, the UAE has reportedly launched air strikes and drone attacks on Iranian oil and petrochemical facilities on Siri and Lavan. Like Israel, they would prefer to see further destruction in Iran by the United States despite the obvious risks of Iranian retaliation should the ceasefire collapse. The UAE approach is anomalous: Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and to some extent Saudi Arabia had stopped short of strongly backing the United States, despite the hits they took from Iran. But the UAE went overboard in its public declarations against Iran (probably for US domestic consumption as well as a reflection of local agitation) including calling for regime change.

Aside from the UAE, however, the Gulf Arab states will be wary about increasing the risk of further direct attacks on their energy and other infrastructure. The Iranians have largely spared Saudi infrastructure so far (despite the hit on al-Jubail) so as to preserve scope for escalation in the event of a wholesale US attack. It will take time for grievances to heal. Ultimately, however, the Saudis and their smaller counterparts have little alternative but to look for ways of living, warily but constructively, with a more assertive and emboldened Iranian presence in the region.

Even in the case of the UAE, it is hard to see foreign investor confidence being restored in the IT, tourism and other sectors driving UAE and Saudi ambitions for economic diversification for a post-oil era until stability and predictability return to relations with Iran.

The deep antagonism toward the United States and Israel at popular levels across the region will be joined by mixed feelings at leadership levels toward the US relationship.

Ignored or left unconsulted about the decision to launch the war; their industries and citizens inadequately protected as it wore on, and facing an aggrieved Iran, a desire on the part of key Gulf leaders to achieve some recalibration of defence relations with the United States seems certain. How far that shift may go depends to some extent on where Iran goes from here in dealing with its Gulf Arab neighbours, and US evaluation of its own interests in the region.

And if the Gulf states do try to resume a more constructive relationship with Iran, the Iranians may seek to set conditions in regard to the future US military presence in the region. Although ties with Egypt and the UAE will probably remain robust, frustration over Gaza, Lebanon, the US relationship with Israel, and Trump’s decimation and sidelining of US foreign service expertise mean US diplomacy elsewhere in the region is singularly ill-equipped, at this juncture, to shape the outcome of that recalibration in ways that best support US interests.