In the first part, I identified the factors mitigating against the sale of 3-5 Virginia class submarines to cover the gap until the arrival of the British designed SSN AUKUS.

In the final analysis, the USN remains well short of its target of 66 attack submarines and it will be this shortfall in numbers that will be the deciding factor.

Could be SSN AUKUS be fast tracked to fill the gap? SSN AUKUS depends on the UK’s capacity to design and build two new classes of nuclear-powered submarines.

The first priority for the UK’s submarine design and building capability is four of the large, Dreadnought class ballistic missile submarines, to replace the ageing, worn out Vanguard class, which have reached their end of life.

The UK’s second priority, the Astute attack submarine program is late, over-budget and experiencing reliability issues. Of the five submarines delivered currently none are at sea:

• Astute has just entered mid-life refit, joining her sister ship Audacious in Devonport dry docks.
• Ambush is alongside in the submarine base in Faslane and has not been to sea for three years, along with her sister ship, Artful, which has not been to sea for two years.
• The fifth and final operational SSN, Anson, has just returned to Faslane.

Two of the class are yet to be delivered.

The UK’s third priority is SSN AUKUS.

The UK’s Submarine Arm appears to have fallen below critical mass, evidenced by the difficulties they have experienced in replacing the senior submarine leadership. Recovery will be challenging and prolonged. A recent decision to allow rescrubs on the UK’s submarine commanding officer’s course (it was called the “Perisher”, as failure meant exiting the submarine arm) illustrates the compromises in standards now required. An expansion to meet the government’s recently announced goal of 12 new attack submarines, delivered at 18-month intervals, would be a huge challenge. The call comes as the UK struggles to meet higher priority defence challenges in implementing its “ NATO first" policy.

The UK’s submarine design, supply chain and build capability are in no better shape to meet this political goal. Such a program would require:

• Laying down an attack submarine every 18 months.
• Having sufficient space for the resultant production line:
• For example, a delivery interval of 18 months and a build time of say, 10 years, means there will be 6-7 submarines in various stages of construction at the peak of the program.
• A shipyard with sufficient space and equipped to accommodate this is required.
• The second critical input is the workforce to staff the production line and supply chains.
• None of these capabilities exists today.

Is SSN AUKUS the solution for Australia?

The new SSN AUKUS is to be over 10,000 tonnes, more than 27% larger than the Virginias proposed to be sold to Australia. Why Australia needs such a large, expensive submarine has not been explained.

The submarine is still being designed – there are no costings, no production schedules and no milestones publicly available to validate “schedule free” assurances that all is well. Earlier talk of a mature design is no longer heard.

The project to manufacture the reactor cores for the new ballistic missile submarines and SSN AUKUS is in serious difficulties. Three successive years of red cards from the UK’s independent auditor, which noted that “Successful delivery of the project appears to be unachievable” – another mess! Unlike its predecessors, no shore base prototype has been built to de-bug and validate the design. Any delay in manufacturing the reactor cores will impact delivery of the new ballistic missile submarines and hence, delay starting on the SSN AUKUS production line.

Based on past performance and the issues set out above, the British program to deliver SSN AUKUS cannot be fast tracked. Indeed, it is highly likely that it will be late, over budget and with the first of class issues which are a feature of any new design.

The final mess: the Australian Government has proved unwilling to increase the Defence vote to fund the program. Instead, funds are being diverted from other important defence capabilities – Australia’s SSN AUKUS program is eating everyone else’s lunch.

Decision-making and funding for essential infrastructure to support the capability is now years behind schedule. This is similar to the situation which has led to Britain’s inability to sustain its submarines.

The existing plan is, therefore, comprised of multiple, serial risks; I would describe it as a quagmire.

With Australia’s access to Virginia class submarines in grave doubt and SSN AUKUS, at this stage, a high-risk design project, Australia is in danger of losing its submarine capability. Far from increasing Allied submarine capability, AUKUS now threatens to reduce both the US and Australian operational submarine forces.

AUKUS Pillar 1, Australia’s transition to a sovereign, nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarine capability is a good idea. However, the path we are on leads elsewhere, to a series of unmanageable risks, many beyond our control.

The government needs to change course, to avoid others’ unmanageable risks and better manage our own:

• Plan B should settle on one class of submarine, not the impractical, highly unlikely to arrive, Virginia/SSN AUKUS mix now envisaged.
• The submarine selected should be based on a mature design, in production, not, as SSN AUKUS is, a new design from questionable antecedents.
• There are two obvious options; a Virginia derivative, or the French Suffren.
• It will have to be built in Australia; there is no spare capacity in the US, Britain or France. The KISS rule applies.
• Perhaps a competitive process should select the best fit, easiest to build in Australia option?

Australia must control its own destiny, not outsource it to become part of someone else’s unmanageable risk. However, the path we are on leads elsewhere, to a series of unmanageable risks and a drop in Allied submarine capability/deterrence when we can least afford it.

Changing at this late stage would not inject further delay; it will most likely be quicker. The current plan is not going to deliver a sovereign, operational capability any time soon and, given the uncertainties set out above, certainly not as planned and possibly, never. Since we have no accurate, contracted costings for the current plan, it is difficult to conclude that an accurately priced contract for a known design would be more expensive compared to the great unknown and serial delays which await SSN AUKUS. Yes, it would require political courage, but given the growing concerns over the current plan, a change that provides greater sovereignty, increased Allied submarine capability, plus improved certainty over costs and timings would be a welcome.

When ambition meets reality, reality always wins – eventually! Time for Plan B!

Read Part 1 of this series.

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.