Peter Briggs
Peter Briggs retired from the RAN in 2001 after a 40-year career, specialising in submarines. This included two submarine commands, command of the RAN Submarine Squadron, director of Submarine Policy and Warfare and Head of Submarine Capability Team, established to rectify Collins introduction into service issues. He was the president of the Submarine Institute of Australia from 2006-09 and is a frequent contributor to public debate on Australian submarine matters.
Peter Briggs's articles (22 total)
AUKUS is a $368 billion gamble Australia does not need to take
US production shortfalls, Britain’s submarine crisis and Australia’s own infrastructure delays are eroding the assumptions behind AUKUS. It's time to take a different path.
The French lesson: why Australia should take another look at LEU
France’s experience with low-enriched uranium submarines challenges claims that Australia would have to send vessels overseas for reactor support, while offering lessons in fleet availability, sovereign maintenance and crewing.
AUKUS Infrastructure, part 7: Sorting the submarine source and sustainment stalemate
In part seven of the AUKUS infrastructure series, the focus turns to Henderson, where fragmented planning risks locking Australia into costly nuclear bottlenecks before construction has properly begun.
AUKUS Infrastructure, part 6: It is not too late to change course
In the final part of a six-part series on AUKUS infrastructure, Peter Briggs argues that Pillar 1 cannot deliver on schedule or budget, and that Australia should pause its HEU pathway and assess proven LEU alternatives.
AUKUS infrastructure, part 5: The HEU problem
In the fifth of a six-part series on AUKUS infrastructure, the choice of highly enriched uranium raises questions about proliferation, safety, waste, regulation and the civil burden placed on Australian shipyards.
AUKUS infrastructure, part 4: Australia’s dual-site labour trap
In the fourth of a six-part series on AUKUS infrastructure, the focus turns to workforce: Australia must build and sustain two geographically separated nuclear submarine hubs despite acute skills shortages, certification bottlenecks and competition from the resources sector.
AUKUS infrastructure, part 3: The Osborne construction enterprise
In the third of a six-part series on AUKUS infrastructure, Osborne’s submarine yard is making visible progress, but unfunded stages, nuclear licensing, supply-chain dependence and the absence of an embedded graving dock pose major risks.
AUKUS Infrastructure, part 2: The Henderson bottleneck
In the second of a six-part series on AUKUS infrastructure, the focus shifts to Henderson, where fragmented land tenure, commercial disruption and regulatory delays could block the facilities needed to sustain nuclear-powered submarines.
AUKUS infrastructure, part 1: The docking gap that could sink Pillar 1
The first in a six-part series examines the maintenance reality behind AUKUS Pillar 1, and the looming risk that Australia may receive Virginia-class submarines before it has certified infrastructure to dock and sustain them.
The US shipyard crisis sinking AUKUS
With more than a third of the US fast-attack submarine fleet sidelined by maintenance delays, the assumptions behind AUKUS Pillar 1 are looking less credible by the year.
AUKUS leaves Australia with the long nuclear goodbye – part two
In the second of a two-part series, Peter Briggs examines the decommissioning, dismantling and waste-disposal risks Australia will inherit from AUKUS reactors.
Before the AUKUS submarines arrive, Australia inherits the risks – part one
In the first of a two-part series, Peter Briggs examines the technical and security risks of relying on highly enriched uranium and an unproven British reactor design for AUKUS submarines.
Australia should take another look at France’s nuclear submarines
The choice between high- and low-enriched uranium submarines will shape Australia’s nuclear security, waste and non-proliferation obligations for generations.
The AUKUS mirage: why Australia needs a pragmatic pivot to Plan B
Australia still needs nuclear-powered submarines for long-range sea denial, but the current AUKUS pathway is too slow and risky, making a locally built conventional fleet essential to avoid a dangerous capability gap.
Second-hand submarines: a sovereign flaw
The decision to acquire three secondhand Virginia-class submarines resolves a major fleet standardisation issue, but it also deepens Australia’s dependence on US industrial capacity, British delivery schedules and political decisions beyond its control.
AUKUS meets reality – UK ‘all in’ a mess (Part 2)
Australia is betting on a British program plagued by delays, underinvestment and workforce shortages – a gamble that risks leaving the country without any sovereign submarine capability.
AUKUS meets reality – what's not in the AUSMIN Media Release (Part 1)
Despite official assurances, the US submarine program is falling well short of its own targets, raising serious doubts about whether Australia will ever receive the Virginia class submarines promised under AUKUS.
SSN AUKUS – Heading for a quagmire (Part II)
In the first part, I identified the factors mitigating against the sale of 3-5 Virginia class submarines to cover the gap until the arrival of the British designed SSN AUKUS.
The shrinking US Navy submarine force – Implications for AUKUS Pillar 1 (Part 1)
The US Navy’s attack submarine force had been predicted to reduce to 49 in 2030.
AUKUS on track? No, Australia needs Plan B now
Last Monday’s AUKUS Security forum at the National Press Club heard arguments of those seeking to support the status quo. It was argued that criticism undermines AUKUS and risks turning the possibility that the US will not be able to spare Virginia class SSNs for sale to Australia from an ‘if’ to certainty.
Why does Australia need submarines?
Why submarines? The submarine’s most fundamental, key feature is its stealth. A well-handled, submarine is able to operate without causing fuss, in areas where we do not control the sea or air and gain access to areas denied to more overt platforms, such as ships, aircraft and unmanned aircraft.
AUKUS SSN: A flawed plan heading for the wrong destination
The AUKUS agreement aims to increase US, UK and Australian submarine capability in the Indo Pacific and the deterrence impact they offer. The current plan will fail for four fundamental reasons.