As the West throws the whole shebang at Moscow, the world’s largest country faces a moment of truth.

Predicting the course of political events during particularly volatile periods, such as the one we entered a year ago, is a thankless and meaningless endeavour. Yet in such times, theres both a need and an opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of the main trends shaping the world. This brief overview is an attempt to identify Russias main course of development in the international arena and its relations with key players in the year ahead.

Ukraine

The longer the conflict in Ukraine lasts, the more it resembles an uncompromising confrontation between Russia and US-centric Western countries. The escalation of hostilities continues to be the dominant trend. The stakes are extremely high for all sides, but for Moscow even more so than for the United States or Western Europe. For Russia, the conflict is not only a matter of external security and its place in the world, but also a matter of internal stability, including the cohesion of its political regime and the future of Russian statehood. After the partial mobilisation last fall, combat operations in Ukraine began to resemble something far broader. What started out as a “special military operation” may well become a patriotic war.

All conflictseventually come to an end as a result of agreements. However, the above circumstances make it nearly impossible to conclude either a peace agreement or even a stable armistice similar to the Korean deal of the 1950s. The problem is that Washingtons maximum concessions are a far cry from Moscows minimal goals. The objective of the USis to exclude Russia from among the great world powers, initiate regime change in Moscow, and deprive China of an important strategic partner. Its strategy is to exhaust the Russian Army at the battlefront, shake up society, undermine peoples trust in the authorities, and finally, get the Kremlin to surrender. As for Russia, it has the resources and power to get the better ofthese schemes and achieve its goals in such a way as to avoid another armed conflict in the future. In 2023, combat operations in Ukraine may not end, but over the next 12 months, we will see whose willpower is stronger and which side will eventually prevail.

The West

The Ukrainian conflict has so far been a proxy war between Russia and NATO. However, the growing number of Western countries joining the conflict and aiming to strategically defeat Russia may lead to a direct clash between the Armed Forces of Russia and Western military units. If this happens, the Ukrainian conflict will turn into a Russia-NATO war. Such a situationwill inevitably carry a nuclear risk. This is further aggravated by the fact that, acting out of desperation, Kiev authorities may provoke the US-led military blocto directly enter the conflict.

However, even if a head-on collision is avoided, the Wests overall hostility towards Russia will keep on growing. Economic relations between Russia and Western Europe, which the latter sabotaged last year despite the evident suicide of such actions, will continue deteriorating.

Western European countries are continuing to isolate themselves from Russia, seeing it as a direct threat and using this “menace” to boost the internal cohesion of their own bloc. For over half a century, European security has been a safe haven for international diplomacy and a mantra for foreign policy. But now, the Western Europeans have dropped the pen and taken up the sword or, more precisely, artillery systems.

Ukraine is currently the most significant battlefront between Russia and the West, but not the only one. The front of confrontation extends north through Belarus, Kaliningrad, and the Baltic into the Arctic, and south through Moldova, the Black Sea, Transcaucasia, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia. Of particular importance in 2023 are Kazakhstan and Armenia, where the West is actively supporting anti-Russian nationalist powers, and Moldova and Georgia, where its attempting to rekindle old conflicts and open a second front in addition to the Ukrainian one.

In Russia-US relations, dialogue has long been replaced by a hybrid war. And Ukraine is but one direction, albeit the most noticeable, that this showdownis taking. Washington’s goal is to actively demonstrate its globaldominance and it’s willing to take serious and risky stepsto this end. Moscowis not the main opponent for Washington, but one that needs to be taken down first. US foreign policy is merciless to rivals, opponents, and allies alike, and Russia can count only on its own power to hold the Americansback.

Ahead of the 2024 presidential elections in the US, political struggles are predictably set to escalate. The Republicans, who recently took control of the House of Representatives, will likely demand greater accountability for the funds allocated to Ukraine. These largesse may also be somewhat reduced. Nevertheless, most Republicans share the views of President Joe Biden’s administration regarding both Ukraine and Russia, so a change in US policy in favour of Moscow remains highly unlikely.

In terms of relations between Japan and Russia, cooperation established by former prime minister Shinzo Abe is being replaced with Cold War-era hostility. In contrast to Western Europe, Japan isnt willing to break off energy ties with Russia. But the revitalisation of the alliance between Japan and the United States, coupled with the strengthening military-political ties between Russia and China and mounting tension on the Korean Peninsula all signal a return to the old confrontation with Russia, China, and North Korea on one side, and the United States, Japan, and South Korea on the other.

The East

In the current circumstances, Belarus remains Russias only absolute ally. At the same time, Moscow maintains partner relations with several nations whose importance has grown significantly in recent times. These are primarily the great world powers China and India; regional players Brazil, Iran, Turkey, and South Africa; and the Persian Gulf countries primarily Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These countries, along with dozens of others, have not joined in the Western sanctions against Russia and continue to be Moscow’s partners. However, Asian, African and Latin American countries that exist within Washingtons financial empire, which are increasingly called the world majority in Russia, are forced to consider the effect of secondary US sanctions.

This is apparent in the case of China. The proposal of a Russian-Chinese partnership without borders demonstrates the willingness of both world powers to develop in-depth cooperation in all fields. Despite Washingtons considerable efforts to use the Ukrainian conflict to sabotage China-Russia relations, economic and military ties between Beijing and Moscow are growing stronger. The promised visit of Chinese leader Xi Jinping to Russia, scheduled for the spring of 2023, is evidence of the ongoing rapprochement.

At the same time, both sides are acting out of their national interests. For Russia, the United States is currently an opponent. But for China, it is only a rival and a potential opponent. This is not enough to form a military alliance between Moscow and Beijing. China naturally values its economic interests in US and European markets, and Beijing may change its mind in favour of a military alliance only if Washington becomes its enemy. For the sake of Russia alone, China is not willing to take this step.

There are also issues around Russias relations with India. Just like Beijing, New Delhi is Moscows strategic partner. Yet with its ambitious goal of accomplishing a major economic leap in the current decade, India is particularly interested in economic and technological cooperation with the US, the EU, and Japan. Moreover, New Delhi sees Beijing as its main rival and a potential military threat: the smouldering conflict on the border between the two most populated Asian states continues to occasionally flare up. In addition to BRICS and SCO membership, India is a member of the Quad group, which the US views as an anti-Chinese alliance.

In such conditions, Russia will have to decisively strengthen its positions in India in 2023. This includes actively working with local elites, explaining Russias foreign policy and countering the attempts to distort it by Western media (used by the Indian pressas its main reference), finding and developing new opportunities for economic, technological, and scientific cooperation, and encouraging productive cooperation via international forums and other platforms. In the opposite case, a go with the flow attitude in Russian-Indian relations will result in Indias drift away from Moscow.

Last year, Iran became the only country to supply its own weapons systems to Russia. At the same time, Tehran entered the process of joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The North-South Transport Corridor linking Russia with the Persian Gulf nations, India, and South Asia has acquired particular importance under Western sanctions. Also, last year it finally became clear that the Iranian nuclear deal would not be extended. This means the suspension and possibly even the termination of over half a century of cooperation between Russia and the United States on nuclear nonproliferation.

In 2023, Russia and Iran will continue growing closer. On the Russian side, this will require the development of a more concise and active strategy towards the Middle Eastern state.

Moscows relations with Tehran directly influence its relations with the Arab nations and Ankara. The region is notable for having several centres of power. The policy of the Persian Gulfs Arab countries (especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) is becoming increasingly multi-vector. They are no longer focused solely on the US and are developing ties with Russia and China. In the coming year, this trend will likely continue and strengthen. Having proposed a concept for regional security in the Gulf zone back in 2019, in 2023 Moscow could step up the efforts and facilitate dialogue between Iran and its southern neighbours.

2023 is the centenary of the proclamation of the Turkish republic, and will seepresidential elections. For Russia and its foreign policy, the importance of Turkey has grown dramatically in recent years. As a result of the Syrian war, the Second Karabakh War, the Ukrainian conflict, and the collapse of normal relations between Russia and Western Europe, Turkey turned into a transport, logistics, and gas hub between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic world.

The Turkish opposition is determined to put an end to the 20-plus year political reign of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who intends to run for another (according to him, final) presidential term. We wont make predictions concerning the upcoming election but will only point out the trend that Turkey is transforming from a regional power into a major independent player with global ambitions. This makes Ankara an indispensable, if challenging partner for Moscow.

Close neighbours

Last but not least are Russias relations with its immediate neighbours. This trend came to the fore in 2022 and is set to continue. Over the coming year, achieving a breakthrough and eventually, victory in Ukraine, will be Russias main priority. Belarus will remain Russias closest ally and partner. Meanwhile, the rise of ethnic nationalism in Kazakhstan and potential discord in relations between Moscow and Astana pose the greatest risk.

Other threats may include a Moldovan attempt to cooperate with Kiev and the West on solving the Transnistria conflict; a potential renewal of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan; another outbreak of the border dispute between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and internal destabilisation issues in neighbouring countries.

On the other hand, under the influence of last years gigantic geopolitical, strategic, and geo-economic shifts, it has become obvious that we need a fundamentally different level of economic and military-political cooperation within the frameworks of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), respectively. Its worth noting that in both aspects, Russia-Uzbekistan cooperation looks particularly promising. What is clear is that under the conditions of unprecedented geopolitical tension along the entire perimeter of Russias new post-Soviet borders, Moscow will need to invest a lot more attention, understanding, and effort to reap results. This will become one of the key challenges for Russian foreign policy in 2023.

This article was first published in Profile.ru

English language translation first published January 19, 2023 by rt.com