Pearls and Irritations

A monumental transformation: There has been a great deal of public criticism of Australia’s decision to acquire a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) via the AUKUS security partnership. The criticism has been both broad and deep, spanning political and industrial challenges, budgetary consequences, safety and environmental concerns, strategic risks, and the erosion of national sovereignty.

While these are all worthy issues to bring to the fore of the public debate, one set of issues that have not received nearly as much attention are the ways in which AUKUS implicates Australia in US nuclear war planning.

From one perspective this is understandable given AUKUS does not involve plans for Australia to acquire nuclear-armed submarines or to station US nuclear weapons on Australian soil. However, when viewed from a wider perspective, AUKUS epitomises Australia’s geostrategic transformation and evolving nuclear posture within the US alliance.

The significance of this transformation is reflected in the fact that Australia will soon become ‘the only ally in the world to host and support military operations by forward-deployed US strategic bombers and SSN attack submarines’. This comes in addition to hosting mature US expeditionary Marine capabilities and a more recent rotational presence of US Army personnel and permanent associated support infrastructure.

Perhaps more significant than providing a ‘vast military launchpad’ for multiple forms of US power projection is the developing role of the ADF to seamlessly integrate with American military forces and to provide what is approaching full-spectrum support operations, including for nuclear missions.

AUKUS and nuclear war

Although the focus of AUKUS ‘pillar one’ is the acquisition by Australia of nuclear-powered, but conventionally-armed submarines, there are in fact several nuclear war planning dimensions to the broader security partnership.

The Australian government refuses to publicly broach the questions of how, where and against whom Australia’s future SSN force might be expected to operate both in peacetime and in the event of conflict. However, a common mission for this type of submarine is to chase down adversary nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Australia’s SSNs would therefore be operationally suited for deployment against China’s SSBNs in the South China Sea.

Alternatively, Australia’s SSNs, in combination with other anti-submarine warfare platforms such as the P-8A Poseidon, could prove effective in maintaining control over critical maritime chokepoints against China’s conventionally-armed attack submarines and other surface vessels.

Although this would not involve the RAN in direct attacks on China’s nuclear submarine forces, such operations could be part of a planned division of labour to help free America’s submarine force to directly target China’s SSBNs. Significantly, part of that submarine force will soon be operating from Australia.

The most concrete element of AUKUS to date is the one UK and up to four US nuclear-powered submarines to be forward-deployed to HMAS Stirling from 2027 under the new Submarine Rotational Force West (SRF – West) initiative. This rotational force is to be maintained and sustained with the support of Australian military personnel and facilities.

It would not be surprising if all of these contingencies are perceived by Beijing as posing an existential threat, particularly as China’s nuclear submarine deterrent continues to develop into an assured second-strike capability.

SRF – West could also one day include the forward-deployment of US nuclear-armed attack submarines. Although nuclear missiles were removed from all US surface ships and submarines (except SSBNs) by a presidential directive in 1991, and later retired in a process that was completed by 2013, there is no impediment to future missiles being returned by order of the president.

Congress has in fact authorised funding over several years for the development of a nuclear cruise launched missile for potential deployment on US attack submarines, and the Biden administration has taken steps to begin a program of implementation.

This inexhaustive list of direct and indirect Australian participation in US nuclear operations constitute only possibilities, but they are possibilities that either didn’t exist or were less feasible prior to AUKUS.

Australia’s evolving nuclear posture

AUKUS is more than just an international arms agreement. By Scott Morrison’s admission the political framework is intended to secure a ‘forever partnership’ and a ‘forever responsibility’ between Australia and the United States. The unprecedented scale, cost, time frame and interdependence generated by the singular AUKUS deal clearly signals a decision to lock Australia into America’s distinctive military strategy for containing China into the future.

A key objective of America’s strategy is to achieve seamless high-end defence integration with its global network of allies and partners. While obstacles to full realisation remain, Canberra’s embrace of ‘integrated deterrence’ is already transforming Australia into both a critical base of operations and provider of full-spectrum support for US force projection into the region. It is also leading to the development of a new and unprecedented role for the ADF in support of US nuclear operations.

This transformation aligns with the goals of the US 2022 Nuclear Posture Review to achieve greater levels of capability integration with Australia and other key allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific to ‘leverage’ their ‘non-nuclear capabilities that can support the nuclear deterrence mission.’

The most significant and concrete element of this new role for Australia can be seen in the more frequent rotations of US nuclear-capable strategic bombers to a greater number of Australian airfields as part of the US Force Posture Initiatives. The dedicated US infrastructure currently under construction to support these rotations will enable sustained US combat operations from Australian soil, including for the first time potential nuclear operations.

Under the framework of the US Force Posture Initiatives the RAAF is engaged in an intense regime of interoperability exercises to enhance its capabilities for providing a wide range of direct support roles to US strategic bombers and other aircraft. These support roles include rapid ground hot-pit refuelling, mid-air tanker support and air protection in the form of advanced fighter and electronic attack aircraft and airborne early warning command and control.

Other Australian support roles for US nuclear operations could come in the form of ADF long-range targeting capabilities, including the Jindalee Operational Radar Network, to enable missile strikes against Chinese dual-capable ground-based theatre missiles, launchers, and supporting infrastructure.

This evolving nuclear posture for Australia constitutes a significant break from what has hitherto been critical but limited expectations of Australian intelligence and communications support for US nuclear operations via institutionalised sharing arrangements typified by the joint-defence facilities Pine Gap and Northwest Cape.

Avoiding a fait accompli

The situation emerging is one of enduring high-level tactical and institutional integration between the defence forces of Australia and the United States, creating the conditions for extreme political pressure and expectations from Washington of Australian support for any future US war with China.

Assertions of national sovereignty, defence autonomy and ‘full knowledge and concurrence’ as reassurance that any future decision by Australia to go to war will be made independently and transparently is effectively rendered nugatory under present conditions.

Consciously, or without a full appreciation of the strategic consequences, tactical decisions about Australia’s involvement in US-led high-end combat operations against China, including nuclear missions, are presently being made in the absence of any formal democratic debate, transparency or accountability.

To advance US-Australia conventional and nuclear war planning, further integration would need to take place at the strategic level, perhaps culminating in formalised joint military planning and coordination in preparation for potential security contingencies. Small steps in this direction are already being taken.

The time to put a halt to any plans for expanding Australia’s nuclear posture is now. If no public pressure is forthcoming the Australian government is likely, in time, to move forward with precommitments to support US nuclear operations behind closed doors, and if presented to the public at all, will be done so as a fait accompli, as was the case with AUKUS, the forward-deployment of B-52 bombers and the US Force Posture Initiatives generally.

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