Pearls and Irritations

The significance of US strategic bomber deployments:Defence Minister Richard Marles played down revelations in late 2022 that up to six US B-52 strategic bombers are to be forward-deployed to Tindal Air Force Base, telling reporters at the time that ‘everyone needs to take a deep breath here.’ Marles implied that there was nothing new about the revelations given US bombers have ‘been coming to Australia since the 1980s’ and ‘training in Australia since 2005.’

Foreign Minister Penny Wong contributed to this narrative with the dissembling statement that the planned B-52 deployment ‘is consistent with the approach Australia has taken over a number of years to increase our capacity to operate with the United States.’

By this approach Wong means the US Force Posture Initiatives that have forged closer defence integration between both countries over more than a decade and rapidly so since 2020. This includes the 2017 Enhanced Air Cooperation initiative that involves rotations to Australia of all types of US aircraft from all aviation arms of the US military.

The significance of the planned deployment of B-52s to Tindal Air Force Base that was seemingly lost on Marles and Wong derives from the fact that 46 of the 76 B-52 bombers in the US Air Force active fleet are nuclear-capable.

Although nuclear-capable does not mean nuclear-armed, the decision to move from the former to the latter amidst a crisis is likely to occur quickly and without forewarning. Significantly, there are no legal or policy impediments today that prohibit the US from launching nuclear operations from Australian soil.

The situation today is very different to what transpired in the past.

While Marles is correct to point out that B-52s first deployed to Australia in the 1980s, including staging through Darwin, the agreement negotiated by the Fraser government that governed these deployments was explicit in the requirement that the bombers be strictly limited to Indian Ocean surveillance operations and low-level terrain avoidance training. Crucially, the B-52s were required to be unarmed and carry no bombs.

Marles’ mention of B-52 training exercises in Australia since 2005 is a reference to the Strategic Bomber Training Program involving B-52, B-1 and B-2 strategic aircraft carrying out long-range bombing exercises and employing live conventional munitions over training ranges in northern Australia. But here too there are marked differences to present arrangements.

It is one matter to have US bombers visit Australia for training and interoperability exercises. It’s quite another when they are supported by dedicated US infrastructure, such as that which is currently under construction at Tindal Air Force Base, including a squadrons operation facility for mission planning, crew briefings and intelligence, along with maintenance facilities, strategic fuel reserves, and earth covered magazines for stockpiling munitions.

The explicit purpose of this infrastructure is to ‘support high-end war fighting and combined military operations in the region.’ As stipulated in the 2014 Force Posture Agreement that governs the US Force Posture Initiatives, the types of possible activities by US forces in Australia have not only been extended beyond the training and interoperability exercises of the past but are now open-ended to include any such ‘mutually determined’ activities.

From tactical to strategic integration

The rapid expansion of the US Force Posture Initiatives and the ‘forever partnership’ established by the AUKUS security partnership reflects the emergence of enduring high-level tactical integration between the defence forces of Australia and the United States, signified by enhanced interoperability and interchangeability.

This comes in addition to mature levels of institutional integration in the form of information sharing (Five-Eyes) and the forthcoming expansion of co-development and co-production of military capabilities (AUKUS pillars one and two).

In the event of what would surely be a catastrophic US-China conflict, Canberra is likely to find itself under extreme political pressure and expectations from Washington to make available for the US war effort the significant investment in capabilities that have been built up in Australia over so many years.

Should the prospect of nuclear war eventuate, expectations from Washington might include direct support for US nuclear operations, including potentially nuclear strikes by US strategic bombers forward deployed to northern Australia.

A decision by Australia not to participate in such a war would have major ramifications for the alliance.

In order to avoid expectation gaps, several prominent defence specialists have advocated enhanced levels of US-Australia strategic integration to match the already high degrees of tactical and institutional integration between both countries.

There is likely to already be some degree of classified strategic contingency planning over the possible eruption of conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Comprehensive strategic integration would establish clear guidelines on what roles and missions Australian forces would participate in to support US nuclear operations. Explicit tabletop exercises and wargaming of ADF support for agreed simulated nuclear missions would likely follow.

Strategic integration could be achieved through a dedicated regular consultative mechanism for joint military planning and coordination in a manner comparable to NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group and the more recently established US-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group.

Small steps in this direction are already being taken. The US-Australia Strategic Policy Dialogue was established in 2019 as a forum for high-level defence and foreign affairs departmental consultations on extended deterrence, although these discussions include a broad range of other regional issues.

Strategic planning need not pertain to the permanent stationing of nuclear weapons on Australian territory. Nuclear planning under NATO goes beyond the actual storage of US nuclear weapons in the territories of five NATO member states to include a much broader range of nuclear burden sharing arrangements. For example, six additional NATO member states play an air support role through the SNOWCAT mission (Support of Nuclear Operations With Conventional Air Tactics).

Australia is in fact adopting at the tactical level elements of NATO’s SNOWCAT mission by providing a wide range of supporting roles for US strategic bombers forward-deployed in northern Australia, including logistics, maintenance and protection, and may in time develop a maritime equivalent via AUKUS and other anti-submarine warfare platforms.

Enhanced strategic integration could also involve multilateral nuclear planning. A proposal for the US to create an Asian Nuclear Planning Group involving Australia, Japan and South Korea was jointly recommended in 2021 by former US and UK defence secretaries and former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd.

Fear of entrapment

Despite pressure from Washington Australian officials have in the past been reluctant to establish high-level nuclear strategic consultations for two reasons. First is the fear that such detailed discussions could lead to a situation of ‘entrapment’ resulting from pressure by Washington to agree to pre-commitments for certain unwanted conflict scenarios.

While this is a sound concern that Australian officials should continue to heed, the practical reality is that by facilitating very high levels of tactical and institutional integration, Australia has already travelled far down the path of entrapment.

The second reason for resisting strategic integration on nuclear planning is the fear of domestic backlash. The Australian government would prefer not to attract public attention to the increasing role that nuclear weapons may come to play in the US alliance, or to the fact that there are no legal or policy impediments to prohibit the US from launching nuclear operations from Australian soil.

This fear stems from a recognition that there is unlikely to be strong public support for Australian participation in US nuclear operations, particularly given this is far more likely to involve support of US partners and allies in Northeast Asia – Taiwan, Japan, South Korea – than in the direct defence of Australia against a nuclear attack.

No support for US nuclear missions

The Australian government should be upfront with the public about the nuclear war planning implications of the rapid expansion of US-Australia defence integration. Any expansion of Australia’s nuclear posture that the government may be contemplating at the strategic level should be made transparent with full acknowledgement of the risks and costs involved.

Resolving expectation gaps between Washington and Canberra regarding joint operations for potential regional security contingencies is an important and urgent task. However, to achieve this Australia should not lock itself into high-level strategic consultations on nuclear planning, or even take incremental steps in that direction.

Rather, the government should develop and publicly announce a simple policy position that prohibits all Australian defence facilities and personnel from directly or indirectly supporting US nuclear operations. This could feasibly extend to intelligence and communications support via Pine Gap.

This position would be consistent with the requirements of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons for which the Australian Labor Party has formally, if unfaithfully, expressed its in principle support. It would also undoubtedly be welcomed by many regional neighbours and partners in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific that have long championed anti-nuclear policies.

What’s more, there is no sane strategic or moral justification for nuclear weapons to feature in Australian defence policy, especially when the expected prospect for their employment is a US-China war that would be utterly catastrophic for all of humanity.

 

Read Part 1 below:

Australia’s evolving nuclear posture: avoiding a fait accompli (Part 1 of 2)