Jon Stanford

Formerly Jon Stanford was a division head in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, a Partner in Deloitte Economics and a founding Director of Insight Economics.

Jon's recent articles

Bewilderingly unsophisticated: ASPI deputy director fires up China threat megaphone

Bewilderingly unsophisticated: ASPI deputy director fires up China threat megaphone

Alex Bristows recent piece on China (Dont sidestep the China problem in public debate on defence, Australian Financial Review, 14 February) demonstrates the extent to which the Australian Strategic Policy Institute has become a cheerleader for the US military-industrial complex.

Covert forces and the overthrow of Edward Gough Whitlam: The series

Covert forces and the overthrow of Edward Gough Whitlam: The series

The dismissal of Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam by Queen Elizabeths Vice-Regal representative, Sir John Kerr, was an extraordinary event. For almost fifty years a debate has raged about why the Governor-General took the unprecedented action he did on 11 November 1975. This five-part series puts a spotlight on the on the external events that were in play at the time

Australia sleepwalking into catastrophic conflict with China

Australia sleepwalking into catastrophic conflict with China

Gareth Evans review of Australias strategic relationship with the United States (Why Australia cant rely on the US to save it from China, 12 December) provides a timely wake-up call on the dangers of Australia sleepwalking into what would be a catastrophic conflict with China.

Covert forces and the overthrow of Edward Gough Whitlam: The Series

Covert forces and the overthrow of Edward Gough Whitlam: The Series

The dismissal of Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam by Queen Elizabeths Vice-Regal representative, Sir John Kerr, was an extraordinary event. For almost fifty years a debate has raged about why the Governor-General took the unprecedented action he did on 11 November 1975. This five-part series puts a spotlight on the on the external events that were in play at the time

The Overthrow of Edward Gough Whitlam: A stain on Australias democracy - finale

The Overthrow of Edward Gough Whitlam: A stain on Australias democracy - finale

Gough Whitlam was an Australian democrat. He passionately believed in our institutions; the supremacy of parliament, the independence and integrity of the judiciary and the separation of powers to curb possible abuses by the executive government. In the dismissal these institutions failed us. Those with responsibility deceived us. Tradition and conventions built over centuries were trashed. The damage to our public life goes far beyond the injustice done to Gough Whitlam. - John Menadue, Postscript, Pearls and Irritations

Whitlams overthrow: Queens Gambit to checkmate. Part 5

Whitlams overthrow: Queens Gambit to checkmate. Part 5

Well, how about a call from the CIA to MI6 saying we have a security problem in Australia? More than one call. Dozens of calls. We have a security problem with the Prime Minister. He's endangering national security for the United States and the Alliance. The evidence is he is making noises about our bases, he's making threats; those bases are absolutely essential to the survival of the Alliance. Now what caused the Brits to act? They made a recommendation for the demise, yes. And in a way, it allowed a duly elected Prime Minister to be tossed out of...

Spooky fiddling: The CIA playbook and the overthrow of Whitlam. Part 4

Spooky fiddling: The CIA playbook and the overthrow of Whitlam. Part 4

In a telephone conversation between Kissinger and Nixon following the 1973 military coup d'tat in Chile, the President asked if our hand showed in the overthrow and death of the democratically elected President Allende. Kissinger explained that we didn't do it, in terms of direct participation in the military actions. I mean we helped them, Kissinger continued, [redacted words] created the conditions as great as possible.

Cold War imperatives: Whitlam and the US National Security Council. Part 3

Cold War imperatives: Whitlam and the US National Security Council. Part 3

In July 1975, Malcolm Fraser spoke to US Ambassador Marshall Green about the Labor governments alleged desire for a non-aligned position in world affairs. In fact, he added, Whitlam and others may be trying to cause the US to take the lead in abandoning ANZUS.

Stress testing the US alliance: Whitlam and the secrets of Pine Gap. Part 2

Stress testing the US alliance: Whitlam and the secrets of Pine Gap. Part 2

When Marshall Green, a very senior official in the State Department, was appointed as Ambassador to Australia in early 1973, President Nixons briefing regarding the relationship with Whitlam was succinct and on point: Marshall, I cant stand that cunt. Green later reflected this was a strange kind of parting instruction to get from your president.

Shame Fraser, shame: The overthrow of Edward Gough Whitlam. Part 1

Shame Fraser, shame: The overthrow of Edward Gough Whitlam. Part 1

When offered the position of Governor-General by Prime Minister Whitlam in 1974, Sir John Kerr consulted friends and colleagues as to whether he should accept the appointment. One of them, Justice Robert Hope, queried why he would take such a dead-end job, a hopeless job. Kerrs response was: Oh, no, its a very powerful position. It has much more power than you realise. - Jenny Hocking, Gough Whitlam, Vol. II.

SSNs for the RAN: A response to Brian Toohey

SSNs for the RAN: A response to Brian Toohey

Brian Toohey (Pearls and Irritations, 14 February 2023) makes a number of criticisms of the recent four-part series on national security by Michael Keating and myself that was published in Pearls and Irritations earlier this month. He contends that we have made assertions that should not go unchallenged, particularly in regard to our support for the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) by the RAN.

The AUKUS pact: If you want peace, prepare for war

Australia's nuclear-power submarines will greatly enhance Australias ability to provide for its own self-reliant defence. Nevertheless, the new strategic approach confronts us with a number of almighty challenges.

Why is Australia still investing in a balanced defence force?

When the Prime Minister recently compared Australias strategic situation to that in 1939, he was right in two respects. Both in 1939 and in 2021, we have put too much trust in a great and powerful friend to secure our independence. Australias problem is a Defence department that, simply put, lacks foresight, resourcefulness and innovation.

Vale Gary Johnston, founder and sponsor of the Submarines for Australia group

Gary Johnston sadly died after a short illness on 10 March 2021. Gary was the founder of the Submarines for Australia website and the generous sponsor of the associated research, submissions and reports published on the site.

The smart money is that in defending Australia we will be on our own. Part 3

The governments recent Defence Strategic Update suggests Australia faces the greatest threat to our independence since 1942. In this final article of three, I consider the need for a Review, both to design a new Australian military strategy and analyse the essential elements of the new force structure that this will require.

Part 2. Australias Defence Strategy: built-in resistance to change

The governments Defence Strategic Update suggests Australia faces the greatest threat to our independence since 1942. This demands a sophisticated diplomatic strategy, the development of a sound military strategy and the careful analysis of how to deliver an appropriate force structure so as to address the threat in an acceptable timeframe.

Sharp-edged but sophisticated diplomacy needs to underpin our defence strategy Part 1

The governments recent Defence Strategic Update suggests Australia faces the greatest threat to our independence since 1942. This demands a sophisticated diplomatic strategy, the development of a sound military strategy to deter an attack by a great power and careful analysis of how to design the right force structure to deliver it. This first article of three looks at the issues around diplomacy.

What should Australian submarines do? Response to Brian Toohey

Brian Tooheys challenging post (19 October) concerns what we want our submarines to do. In light of the recent Defence Strategic Update, the ADF needs to build a force capable of deterring an attack by a major power.

JON STANFORD. A Response to Michael McKinley on Future Submarines

In a series of five pieces in Pearls and Irritations last week, Dr Michael McKinley cites the recent report by Submarines for Australia at some length. While I acknowledge some of Dr McKinleys concerns about our approach, it is not clear to me what he is proposing in its place. But insofar as I understand his criticisms I will respond to them in three areas below.

JON STANFORD: Second rate leadership: Future Submarine Part 4 of 4

I have suggested that recent governments have failed to provide leadership in the defence portfolio. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the case of SEA 1000, the future submarine program.

JON STANFORD: Second rate leadership: Future Submarine Part 3 of 4

I have suggested in earlier posts that recent governments have failed to provide leadership in the defence portfolio. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the case of SEA 1000, the future submarine program.

JON STANFORD: Second rate leadership Part 2 of 4: Defence

Australia is now a confident, wealthy nation that has the right to expect its leaders to rise above the second rate.

Second rate leadership. Part 1 of 4

Australia is now a confident, wealthy nation that has the right to expect its leaders to rise above the second rate.

JON STANFORD. Comment on Mike Scrapton's article 'The casual talk of war'.

Isnt it interesting that in the Prime Ministers attempt yesterday to make us all very frightened indeed about the national security threats that a Labor government would expose us to ranging from hordes of asylum seekers at the gates, including paedophiles and murderers in their ranks, to increased domestic violence against women he completely forgot to warn us about the elephant in the room, namely a major war in the South China Sea over Taiwan. This is now widely canvassed among academic strategic experts, including Hugh White and Paul Dibb, as being distinctly possible in the not too...

JON STANFORD. The Future Submarine: Time for a Review

One year ago, Insight Economics, sponsored by Sydney businessman Gary Johnston, published a comprehensive, independent report on the future submarine (FSM) acquisition. Launched at the National Press Club by Professor Hugh White and Dr Michael Keating, the report highlighted the excessive cost of the FSM; its unacceptable delivery timetable leading to a dangerous capability gap; the extremely high risks around the capability it would deliver; and the challenges and high cost surrounding a life extension of the obsolescent Collins class submarines. Over the past year, nothing has occurred to change these conclusions. Indeed, recent developments have only served greatly to...

JON STANFORD. Australias Future Submarine. Part 3 of 3. Responding to the criticisms

At the National Press Club in Canberra on 27 September 2017, Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the ANU, launched an independent report by Insight Economics on Australias future submarine (FSM). The report, Australias Future Submarine: Getting This Key Capability Right, was commissioned by Gary Johnston, a Sydney businessman and owner of the website, submarinesforaustralia.

JON STANFORD. Australias Future Submarine; Part 2 of 3 : Addressing the problems in a second-best world

At the National Press Club in Canberra on 27 September 2017, Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the ANU, launched an independent report by Insight Economics on Australias future submarine (FSM). The report, Australias Future Submarine: Getting This Key Capability Right, was commissioned by Gary Johnston, a Sydney businessman and owner of the website, submarinesforaustralia.

JON STANFORD. Australia's Future Submarines: A response to Christopher Pyne

Last week at the National Press Club, Hugh White launched a report by Insight Economics, Australia's Future Submarine: Getting This Key Capability Right, of which I was the principal author. The report was sponsored by Gary Johnston, a Sydney businessman with no commercial interest in the SEA 1000 Future Submarine (FSM) program but an abiding concern with the waste of taxpayers' money in failed defence acquisition projects.

JON STANFORD. Australias Future Submarine - Part 1: The problems

At the National Press Club in Canberra on 27 September 2017, Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the ANU, launched an independent report by Insight Economics on Australias future submarine (FSM). The report, Australias Future Submarine: Getting This Key Capability Right, was commissioned by Gary Johnston, a Sydney businessman and owner of the website, submarinesforaustralia.

JON STANFORD. Brexit and some lessons from the British election.

Despite recent disruptions in the comfortable world of electoral punditry Brexit, Trump, even Macron when Theresa May called a British general election in April, the only question was how many additional seats the Conservatives would win.

JON STANFORD. Australias climate change policy mess: quo vadis?

Make no mistake: Malcolm Turnbulls pusillanimous refusal even to consider the option of an emissions intensity scheme (EIS) for electricity generation represents a massive abdication of responsibility to the Australian community.

The French submarine boondoggle

Is DCNS's imaginary Shortfin Barracuda submarine Australia's biggest defence blunder? The Turnbull governments decision on the future submarine (FSM) represents bad policy. It is bad for the Navy, bad for the taxpayer and bad for the future defence of Australia. Given the key role the FSM is meant to play in the future of the naval shipbuilding industry, it is also bad news for South Australia. The Navys requirement is for a uniquely large conventional submarine (SSK) that can undertake force projection missions far from home. This in itself raises important strategic questions. Is this an appropriate role...

JON STANFORD. Business welfare under the Coalition: two case studies (2)

This is the second of two articles by Jon Stanford on the Coalitions approach to industry protection and business welfare. Part 1 (Motor Cars) can be found at Jon Stanford. Business welfare under the Coalition: two case studies. Naval shipbuilding At the outset, we need to understand that there are no significant defence reasons for building naval platforms in Australia. Self-reliance means that Australia must be capable of maintaining its defence platforms and systems to a high standard and returning damaged assets to full availability as quickly as possible. Australia does not produce a single missile or weapons...

JON STANFORD. Business welfare under the Coalition: two case studies (1)

The Abbott government came to power with a Treasurer who announced that the age of entitlement was dead and that he had no time for business welfare. In these two articles, Jon Stanford examines how this philosophy has been applied since 2013 to two manufacturing industries, passenger motor vehicles (PMV) and naval shipbuilding.

JON STANFORD and JOHN MENADUE. The submarine confusion continues. Is the way being prepared for Australia to acquire nuclear submarines?

REPOST In an interesting development relating to Australias new submarine acquisition, Peter Jennings, Executive Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), has written a piece in The Australian (7 June 2016) that is clearly at odds with the Institutes previous public stance. Jennings says that while conventional power for Australias submarines has previously been an article of faith, the capabilities required for our future submarine would in many ways be better performed by nuclear-powered boats.

JON STANFORD. Brexit - UK is unprepared.

The thrust of Michael Keatings essay on Brexit is that the vote in favour of leaving the European Union taken by the British electorate on 23 June will be bad for the UK but will have a minimal impact on the rest of the world. If the British government accepts the advice put forward in what is an advisory referendum, Dr Keating may very well be correct. Already significant damage has been done to the UK economy, even before Article 50 has been triggered. The exchange rate for the pound is in a nosedive, some banks have lost 40...

Jon Stanford. French submarines and the East and South China Seas. why?

A response to Richard Broinowski. While the government might emphasise the roles for the new submarine that may be regarded as defensive intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance Richard Broinowski ignores perhaps the most important role, namely power projection in the East and South China Seas. This role was perhaps most graphically illustrated the Rudd governments 2009 White Paper, which first made the case for 12 powerful new submarines. Rather extraordinarily, that White Paper mooted the possibility of unilateral action by Australia against a major adversary: But we do assume that, except in the case of nuclear attack,...

John Stanford. Technology, economics and Australias future submarine. Part 3 of 3.

Part 3: Implications: a more efficient and less risky approach Introduction The purpose of this three-part article is not to question the governments requirement for advanced submarine capability but rather to explore some of the technological, economic and financial issues, and the associated risks, around the programme by which the government is seeking to deliver this capability. After all, it is not the new submarines themselves that constitute the objective of this major programme, but rather the capability they will deliver. If this capability could be provided more efficiently and at less risk, there would be clear benefits for...

Jon Stanford. Technology, economics and Australias future submarine Part 2 of 3.

Part 2: Economic and financial risks Introduction The first part of this article considered the technological risks involved in the decision, as set out in the 2016 Defence White Paper, to procure twelve new submarines at an acquisition cost of at least $50 billion. The economic and financial risks of this project are discussed here in Part Two of the article. There is a considerable literature on the economics of defence procurement but the fundamental principles of economics, including corporate financial analysis, can readily be applied to military programs. Any major investment program to acquire a new or...

Jon Stanford. Technology, economics and Australias future submarine. Part 1 of 3

Part 1: Technology risk Introduction The most important acquisition included in the governments Defence White Paper, released in February 2016, is the decision to procure twelve new submarines for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). With an acquisition cost of at least $50 billion (and with a much higher through life sustainment cost), this is by far the largest defence programme in Australias history. Australia has made some extremely costly errors in defence procurement in the last few decades, particularly naval acquisitions. The Hawke governments decision to specify a unique requirement for the Collins class submarines and to build...

Jon Stanford. Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Implications for Australia

Despite a generally positive reception to the Paris accord on climate change, the ideologues on both sides of the debate regard it as a failure. For the sceptics, the agreement that developing countries (which played a negligible role in causing the problem) can continue to increase emissions is so inequitable that it undermines the whole deal. For the more extreme green groups, given their view that renewables are ready to take over from fossil fuels now, the ambition is not nearly high enough and much more should have been done. But for the non-ideological majority, the Paris agreement is...

Jon Stanford. Defence procurement and the new submarine

When people remember Gough Whitlam, few would identify him as an economic rationalist. Economics was not his primary interest and, partly because of the perceived urgency of implementing the programme after 23 years in opposition, partly because of the incompetence of some of his Ministers, the budget blew out excessively on his watch. Yet in terms of microeconomic reform his record was, in many ways, better than that of previous and subsequent Coalition governments. Even including all the reforms by the Hawke/Keating governments in the 1980s and 1990s, Whitlams 25 per cent tariff cut in 1973 remains the single greatest...

Jon Stanford. The Pathway to Two Degrees: Should we ban New Coal Mines?

Leading up to this months major climate change conference in Paris, there has been a welcome increase worldwide in the commitment to address climate change generally and, in particular, to restrict global warming to two degrees Celsius. Although they are still insufficient to meet the two degree target, the initial national commitments to be taken to the conference are, perhaps, more ambitious than might have been expected a couple of years ago. One of the side effects of this increased ambition has been a growing focus on the role of coal in increasing carbon emissions. In particular, there has...

Jon Stanford. Australias New Submarine: What is its Mission?

Recent papers published in Pearls and Irritations by Jon Stanford and Rear-Admiral Ian Richards have suggested respectively that: the case for providing significant financial support to the naval shipbuilding industry is flawed, both on defence policy and industry policy grounds there are unacceptable risks involved in building Australias proposed new fleet of submarines locally. In this article I seek to move back from the issue of local or overseas acquisition of the new submarines and attempt first to address the more fundamental question of what exactly the Australian government wants these submarines to do. That then leads on...

Jon Stanford. The governments new naval shipbuilding policy

I think this is an outstanding article on naval shipbuilding, industry policy and economic prospects in South Australia. Jon Staford suggests that in terms of industry policy, 'continuing to prop up the car industry ... would probably have been a much cheaper way of [creating jobs]'. In case you have missed it, I have decided to repost. John Menadue The recent statement by the Prime Minister on the naval shipbuilding industry is highly problematic. By committing up to $89 billion to a continuous warship-building program in Adelaide, the governments largesse knows no bounds. This policy seems irresponsible, not just...

Jon Stanford. Climate Change Policy: a wedging opportunity for the ALP?

For those who believe that Australian elections should be based on a contest of ideas about public policy, developments at the national conference of the ALP in July 2015 will provide some basis for optimism. In contrast to some previous Opposition leaders who have been content to maintain a small target strategy, Bill Shorten is starting to make himself quite a large target in policy areas such as the republic, gender equality and climate change. Why has Shorten taken this risk? It certainly helps to be opposed by a prime minister who is a high conviction politician, driven by...

Jon Stanford. Policy Approach to Climate Change

Policy Series Given that the substantial threat brought about by anthropogenic climate change has been recognised for a quarter of a century, it is remarkable that global policy makers have been so dilatory in responding to it. Voluminous scientific and economic studies have been produced, Ministers have met annually to discuss and negotiate a global policy response and yet in terms of outcomes nothing much has happened. This year, however, the annual conference of the parties (CoP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to be held in Paris will be of unusual importance. The parties will be...

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