
In the current edition of the prestigious publication Foreign Affairs Robert E. Kelly and Min-Hyung Kim argue a strong case for South Korea to build nuclear weapons to counter the military threat from North Korea. “Assembling even a limited arsenal would give South Korea greater strategic independence and reduce its constant anxiety over the shifts in US foreign policy”, they argue.
Technically the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) remain at war. The history is instructive and relevant to the current political turmoil in Seoul. The Korean Armistice Agreement of July 1953 was a negotiated ceasefire. It did not end the war. It was signed by US Army General Mark W. Clark representing the United Nations Command, DPRK Supreme Commander Marshall Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-Huai, Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army. The Armistice aimed to “ensure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved”. South Korea refused to sign the Armistice because then President Syngman Rhee could not accept the failure to unify Korea by force.
It is against the background of Korean War history that impeached President Yoon Suk- yeol sent ROK special forces to seize control of the National Assembly in Seoul on 3 December 2024. He claimed he was aiming to “eliminate the despicable pro-North Korean and anti-state forces at one stroke”. Yoon also raised fears of Chinese spies while defending his martial law. He instructed the military to prevent the country’s elected representatives from convening to lawfully vote down his decree. He also ordered the detention and interrogation of National Electoral Commission officials in an attempt to discredit the May 2024 election results favouring his political opponents. Reports have since emerged that his special forces were supported with truckloads of weaponry and live ammunition and backed up by the 3rd and 9th Airborne Brigades.
South Korean media have confirmed that Yoon’s political inner circle were discussing the possibility of a martial law decree as early as March 2024. A memo written by Roh Sang-won, the former head of the Defense Intelligence Command, identified as a key instigator of the insurrection attempt, contained the phrase “inducing a North Korean attack around the Northern Limit Line (NLL)”. With this and other substantiation pointing to attempts to stoke conflict with North Korea surfacing, police have stated that they are investigating President Yoon, his former defence chief Kim Yong-hyun, and others on suspicions of treason.
Obviously 3 December was a well-planned power grab, not the impulsive, Keystone Cops operation Yoon’s ‘Stop the Steal’ supporters are now trying to spin to the world. He failed, but the political fallout from his attempt to impose martial law has resurrected a menacing and ugly element into the nuclear-charged politics of the peninsula. For many Koreans, their President’s bungled attempt to neuter his political opponents with the military has brought back memories of the last time the ROK government used deadly force against its own people.
1988 was the first year the South Korean people democratically elected a civilian government. That election ended 40 years of hard-line military dictatorships under Syngman Ree and then Park Chun-hee. Park was shot to death in 1979 by his national intelligence chief, Kim Jae-kyu, during a coyly described ‘drinking party’. Following the assassination, General Chun Do-hwan seized power and ruled South Korea ruthlessly as a military dictator until 1988. Ironically, it was then US President Jimmy Carter, renowned today for his human rights credentials, who gave the green light for Chun to crush a popular student revolt against his illegal seizure of power. In the southern city of Gwangju thousands were killed or wounded in a savage army massacre ordered by Chun.
During the country’s decades of military dictatorship, conservatives promoted the idea of ‘buk pung’, the so-called ‘wind from the north’ that brings with it communist contamination – a danger that must be resisted by the ROK military together with strong conservative leadership. Yoon is an apologist for the murderous violence of his dictator predecessors and has a political agenda similar to their belligerent anti-DPRK policies. He is a fierce opponent of the opposition DPK’s ‘Sunshine Policy’ promoting engagement and mutual co-operation with North Korea as more effective than aggression and confrontation. He is heavily committed to the unification of Korea and has not ruled out the use of force. There are many indications that he intended the martial law declaration as the precursor to a military confrontation with the DPRK military.
There is also evidence emerging that Yoon used the declaration to stymie opposition DPK calls for him and First Lady Kim Keon-hee to answer allegations of corruption and fraud. Last week the New York Times reported that South Korean marine Colonel Park Jung-hun, who has faced insubordination and defamation charges after accusing President Yoon of whitewashing his investigation into a marine’s death, was acquitted by a court-martial. The case has been a sensitive issue in the National Assembly where the opposition raised the prosecution of Colonel Park as one of many examples of how Yoon’s government has repeatedly abused its authority to silence dissenting voices in civil society, as well as within the military. Yoon is known to have taken the challenges to his authority badly.
The geo-political background to this extraordinary situation brings into focus the ROK relationship with the United States and with Japan. In October 2023 President Yoon met with US President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio at Camp David. At the end of the three-day summit a joint declaration was released. It was saturated with esoteric diplomatic language and appeals to the same vague principles that cover the AUKUS agreement we know in Australia. The three leaders pledged their support for a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” for an international “rules-based order,” and for “peace and stability” around the world. We are all now very clear these are code words for the maintenance of US military and economic hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.
Under cover of the official platitudes, South Korea, Japan, and the US pledged to share data on North Korean missiles, coordinate joint military responses to threats in the region, and host a new annual trilateral military exercise. This marks the formation of JAKUS, sister to the AUKUS pact we have been saddled with in Australia by the Morrison and Albanese governments. The objective is the same – containment, and if called upon by the US, direct confrontation with China.
Compounding the constitutional situation, which remains a stalemate between the National Assembly majority and the still intact Yoon administration, is the national paranoia about the growing threat of the DPRK nuclear missile capability. The ROK armed forces are over 3.2 million strong and can call on advanced cyber warfare, missile, naval and air power assets, as well as hundreds of thousands of well trained army reservists. Still, Yoon thought it necessary to call a ‘temporary’ national holiday’ on 1 October 2024 designated as ‘Armed Forces Day’ to ‘raise national security awareness and increase troop morale’.
I was in Seoul that day to witness the massive 3-hour public parade of military hardware and manpower. The parade resembled the dramatic military spectacle we used to see on May Day in the old USSR.
The failed attempt to impose martial law and the subsequent impeachment of President Yoon has not ended the political emergency. It is still possible that Yoon or another actor in the military establishment will try to return the county to military dictatorship. The Constitutional Court has 6 months to decide whether to confirm the impeachment of the President. In the meantime, the country remains on tenterhooks wondering who will win the power struggle. If Yoon’s impeachment is overturned, he will likely be restored to full power in South Korea and may well decide to impose martial law again. If so, he will make sure he succeeds.
With Donald Trump about to reoccupy the White House the foreign policy of the United States is now in complete disarray. Trump caused a stir during his press conference on 16 December by excluding South Korea from the list of countries he intends to engage with in summit talks. Despite outgoing Secretary of State Antony Blinken flying to Seoul in early January to “reaffirm the ironclad US-ROK Alliance and discuss ways our two nations can build on our critical cooperation on challenges around the world based on our shared values,” South Korea can bet on nothing from Washington. Joe Biden has left a US foreign policy legacy of tumult all around the world. Nobody really knows whether Trump will support the ROK or the JAKUS alliance given his previous attempt to cut a peace deal directly with North Korea.
With Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un and the Pyongyang military elite now openly abandoning the erstwhile ‘peaceful reunification’ rhetoric and ramping up its nuclear missile program, the ROK finds itself in a world of uncertainty. That unpredictability risks the prospect of conflict between the two Koreas escalating quickly. Little wonder South Koreans are now debating the merits of their country developing and deploying nuclear weapons. A recent poll showed 71 percent of South Koreans support acquisition of nuclear weapons, a big increase from the 56 percent support the Seoul-based Asan Institute for Policy Studies found in a survey in 2010.
In their Foreign Policy analysis Robert E. Kelly and Min-Hyung Kim issue a chilling warning on the likely outcomes of resumed conflict between the two Korean states:
In such a conflict, Pyongyang would almost certainly threaten nuclear attacks on
American targets to deter US participation. US bases in the Asia-Pacific, Guam, or
Hawaii would be threatened first, and then the US mainland. This raises the
potential cost of American assistance to South Korea far higher than it has ever
been. And it is likely enough to make the United States hesitate before getting
involved.
If President Yoon Suk-yeol returns to power after Trump becomes US President any one of a range of scenarios could play out to restart the war between Pyongyang and Seoul. Clearly, the DPRK’s recent announcement of a formal military alliance with Russia and its historical ‘special relationship’ with China are major factors. China and the DPRK signed a mutual defence treaty in 1961 – notably China’s only formal military alliance. That means the DPRK-Russia-China military bloc presents a triple nuclear threat to South Korea and to the world. Whilst the acquisition of their own nuclear deterrent makes some frightening strategic sense, the very last thing South Koreans need is a belligerent ROK military even thinking about crossing the DMZ border and engaging the North in combat.
On the domestic front, on 4 December 2024, Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong said Australia is “concerned” by the political situation in Seoul. Her spokesperson added that as “a close partner and friend of the Republic of Korea, we hope for a democratic and peaceful resolution for the Korean people”. There has been no official statement since that time. There has also been statements of ‘concern’ but no condemnation by Prime Minister Albanese or Foreign Minister Wong of President Yoon’s declaration of martial law. Nor any statement of relief that the order was withdrawn in the wake of the ROK parliament’s vote to annul it and to impeach Yoon.
Once again, the Australian Government, which styles itself as a “constructive middle power”, sits mute amidst a seismic political upheaval – this one portending nuclear war in our region. This is despite the 1 May 2024 Australia-ROK Comprehensive Strategic Partnership declaration noting “the affinity, mutual respect and strong connections between the peoples of Australia and the ROK”. While the Foreign Minister conducts media-friendly visits to the Korean DMZ to symbolically walk across the North-South border and harshly condemns North Korea’s “destabilising activities”, we do nothing. We wait for Washington to act for us.
Former Ambassador and Departmental Secretary Peter Varghese has recently delivered his report for the Commonwealth’s Independent Review of Funding for Strategic Policy Work. It reveals substantial gaps in coverage of the Australian think tank community. He found that Australia’s “heavy focus on the US alliance means that serious thinking on China, Japan, Indonesia, India and Korea is in short supply”. That finding will surprise few keen observers of Australia’s current foreign policy priorities.
After the Korean War the Australian military remained in Korea as part of the UN multi-national peacekeeping force until 1957. Over 17,000 Australians served during the 1950-53 conflict, of which 340 were killed and some 1,200 wounded. The war resolved nothing. It killed millions of Koreans and reduced the peninsula to ashes. What will Australia do to help prevent an even more apocalyptic conflict from breaking out again in 2025?