As civil war rages, Myanmar is the most fragmented it has been since 1949. Back then, the recently established post-colonial government was beset on all sides, its various detractors challenging its ideology and its composition.
Now, some seven decades later, the ruling regime again has its back to the wall. The last time the government called on the military to save it. This time it is the military that needs saving.
The junta, which came to power in the 2021 coup, now controls less than 40% of the countryside. The various armed anti-junta groups are, however, only in a loose and sometimes internally conflicted alliance. On both sides, the dominant theme is warlordism.
Defined by colonial borders rather than a shared national identity, Myanmar is a patchwork of distinct ethnicities roughly located along the central Irrawaddy Valley and the mountain ranges that hem it from either side. The dominant ethnic Bamar people of the central Irrawaddy, who lent the country its colonial name Burma, had historically waxed and waned in their control of the “frontier areas” which, since independence in 1947, have sought autonomy in their own affairs.
There was a period, immediately after 2015, when it seemed there might be an accommodation between the majority Bamar and the ethnic minorities. But, following the coup, anti-junta National Unity Government with its People’s Defence Force and a swag of armed ethnic groups are now fighting the junta’s forces, even if their alliances are marriages of convenience.
There is tacit agreement between them all that, should the junta be toppled, Myanmar will be reconstituted as a federation of separate states and self-administered zones. The NUG supports reconstituting the state under democratic federalism, with a focus on centralised control. Of the dozens of non-state armed groups, most support a more decentralised model.
While some armed non-state groups closely coordinate, others are in a loose alliance. There are also a number of pro-junta armed ethnic groups, with some changing sides depending on which way the strategic wind is blowing.
Many of the armed non-state groups, on both sides, engage in extra-curricular business, including gem and timber smuggling, internet scam centres – estimated to bring in around $15.3 billion a year, or a quarter of total GDP, and drug production. China has pressured the junta to close the scam centres, operated by the junta’s armed ethnic allies.
Following Myanmar’s post-2015 elections, Myanmar’s military, the Tatmadaw, retained significant political authority. It reserved a quarter of parliamentary seats for military personnel as well as three key ministries; Defence, Border Affairs and Home Affairs.
However, the pace of the political change, from military rule to a largely elected government made many generals nervous. Divisions opened up between the Tatmadaw’s pro-reformers and hardliners. This disunity was highlighted following the military’s 2017 clearance operation against Rohingya Muslims, in which at least 9,000 were killed and almost a million were forced to flee the country.
Inflaming of entho-religious conflict was intended to reassert the military’s central role as “guardian of the state” and hence end further political reform. Disturbingly, the government led by Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, did nothing to limit the anti-Rohingya attacks.
To the extent that the military stepped back from running the country, the electoral process was part of former military dictator Than Shwe’s retirement plan more than genuine democratisation. The shift was, however, uncritically welcomed by the West, while even the NLD-led government seemed to be lulled into a false sense of security. This was despite there being a constitutional provision for the military, under the guise of the National Defence and Security Council, to re-impose military rule at any time and for any reason.
When the military’s plans appeared to be challenged by the overwhelming rejection of its front party in the 2020 election, military commander Min Aung Hlaing and the hard-liners retook power. The force of the subsequent anti-junta uprising and the reinvigoration of armed ethnic groups has, however, left the junta reeling.
Despite the junta being armed by Russia and China, among others, anti-junta forces have since overrun scores of military bases and taken dozens of towns. The junta has been forced to conscript remaining men between 19 and 35, although morale is low and desertions are high.
Despite its failing position, the junta has put its biggest backer, China, off-side. Chinese investment in Myanmar had been growing steadily prior to the democratic period, but stepped up further under the country’s liberalisation.
But, as a result of the coup and civil war, Myanmar’s economy has crashed. Having grown by an average of 6% a year between 2011 and 2019, the coup wiped out most of those gains. Its currency, the kyat, has dropped to a third of its pre-coup value, and one fifth on the black market. Poverty — less than 76 US cents a day — fell from almost half in 2005 to a quarter in 2017, but is now back up to 2005 levels, with a further third of the population classified as “economically insecure”. GDP has dropped from $80 billion before the coup to $62 billion after the coup.
China invested US$2.5 billion just before the coup, totalling (including Hong Kong) US$28.5 billion, but has since held back further major investments. Other major investors have left the country, including France’s TotalEnergies, the US’ Chevron, Australia’s Woodside and ANZ, Norway’s Telenor and Qatar’s Ooredoo telecommunications companies.
With Chinese investments at risk, it is now urging the junta to hold elections. Elections would now only be agreed to if the junta stepped down and allowed their oversight by an interim civilian government.
It appears that only if and when China finally tires of supporting the Tatmadaw, and pressures Russia to do likewise, that this war will end. China is losing patience with the junta, but understands a post-junta environment may produce a different type of chaos.
The National Unity Government has greater legitimacy than the junta, but reconstituting the state will ensure that major challenges will remain even after the current crop of generals has been moved on. For the moment, therefore, China continues to back the devil it knows.
Damien Kingsbury Emeritus Professor at Deakin University and author of The Rise and Decline of Modern Democracy, Routledge, 2023.
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