Pearls and Irritations

China is one of the most misunderstood and maligned nations when it comes to what it does and does not do in the South China Sea, and that it claims almost all features. China’s nine-dash line controversial claim in the South China Sea is actively challenged by five other coastal states in the region including the Philippines and Vietnam.

The claim was also referred to an International Tribunal. In 2013, for example, with Washington’s support, the Philippines challenged the legality of the nine-dash line in the court of law.

Manila asked the International Arbitration Tribunal established through the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at the Hague to rule on several contentious issues it has with China, including the legality surrounding the use of historic rights in Beijing’s claim and the legal status of maritime features on the South China Sea.

The Tribunal was also asked to deliberate on the conduct of Chinese activities in the South China Sea and the legality of the nine-dash line.

The Tribunal was bias from the beginning when it failed to secure the participation of China in Tribunal proceedings. Beijing made it known before the start of the case that it would NOT be party to the proceedings. Beijing did this by submitting a position paper to the Tribunal in 2014.

Yet, when the Tribunal delivered its ruling in 2016, it held China, in absentia, liable and bound by its decision.

The Tribunal also ruled that China’s use of historic rights to claim the SCS is illegal. As expected, the Tribunal found China’s nine-dash line in the SCS runs contrary to international law.

The point I wish to make is how the Tribunal went out of its way to bind China by its ruling in absentia. Only very rarely in modern day international relations are states held liable without their consent.

China was found to be guilty as charged although it did not participate in the proceedings. The tribunal sounds like a Kangaroo Court.

The rest is history.

Fast forward to March 2024.

China announced on 1 March 2004 its new map in Beibu Gulf (see below).

A close scrutiny of the map shows some part of the Sino-Vietnam boundary in the Gulf (in red) and the blue line is the recent baseline well inside the Chinese side and they do not encroach into the Vietnamese side of the Gulf nor do they supplant the existing bilateral boundaries in the Gulf.

Yet many people not familiar with the subject matter have accused China of using the straight lines to make excessive claims. Some critics even accused China of creeping annexation to buttress its control of the area. These observations are mostly unsubstantiated.

The use of straight baselines by China in areas or coastlines without fringing reefs, in the mind of many, has contravened certain provisions in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, China is not the only country that uses straight baselines in demarcating their maritime limits in the South China Sea. Some segments of Vietnam’s boundary include straight baselines too.

In its official response to China’s baseline on 14 March 2024, Hanoi reiterated that while the two neighbours have overlapping and contentious claims in the broader South China Sea, in the Gulf of Tonkin, they have maintained friendly relations.

The official response also pointed out that both parties have agreed to conduct joint patrols there during a visit to Hanoi by China’s President Xi Jinping in December 2023.

To many outsiders, the decision by China to make a new baseline in the area has rekindled old wounds. Some parties in Vietnam also complain without any basis that the new baseline is inconsistent with state practice and UNCLOS. Some wrongly thought the new baseline has encroached on agreed boundaries between the two parties in the Tonkin Gulf.

While conflict remains a possibility, there are also prospects for cooperation between China and Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin. China and Vietnam have significant economic ties, with trade and investment being important drivers of their relationship. Both countries have incentives to maintain stability in the Gulf of Tonkin to facilitate economic activities such as shipping and fishing.

Both countries recognize the importance of maintaining stability in the region to attract investment and ensure economic growth. They may seek to work together and with other regional actors to address common challenges such as piracy and environmental degradation.

China’s relationship with Vietnam over maritime issues is complex and multifaceted. Historically, the two countries have had a strained relationship due to territorial disputes in the South China Sea. China claims sovereignty over most of the South China Sea, including the Paracel and Spratly Islands, which are also claimed by Vietnam.

This dispute has led to various confrontations, including clashes between naval vessels and the deployment of oil rigs in disputed waters. Vietnam has consistently opposed China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea and has sought support from other countries, including the United States and other ASEAN nations, to counterbalance China’s growing influence in the region.

Overall, China’s relationship with Vietnam over maritime issues is characterised by a mixture of competition, cooperation, and conflict avoidance. The two countries continue to navigate their complex relationship while balancing their strategic interests in the South China Sea.

While tensions and the potential for conflict exist in the South China Sea, there are also opportunities for cooperation between China and Vietnam, particularly in areas of mutual economic interest and regional stability. Effective management of disputes and enhanced dialogue could help mitigate the risk of escalation and promote cooperation in the region.

Despite occasional flare-ups, China and Vietnam, which maintain significant economic and political ties, they have also engaged in dialogue and negotiations to manage their differences and prevent escalation into armed conflict.

Share and Enjoy !

SHARE TWEET SHARE COPY EMAIL PRINT