For decades, Palestinians forgot a crucial mission. Focused on Western audiences and outflanked by an increasingly sophisticated Israel hasbara machine, they failed to settle in the hearts and minds of Gulf Arabs

An Emirati man looks walks past a sign welcoming guests to a signing ceremony between the UAE and Israeli football associations. Dubai, December 14, 2020.KARIM SAHIB - AFP

Plenty of reasons have been offered for the breathtaking speed and scope of recent normalization agreements between Arab states and Israeland without a_quid pro quo_in the form of Israels recognition of a Palestinian state.

Among the factors cited for the enthusiasm demonstrated by the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and now Morocco are: securing advancedU.S. weaponry; sharing intelligence on Iran, keeping tags on the geopolitical ambitions of TurkeysRecep Tayyip Erdoganand the Muslim Brothers, locking in TeamBiden, and halting the impendingannexationof the West Bank.

All they had to do, in exchange, was to throw thePalestiniansunder the metaphorical bus.

Recognizing that Donald Trump was likely to lose the 2020 elections added fuel to their fervor. They knew there would never be a more sympathetic figure in the White House, sharing their world view not just on Iran, but on the (to them redundant) issues of democracy and human rights.

Trump did not care about these issues. He was a businessman and a man who idolized authoritarian leaders. In their eyes he was their perfect American president.

More than that, youd be forgiven for thinking that the normalization wave was one of those rare moments of regional unanimity, and of perfect synchrony between rulers and ruled.

After all, the media is full of heartwarmingstoriesof newly-minted business deals and delegations between Israel and theUAEin particular. And the UAE is thekey playerin the whole affair. Every single country that has recognized Israel has been uniquelyvulnerableto diplomatic pressure from the Emirates.

But the Palestinian cause is still an emotional issue in the Arab world; it cannot be calculated in hard currency. Recent sharpcommentsby Prince Turki al-Faisal, who led Saudi intelligence for more than two decades and served as ambassador to the U.S. and UK, laid bare that divisions still exist in the Arab world on the question of normalizing relations with Israel.

Speaking at a conference in Bahrain, Prince Turki insisted that any normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel canonly happenalongside a lasting peace deal involving atwo-state solutionto the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

But the pushback has been overwhelmed by the sickly-sweet PR. How has this been possible? How have Palestinian national rights, an issue once so firmly rooted in the Arab consensus, been shunted off to official oblivion so quickly and easily?

Its all about the narrative. In this case, its about Israel and its new allies mastering the message about normalization, their efforts tochange Gulf attitudestowards the Palestinians and the Palestinians apparent tragic failure to root their narrative more deeply in the Gulf.

Empathy for the plight of the Palestinians appears to have weakened amongst some Gulf elites. Or, at least, this is what Israeli hasbara or public diplomacywants youto believe.

The younger generation of Arabs barely remember the first or second Palestinian intifadas, let alone the heyday of Arab nationalism. For this generation, colonialism is something they read about in books.

That is a weak spot that hasbara efforts zoomed in on. The IDF, the Israeli foreign ministry and pro-Israel groups like the American Jewish Committee, have all pivoted over the last couple of years totargetthis younger generation, pushing Arabic-language social media to change the narrative about Israel.

This is not the case with Prince Turki, who is 75 years old, and who remembers those days well. It was not by accident that in his Bahrain speech he called Israel “the last of the Western colonizing powers in the Middle East.”

The trouble is that beyond Israeli hasbara and Arab state media we dont really know in depth what popular opinion in the Gulf really thinks about the deals. But theresenough evidenceto induce skepticism that grassroots Arab views back the normalization train.

It is not by chance that the Arab states that recognized Israel in contravention of the Arab Peace Initiative are ruled by authoritarian leaders where there islittle spacefor civil society to openly criticize them. Where information about Arab public opinion is available, it demonstrates that there remains widespreadsympathyfor the Palestinians, or at least opposition to normalization before the creation of a Palestinian state.

Comparative politics researcher and professor Dana el Kurd has pointed toresearchby the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, for example, which showed that in Saudi Arabia, only 6 percent of those polled support diplomatic recognition of Israel. In Kuwait, 88 percent of the sample rejected such recognition, with 10 percent in favor. In Qatar, 88 percent also rejected recognition.

The UAE and Bahrain were not included in the survey, but el Kurd explained that Emirati phone numbers “received government WhatsApp messages before the [normalization] announcement, a warning that opposing official policy wasnot permitted.”

In Bahrain, where despite the repressive government, social media users still speak out more than their UAE and Saudi peers, there have been energeticanti-normalization campaignsonline and by civil society organizations.

When I asked an Arab friend what his colleagues in the UAE thought about normalization, he told me that he hadnt even bothered to ask them because “they wouldnt say much in case theyre being surveilled.” He explained that a lot of his friends wont speak up because they “have all their business and money tied up there” and dissent risks deportation.

Although there isnt firm data about Gulf responses to the reality of normalization, a sophisticated media campaign to make normalization more palatable to the Arab world has been going on for some time, even predating the Arab Spring. That concerted effort has now goneinto overdrive.

To draw the point home, let me recall two anecdotes.

The first was at a dinner party I attended in the home of Professor Walid Khalidi in Cambridge, Massachusetts, just over a decade ago, when the eminent Palestinian historian told me that hed stopped writingop-eds in English language newspapers as he was more concerned about correcting misapprehensions about the Palestine issue in the Arab press.

He was worried that the Palestinians had neglected the Arab world, and a new generation there was increasingly unfamiliar with the details of the Arab-Israeli conflict. I think hisprescientfears have now come true.

The Palestinian leadership has consistently focused on Western capitals and neglected their regional backyard, not just in terms of focus but message, too. One size does not fit all. The narrative that works in DC doesnt necessarily work in Dubai.

Anti-colonial discourse about self-determination and human rights may play well on progressive university campuses and some television networks, but itdoes not workeverywhere.In Gulf states, where individual and minority rights are severely restricted, it is no longer obvious why they should support Palestine.

And the trope of Israel as the last bastion of European colonialism in the Middle East is a hard sell when, for years, Israel has successfully re-branded itself as the ultimate “start-up nation,” a country toemulatenot least foroil-receding Gulf economies.

The second anecdote is more recent. Another Arab friend whod recently moved to Singapore from the Gulf told me while she was in Dubai shed signed up to the email list for Daniel PipesMiddle East Forum,thinking that it was a balanced think tank on Middle East issues.

To any informed observer, and any Palestinian worth their salt, the Middle East Forum (whosestated missionis to protect “Western values from Middle Eastern threats”) couldhardlybedescribedas “balanced.”

But Pipes has, almost incredibly,succeeded (together with likeminded groups) in establishing a foothold and following in the Arab world, an area that Palestinian activists have neglected.

Only when, last year, my friendreceived an emailfrom the Forumcallingfor donations for “Israels Victory project” didthe alarm bells start ringing. Sheinsisted I watch theaccompanyingvideo which offered the thesisthat the conflict would only end “when the Palestiniansgive up.”

Shed been pulled into a false sense of Pipes “moderation,” just as Gulf Arabs have been. They are far less_au fait_with the conflict than Palestinians necessarily are. They cannot detect the nuances and biases advanced by groups whose agendas appear to be reasonable, until theyrip off the maskwith initiatives like “Israels Victory Project.”

The influence of Israeli hasbara in the Arab world is not just the result of a failure of Palestinian strategy, but also, it would appear, the success of Israeli hasbara in shaping the way some Gulf elites view the Israel-Palestine conflict.

It has become sophisticated, amplifying Israels message on social media throughstate-backedTwitterinfluencersand even abotnetworkoperated by sources in the UAE.

It is also appears as a form of elite socializing: the chumminess that comes from discrete dinners, think tank discussions, and of the prevalent pro-Israel tone of much of popular media and entertainment, fromCNNto Fox News, HollywoodtoNetflix.

That constant distortion of how we read reality, privileging Israels narrative over the Palestinians, now has real world consequences. And Gulfpoliticians and business leadershave recently demonstrated how deep that dissonance goes.

ConsiderTrumpsso-called “Deal of the Century,” which was written in such a way that no Palestinian leader could ever accept it. The plan literally crossed every single Palestinian red line.

No Arab familiar with the geography of Jerusalem(unless “familiarity” means Google maps)could genuinely believe that a Palestinian capital could be established in Abu Disandinclude thesitessacred to Palestinian Muslims and Christians in or near Jerusalems Old City, from which itsseparated by an eight-meter-high concrete wall and the Mount of Olives.

The same standard of ignorance applies for how the Plan legitimizesIsraeli settlements, annexing the Jordan Valley, and potentially stripping Israeli citizenship from tens of thousands of Arab Israelis who live intenborder towns.

Yet the Emirati and Bahraini ambassadors had no qualms about endorsingit.Sensibly, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan, more familiar with the situationon the ground,refusedto attendthe Plans White House launch.

Whena UAE business delegationrecently visitedthe Al-Aqsa Mosque they werechased outby angry Palestinian worshippers. The Palestinians had good reason to be upset, beyond their perception of Emirati treachery, and again, it rests on Gulf ignorance, or indifference. Arab VIPshave a specific entrance,the Tribes Gate,manned by the Waqf; there arenineothergatesforMuslim worshipers.

But the UAE delegationaccessed the Mosque compound,accompaniedby Israeli police through the one gateset aside for non-Muslims,administered by Israel andthe cause ofmuch frictionbetween Israel and Jordan.Perhapsthe UAE delegation wasmisledby their Israeli hosts, but they should have done their homework. Jerusalem, despite appearances, remains an occupied city.Most Palestinians, including those in Gaza and the West Bank, cannotvisitthe sanctuary.

Perhaps the most bizarreGulferror of judgement waswhenBahrains Minister of Tradestated the kingdom would makeno distinctionbetweenimportingproducts produced in Israel orfrom settlements inthe occupied West Bank and Golan Heights.It was a major faux pas, which led to Manamaretractingthe statement.

Theres no need to accuse the Bahrainis of malicewhen its so patently clear thatsome Gulf leaders do not really know what they are doing.

But by far the most unfortunate consequence of normalization is how it is legitimizing the Israeli Right. Consider the sheer number ofright-wing journalistsand settler groups that are flocking to Dubai inrecord numbers.

Then there are the shady business deals, not forgettingthe UAEroyal whoboughta stakeinIsraels most racist, right-wing football club,Beitar Jerusalem,infamous for itsrefusalto hire Arab players. It is, needless to say,galling that normalization isburnishing the prestige ofone of the most dishonest leaders in Israels history. Whatever you may think of their politics, Netanyahu is no Yitzhak Rabin or Menachem Begin.They at leasthad integrity.

I am all in favor of “normalization,” if normalizationmeansthe establishment of two independent states living in peace between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, very much in the spirit ofthe Arab Peace Initiative that SaudisPrince Turki invoked.

At the same time, the Palestinians need to recognize how far their message has failed to “settle” in Arab Gulf hearts, especially in their ruling elites,since before the Arab Spring.

Its incumbent on the Palestinians to redouble efforts to build a coalition one that does not replicate the existing divisions in the Arab world of those governments committed to a fair resolution of the conflict, and to find a way to “sell” their cause that appeals to younger Arab generations, beyond the Wests often receptive younger audiences.

Thats essential, because even if theyve been outmanoeuvered by Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi, theres no way Palestinians will ever sit back and accept the Greater Israel project, or “give up” in the face of Israeli and Gulf triumphalism.

_Victor Kattan_is a Senior Research Fellow at the School of Law at the University of Nottingham. He is also an Advisor forAl Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy Network. He was previously a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute at the National University of Singapore and an Associate Fellow at the School of Law.Twitter:@VictorKattan

https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/.premium-israel-s-gulf-coup-how-palestinians-lost-their-arab-allies-1.9388131