‘Joe Biden allows Ukraine to use long-range US-supplied ATACMS missiles on targets in Russia, prompting threat of world war’ – so runs the ABC headline of 18 November. Serious stuff, not to be lightly discounted, and yet perhaps what we are seeing is primarily performative politics, viewed through the smoke of uncertainty and reflected in the distorting mirrors of propaganda. In short, whilst the consequences could not be more dangerous, when we unpack the narrative, it seems that, at the moment at least, the situation is not so critical as it might appear.
At the time of writing (20 November) there has been no official statement from Putin and Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov did not threaten fire and brimstone but merely said that the decision ‘if confirmed, indicate[s] a dramatic escalation of the conflict’. The official news agency, TASS, in its English-language review of the Russian press (18 November) gives the lead to an article in Izvestia on the Biden decision, but in a clutch of five, ending with one about Europe’s gas prices doubling this (Northern) winter: ‘Biden OKs long-range missile use as backlash to Scholz’s Putin call grows’. So, no panic from Russia.
The Izvestia article is in Russian, and the machine translation to hand is very clunky, but as TASS comments, it frames Biden’s action in terms of domestic politics:
Experts believe the outgoing US administration is seeking to escalate tensions as much as possible before US President-elect Donald Trump assumes office.
Incumbent US President Joe Biden wants to place Trump in a no-win situation, American historian and former Harvard University professor Vladimir Brovkin said. “America may be dragged into a war, and Trump will have to deal with the trouble that Biden started’.
It is true that American foreign policy is very much an extension of domestic politics, much more so than that of other countries, but the situation is more nuanced than Brovkin suggests, because it is unlikely that Biden wants to be saddled with dragging the US into a war on his watch. If the war turns out badly for America, then he gets the blame but if Trump somehow is seen to win, then it is he who gets the praise. So it is probable that it is more a rhetorical escalation than a substantive one, and the available facts bear this out. The ramifications are well discusses by the informed and astute former senior Pentagon official Stephen Bryen.
The ostensible reason for the authorisation, according to the ABC article by Riley Stuart, is those North Korean troops we’ve been hearing so much about:
Biden’s decision comes shortly after it was revealed North Korean troops had been sent to bolster Vladimir Putin’s forces……
In recent months, Russia has been making steady ground against Ukraine’s forces, although its military is sustaining massive losses.
In a surprise counterpunch, however, Ukrainian forces captured a swathe of Russian territory earlier this year when they stormed over the border and into the Kursk region.
Putin’s army, with the help of North Korean reinforcements, have been attempting to retake that in the months since.
This is a frequent argument but is wrong on the key points. The Russians are not sustaining massive losses for a number of reasons. They have overwhelming superiority in firepower and are fighting a war of attrition, focusing on inflicting maximum losses on the enemy while minimising their own, relegating territory to a subordinate objective. The Ukrainians, on the other hand, despite a shortage of weapons and ammunition, need to take or retain territory to satisfy their foreign patrons, and that involves disproportionate losses, 30,000 so far in Kursk alone according to credible reports. The Russians are moving slowly in Kursk not because they are suffering massive casualties and are so short of troops that they need reinforcement from North Korea, but because they are minimising their own casualties and taking advantage of the enemy’s vulnerability. The Ukrainians have not had ten years to build defensive positions there as they have had in the Donbass.
And then there are the probably mythical North Korean troops, for which after a month of claims there is no evidence -plenty of assertions (the Pentagon ones being heavily qualified with words such as ‘likely’ and ‘expectation’), lots of fake news but so far no hard evidence.
And, as if to underscore the hollowness of the claim it turns out that the first ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) strike after Biden’s decision was at an ammunition depot in Bryansk and not, after all, in Kursk, where the supposed North Korean troops pose such a threat.
The ATACMS themselves have a certain mythical quality in this context. For one thing, as Riley Stuart admits, the Russians have moved military assets, such as the aircraft that launch the devastating glide bombs, out of range. The ATACMS, being land-launched are susceptible to airstrikes as well as being vulnerable after launch to Russian air defence. And there are not many anyway. As the Washington Post puts it:
Biden administration officials note that Ukraine has very limited stocks of ATACMS. Russia has shown that it has a significant shoot-down capability, and the Pentagon, whose own missile supply is dwindling, says it does not have many more to give without affecting U.S. readiness. [emphasis added]
The word ‘limited’ appears frequently in this article:
The Biden administration will allow Kyiv limited use of ATACMS to strike enemy positions in Russia, according to senior U.S. officials…..
A second U.S. official said that Biden’s approval of ATACMS “is going to have a very specific and limited effect” on the battlefield, designed to limit concerns about escalation. [emphasis added]
A mythical sword to slay a mythical dragon?
Myths often express deeper meanings. The key issue with ATACMS (and Storm Shadow cruise missiles, etc) is that they require direct NATO involvement in operational targeting. And that, as Putin has quietly but forcefully said, would require an appropriate Russian response. That might be asymmetrical – the rapid development of the Houthi’s ballistic missile capability used against Israel-bound shipping in the Red Sea and the US-led navies protecting it that the Pentagon finds so ‘scary’ might well be an example. Or there might be direct retaliation against a NATO airbase. There are so many possibilities that might lead further up the escalatory ladder. But Putin carefully used the word ‘appropriate’ and it is he who decides what that might be. He clearly does not want a war with NATO, and he might well be waiting for the incoming Trump administration. Trump will find negotiations much more difficult than his narcissism anticipates, and he might escalate out of chagrin, but Putin is a cautious strategist and he is unlikely to foreclose on the possibility he may agree to an acceptable deal.
The major driver behind this push for deep strike authorisation is the effort of the Zelensky regime, facing collapse on the battlefield and an energy-starved winter, to drag the US, under Biden or under Trump, into direct involvement in the war because that is seen as the only way to stave off disaster. That road, of course, may well lead to World War III. However, the Biden administration is aware of this (although there are contesting factions within it) and it does seem, if one reads carefully, the Pentagon is adamantly opposed. Its stockpiles are depleted, it cannot recruit personnel, has problems maintaining its ships, its wunderwaffe don’t perform too well, and Pete Hegseth is just around the corner.
This may well be a case where the US cavalry is coming to the rescue, though not in the way that John Wayne played it.
Faced with pressure from Kyiv, and opposition from the Pentagon, Joe Biden is playing performative politics, staging a piece of theatre to give the impression of forceful action but actually just blundering along to little effect. Dangerous stuff, but perhaps -hopefully- not quite so dangerous as appears at first sight.
Tim Beal Author, Researcher, Educator; Asia specialist
Tim is a retired NZ academic who has written extensively on Asia, with a focus on Northeast Asia. He also has an interest in imperialism, again mainly in respect of Asia but recently, also inevitably encompassing Europe
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