Simon and Garfunkel sangof the dangers of the sound of silence. But in Australian Foreign Policy, we need more of it.

This reflection came to mind on Friday withthe news of an alleged snub of Australiaby India when the latter declined to accept Australia in the Malabar naval exercise involving India, Japanand the United states–our partners in the proposed Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). Reportedly India took thisposition to avoidirritating China ontheeveof this weekend’s summit between Indian PM Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Actually it was notmuch of a snub. Malabar has been going for years and we have never been in it. But our omission raises questions about the viability of the Quad as a strategic tool.

There have always been different views in New Delhi about the merits of the Quad because India tooseeks balanceinitsdealings with China and because some in Indiaseethe Quad as inconsistent with India’s doctrine of Strategic Autonomy.

A furtherconcern inJapan and India in the past about the Quad was alsowhether Australia wouldhave the stamina for it given our earliervacillation on itand givenour economic dependence on China. India’sconcern may now be asmuch about excessive Australianzeal.

But the issue also raises wider questions about our Asia Pacificpolicies.

In discussing our regional security, our Foreign Policy White Paper advocated three central objectives: broadening and deepening our alliance cooperation withthe United States; strong and constructive ties with China;and interms of achieving abalance inthe region favourable to our interests, working with the major democracies notably Japan , India,Indonesia and South Korea .

We are doubtlessdeepeningour alliance cooperation withthe United states, albeit that America’s policies towards theregionare jagged and some American actions, particularly on trade, are notin our interest.

Our relationship with China has deteriorated .While for this Chinamust share much - maybe most - of the blame, we need to do something about it.

In working with the major regionaldemocracies, we havedone reasonably well.Butwe should think more closely about how the conduct of our relationships with the United States and Chinadovetails withour dealings withthe rest of theregion.

Our relationship with the United States isa factor in facilitating United States strategic engagement inthe Asia Pacific.Most countries, China excepted,favour this. So while our anxiety to please Washington tends to portrayus as an American proxy,ANZUS itself is a netplus for our regionaldealings.

However regionalcountries are also seeking to construct relationships with China which aremultifaceted, nuanced and flexible. Most are profoundly impacted by China and have an existential interest in getting their relationships with it right. China’s economic clout isself-evident.India and Japan have irredentist issues with China. Formost ASEAN nations Chinais crucially important because of its size,propinquity and the existence of influential Chinese diasporas.

So while regional countries may welcome Australia as afriend,they may notwelcome too close a visible association with us on China policy while our relationship with China is so obviously inthe doldrums.

If that judgement is valid now, it will be the more so if the major players in theregion and China increasinglyseek a measure of mutual accomodation.

There are signs of this happening in India’s case asevidenced by Modi’s reportedly positive meeting with Xi this past weekend.

China and Japan are alsoexploring the possibilities of a more constructive relationship. Both countries are under the pump from the Americans on trade and Japan has felt out of the loop on North Korea. Japanese Foreign Minister Kono has spent alot of time withhis Chinese counterpart Wang Li. The latter recently made the first official bilateralforeign ministerial visit to Japan in eightyears. There is talk of an Abe/Xi summit.

Moreoverin the longer term, apost Abe dispensation in Japan may want to take a significantly moreaccomodating approachtowards China. Abe is after all at the nationalist end of theJapanese political spectrum and such shifts in Japanese Chinapolicy have happened before.

What then shouldwe do?

There are nosensible arguments for Australia declining to be clear with China about where our national interest lie and where China traduces those interests. So we may have to just put up with some difficult times.But there are arguments for alessnoisy approach if we arenotleft likeashag on arockon China policy-both interms of our dealings with China perse and interms of our wider dealings in theAsia Pacific.

In the South China Sea, Australia should go where it is entitled to go according to its national requirements and consistent withinternational law. But there is little merit in grandiloquent Freedom of Navigation exerciseswiththe Americans designed to show the Chinese who’s boss. Fortunately we seem to be avoiding such gestures.

If the Chinese offend by interfering in our political processes or engage in cyber warfare, we should oppose this in calibrated ways, considering what is best said privately and what requires public remonstration. We shouldnot unnecessarilygivethe Chinese ammunition to accuse us as they have of “systemic,irresponsible and negative” remarks EG: frequent adversecomments on Chinaat primeministerial level; statementsby ministers critical ofChinese aid to the South Pacific; or attributable briefing to media by ministers’ offices about the benefits of Britainand France countering Chinese influence in theregion.

In our diplomacy generally, we would do well to follow Teddy Roosevelt’s advice about speaking softly, all the more so because unlike the United States, we do not carry abig stick–and everyone knows it . If we follow such advice, we maybe listened to more, including by China.

John McCarthy has served as Australian Ambassador to Vietnam, Mexico, Thailand, USA, Indonesia, Japan and High Commissioner to India.