One response from a colleague to the contentious proposal by Professor Hugh White in his newbook How to Defend Australia that the government should seriously consider adopting a nuclearcapability was the brief Oh, for Gods Sake!. Underpinning such a comment is the prospect of thekind of dystopian nightmare that stalked the Wests Cold War MAD (mutually-assured destruction)containment doctrine. As Russias President Putin, among others, has suggested tersely, in a 21stcentury nuclear war no one would survive.

Professor White is no doubt one of the Australian National Universitys most eminent, influentialfigures in defence and strategic studies. What is at issue in his brave proposal is Australias need fora strategic, upgraded defence _posture_in which, of sad necessity, we join the international league ofcountries with nuclear arsenals. According to figures from the Stockholm International PeaceResearch Institute, whose mission statement is to catalogue and campaign against furtherproliferation, nine countries currently have developed such capabilities. These include the US, theUK, France, India, China, Pakistan, Russia, Israel and more alarmingly North Korea. In terms ofexpenditure on the development of advanced high-tech nuclear weaponry, top of the list by a verylarge margin is the US.

Given the vagaries of relations between states, Professor White has an oft repeated view thatduring the coming century or even decades America may, is likely to, or very likely to, or indeedwill almost certainly, prove to be an unreliable ally. More specifically, in any regional conflict inwhich China would loom large, the US cannot be counted on to back Australia. For White, the implication here is that having our own independent nuclear weaponry helps to ensure we arecredible participants in the great global zero-sum game of threat and counter threat. Moreoverreviewing our defence capability right now is a matter of urgency.

This last suggestion may well be good advice. As a matter of pragmatics, there is much about Professor Whites perspectives that invites serious challenge.

Firstly, there is the overriding issue of whether commitment to a nuclear arsenal would make a blind bit of difference to either our short or our long-term national security. Despite the occasional burstof shirtfronting, nationalistic, tough talk, Australia is a small to middle level power on the south-eastern periphery of Asia which since first white settlement has been integrally dependent on greatand powerful friends. For more than seventy years this has entailed commitment to the USdomination of the Western Alliance. Among other things this has meant America has profitedenormously from supplying Australia with a good swag of the countrys current non-nuclearweaponry an arrangement that has included lucrative, US-controlled maintenance contracts.

The question here too is whether America will be the best in the business when it comes to newgeneration high tech nuclear weapons. With the accelerating sophistication of Fourth IndustrialRevolution weapon technologies, there has been accompanying rapid rate of obsolescence.Professor Whites strategic planning of what he argues is an effective Australian defence force forthe late twenty-first century thus acquires the aura of an overweening belief in ones prescience.

This concern is currently reflected, for example, in assessments in Canberras defence circles of thepractical benefits of Australias purchase of the multi-billion dollar American-manufactured F35 JointStrike Fighters. The Australian government ordered seventy of them seventeen years ago, only fourof which have so far been delivered, and about which apprehension has been expressed that they may be obsolescent in around fifteen years.

A worst-case scenario is that, even with a nuclear arsenal, the mind-boggling 3.5-4% budgetdefence allocation advocated by Professor White provides no guarantee that Australia wont turn out to be deemed a dispensable pawn in the great games of considerably bigger powers of whatevernew world order. Or indeed whether such an allegedly independent defence posture might ensurethat unparalleled destruction is rained down upon the country - with its immense, heart-wrenchingcost in blood and treasure.

Secondly, there is the issue which has been constantly raised by Professor White over the years ofthe inevitability of Australias being forced to choose between increased engagement with itsregional neighbours and its US Alliance. A prevalent response to this has been that, as a matter ofworldly, agile foreign policy, the country should strive never to make such a choice. Though limited,here the tools of the trade are all the measures short of war. These include constant high-leveldiplomatic engagement in all directions, cultivation of back channels, cultural and educationalinterchanges and aid projects, humanitarian help by defence forces in natural and human disasters,strong participation in the institutions that support and foster global governance, and themaintenance of the hopeful determination in an imperfect world that these institutions have a roleto play in diffusing regional conflicts. Then there is the diplomatic embrace of economic multilateralism, in which trade and investment might enhance positive global engagement. Finally, it should be noted that, beyond a propensity to give lingering insult to the Chinese and Russiangovernments, these are all initiatives in which Australia is an abiding participant. After that, perhaps what is needed is simple good luck.

Thirdly, there is the apparent assumption behind Professor Whites views that with the revisedbalancing of the countrys naval, air and army capabilities and with the addition of a nuclearweaponry, the country is unarguably defendable. The likely perpetrator of a regional war, he suggests, could be China, though in a more generalised way a rising, militant Asia could be a problemmeriting his recommendations for new strategic planning. The counter argument is that, as an island, Australias porous borders and expanses of desolate terrain, combined with Asias hugewealth and population, entail severe constraints on the countrys defendability.

Imagine, so an alternative satirical vision goes, a much preferable, certainly less expensive strategy,inspired by Russias centuries old approach of tactical retreat in the face of a foreign invasion. Theextreme drought, crippling heat and the occasional dust storm would not be propitious for anattack on Australia by the Chinese Red Peril. Add to the unfortunate geography an overpopulationof crocodiles and the worlds most venomous snakes, and an Asian victory might prove hard to comeby.

By Dr Dorothy Horsfield, Foundation Fellow in contemporary Russian studies, Australian National Universitys Australian Studies Institute, 29/07/32019