With the relationship between Australia and China now in a stalemate with the possibility it could get worse, leading local protagonists have taken to telling a story of how things came to be. But its in no small part a self-serving tale, seemingly designed to deflect having to take some responsibility.

The starting point to be clear on is that as former senior Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan has observed, Australias foreign policy challenge of having to manage a large economic relationship with China alongside a deep strategic and security relationship with the US isnt unusual. Many countries, including Japan, India, Thailand, and the Philippines to name just a few, similarly must balance such interests.

The next point to recognise is that Canberra isnt alone in having serious differences with Beijing. Indeed, the divisions between China and Tokyo, New Delhi, and many other capitals are even more acute. Yet despite this, it is Australia that is an outlier in having no senior-level political dialogue with China, in addition to the array of trade punishments it is being hit with. This raises obvious questions about whether in the face of Chinas undoubted capacity for hypocrisy and bad behaviour, Australia got its strategy for handling the relationship right.

Former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, who was at the helm when the relationship with China began its downward spiral,wrote recently that the Chinese strategy was to isolate Australia from its allies. He further assessed that at the same time as Australia was being disciplined, Beijing sought to get closer to Japan and the United States.This implies that the severing of political dialogue and trade strikes that now mark Australia as an outlier was not of its own making. Turnbulls remarks instead argue Chinese strategists had settled on isolating Australia and that was that. This aligns with Prime Minister Morrisons more recentclaimthat Australia has done nothing to injure [the] partnership [with China], nothing at all.

However, this version of events comes up short. First, it ignores occasions when arresting the decline, and potentially even turning the corner to a positive relationship trajectory, was within reach prior to the dramatic negative step-change in 2020.

On August 7 2018, just two weeks before he was deposed as prime minister, Turnbull delivered what Phillip Coorey, the_Australian Financial Review_s Chief Political Correspondent,describedas a China reset speech. Coorey noted it was carefully written and planned to address an invited audience, which included Chinas ambassador and consul-general to Sydney. Inrespondingto Turnbulls intervention, which had praised Chinas economic reforms and the benefits of bilateral ties, the Chinese foreign ministry said it had noted and commended these positive remarks.

On August 23 2018, the Australian governmentbannedChinese tech company Huawei from participating in the countrys 5G rollout. At the time, Scott Morrison took responsibility for the decision, then in the position of treasurer and acting minister for home affairs. When he subsequently emerged as prime minister, Beijing still extended an invitation to his new minister for foreign affairs, Marise Payne, tovisit Chinain early November 2018 for the 5thAustralia-China Foreign and Strategic Dialogue. Paynes predecessor Julie Bishopwentthe last two and a half years of her tenure without setting foot there. As well, ayear later, Chinese Premier Li Keqiangmet Morrison for an annual leaders meeting on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit in Bangkok. Such moves are hard to square with a settled strategy of isolating Australia.

Second, the idea that Australias outlier status was inevitable ignores a series of national diplomatic choices over a period of years that were guaranteed to make China less willing to cooperate with Australia, while providing no offsetting national interest benefit.These included Bishops needlessly provocativeFullerton Lecturein Singapore in March 2017, in which after singling China out as a non-democracy, she then contended that democracy and democratic institutions are essential for nations if they are to reach their economic potential.

Then there were Turnbulls inflammatory remarks made while introducing new foreign interference legislation in December that year. Delivered in Mandarin, Turnbull assertedthat the Australian people had stood up, just as Mao Zedong said the Chinese people had done at the formation of the Peoples Republic in 1949 following a century of foreign occupation and humiliation. As well, rather than pressing the point that the laws were intended to be country-agnostic, Turnbull chose to justify their passage bycitingdisturbing reports about Chinese influence.

Australias diplomatic positioning hasnt only involved loose rhetoric. For instance,The Wall Street Journalreportedthat in recent years, Australian diplomats have crisscrossed Europe connecting China critics in smaller nations with counterparts elsewhere, adding that these efforts had buttressed similar ones by Washington.

Third, even if other countries such as Japan were the subject of Beijings overtures, they also proactively took steps to maintain a balanced relationship with China. Tokyos approach to China, by contrast to Australias, has been anchored in careful, consistent, and clear diplomacy. Former Australian ambassador to Tokyo John McCarthyassessedthat, The Japanese are careful about the tone and context of public statements about China, and the company in which these are made.This can be illustrated in the fact Japan has sought to find areas where partnerships with China could be forged, even while retaining misgivings.

On Chinas Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Tokyo University professor Asei Itosaysthat Japan moved from non-participation prior to 2016 to conditional engagement afterwards. Ito further assessed Japan demonstrated a willingness to work with China on projects in third countries. On a state visit to China in October 2018, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and President Xi Jinpingannounced50 joint infrastructure initiatives in partnership with China.

On the other hand, Australia appears to have moved from conditional engagement, signing a memorandum of understanding with China on cooperating in third countries in 2017, to non-participation. This can be reflected in the prime ministers declarationin June last year that the BRI was a programme Australian foreign policy doesnt recognise, with it not being in Australias national interests. This turn has extended as far as threatening to tear up a non-binding agreement on BRI cooperation signed by the Victorian government.

That ties between Tokyo and Beijing are now experiencingstraindoes not change the facts of Australias China policy since 2016. Abbreviated accounts of how Australia-China relations came to be in such a parlous state wont fool China. And in the long run, they wont serve Australias interests either.

This article has been republished under a Creative Commons license from the _Australian Institute of International Affairs_24 March 2021. Click here to read the original article.